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PREFACE
The study of the formation of the Czechoslovak 
State, following World War I, has proved most rewarding 
No new Nation, arising out of the remnants of the once- 
great Habsburg Empire, achieved its independence in a 
more interesting manner*
I wish to express my appreciation to Dr* A* Stan 
ley Trickett, who patiently guided the study tp its 
completion, and to my wife, Mary, for her great under­
standing and assistance.
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CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND? A NATION IS SUBMERGED
The history of the Czecho-Slovak nation is a proud 
one. During the long course of time it records how a nomad­
ic Slav tribe developed into a modern-day nation of culture 
and industry, and yet one which retains many characteristics 
of a nation of another era.
Basically, the Czechs and Slovaks both spring from 
the same racial and linguistic background, but they have 
experienced a different history. The Czechs (Bohemians and 
Moravians) developed largely under their own leadership, 
either Independently or-under the:Habsburg Crown; while the 
Slovaks very early came under the domination of the Magyars 
of Hungary and long were held in subjugation by that and 
other groups of Asiatic background.
The rapid advance of the Turks into Europe early in 
the Sixteenth Century, under the great Ottoman ruler, 
Suleiman the Magnificent, caused consternation among the 
Christian nations. Much of Hungary was overrun, and with 
the death, at the Battle of Mohacs on August 28, 1 $;26, of 
King Louis Jagellon, who occupied both the Hungarian and 
Bohemian thrones, the Estates of Austria, Hungary and 
Bohemia united, in a free federation. Ferdinand, Archduke 
of Austria and Louis® brother*In«law, was chosen to unite 
the forces of the three embattled states and with them 
resist the advance of the Moslems.
2Under terms of the federation, each of the three in­
dependent states, bound together solely through the person 
of the monarch, was to retain its sovereignty unimpaired*
As the Moslem drive lost its vigor and Christian forces be­
gan the long struggle to drive the Turks out of Europe, 
however, the Bohemian State was even more closely linked 
with Habsburg interests, until, during Ferdinand II*s re­
gime, unwilling to accept his religious aims regarding 
Catholicism and centralization of power, the Czechs rebel­
led in 16X8, deposed the Habsburgs, and chose Frederick ofthe 
Palatinate as King of Bohemia*
The Czech struggle for independence began when the 
Bohemia nobles, defending their feudal rights and their 
Protestant religion, literally threw the royal officers out 
of the windows of Hradcany Castle on May 23, 1618, in the 
famous "defenestration of Prague*" This event culminated 
the efforts of Ferdinand, an ardent Catholic, to decrease 
Bohemian rights earlier granted in the so-called Ma.lestats- 
brief (Letter of Majesty) issued by Rudolph II in 1609 to 
assure freedom of religion to the Bohemian peoples*
Ferdinand did not delay long in accepting this chal­
lenge to his royal absolutism and Catholicism* Frederick 
and his forces fought valiantly, but were defeated in the 
humiliating Battle of White Mountain during November, 1620, 
when the Imperial forces under Tilly were aided by Maximil­
ian I of Bavaria. Although the son-in-law of King James I
3of England, and fully expecting support in men and money from 
the Island Kingdom, Frederick5 s pleas for assistance were 
ignored by James, with the result that the embattled Bohemian 
ruler and his allies were decisively defeated in this first 
major battle of the Thirty Years” War. Bohemian independence
r /
died at Bila Hora (White Mountain), not to be regained for 
nearly three centuries. Frederick's reign, thus, was brief, 
and the often-used name, "Winter King," is an indication of 
the fact.
During the Thirty Years” War, much of Bohemia was 
laid waste, and the Protestant nobility was exiled and re­
placed, as one author aptly states,
...with a carpetbagger, alien nobility, gathered from 
the four corners of the far-flung Habsburg domains.
This new nobility became speedily “Bohemian” but never 
”Czech” in sentiment. In culture, it became German.1
S. Harrison Thomson sums up the unfortunate results of the
war for the Czech peoplesi
It would be almost Impossible to overestimate the 
significance of the Battle of the White Mountain in 
the history of the relations between the Hapsburgs
fsic.nj and the Czech Kingdom. Up until that fateful ate There was always the possibility that a workable modus vlvendl might be found under which the ruler and 
the people, although of different nationality and, it 
might be truly said, of different religious faith, 
might work together in peace and contentment. The. 
shadow of the two years of struggle, 1618-1620, and
^Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Cen­
tral Europe. 191^-19181 A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and 
Propaganda (Princeton? Princeton University Press, 1957)s
the crushing humiliation the Czechs suffered at the end 
of that time hovered over the whole course of Czech 
history until 1918.2
From 1618 to 1918, Bohemia became closely associated 
with Austria, although it never completely lost its identity 
as it remained a distinct unit within the Habsburg Empire. 
After the Peace of Westphalia (October 24, 164-8), which en­
ded the Thirty Tears1 War, a series of ruthlessly repres­
sive measures was enacted by the vindictive Ferdinand in 
Bohemia. Forcible Germanization, oppressive taxation, 
absentee land ownership, among other things, reduced the 
Czechs, except for a few favored magnates, to a life of 
degreadation and misery.
Emperor Ferdinand's saying gives the key to the 
Counter-Reformation period of Czech history? "Better 
no population at all than a population of heretics."
At the beginning of the Thirty Tears* War, there were 
3,000,000 people in Bohemia, nearly all Protestants.
At the end, there were only 800,000, all (nominally) 
Roman Catholics...The towns were repopulated by Ger­
man Immigrants belonging to the Church of Rome, and 
the estates of the nobles were confiscated and given 
to aliens...The Czech language ceased to be the of­
ficial language...and eventually German became the 
dominant language.3
The spirit of Bohemian independence, however, lived 
on during the several centuries of Habsburg rule; and with
Inc
S. Harrison Thomson, Czechoslovakia in European His- 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 194459 p. 7;
^Joseph S. Roucek and Associates, Central-Eastern 
,* Crucible of World Wars (New Tork: Prentice-Hall,
•»
5the dawn of the Nineteenth Century, a rebirth of Czech 
nationalism and interest in the Czech language came upon 
the heels of the revolutionary era. The Czech language was 
brought back into general usage under pressures generated 
by the growing demands for revival of the Czech Nation.
Under the enlightened leadership of Frantisek Palacky, 
nationalist, historian and political realist, the Czechs 
began the long development toward national consciousness and 
eventual recognition as a state. Far from wishing the dis­
solution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Palacky advocated 
its reorganization into a federation of autonomous national 
states, as a step towards the solution of a major European 
problem. A liberal in the best sense of the word,’ |Palacky 
advocated national liberation through education and enlight­
enment , rather than by the methods of revolution. "One of 
the earliest Austrlans to become aware both of the Russian 
danger and of German predominant influence, pPalackfJ pro­
posed the establishment of a multinational federation."^
It was Palack/ who coined the famous phrases "If 
there were no Austria, it would be necessary to create 
her."*..But, it was he too, who struck a more radical 
note in that other phrases "Before Austria was, we 
were, and when Austria no longer is, we "still shall be.
^Robert J. Kann, The Habsburg Empire. A Study in In- 
tegration and Disintegration (New York; Frederick A. Prae- 
ger, 1957)s p. 1 3 1 . (Cited hereafter as Kann, The Habs­
burg Empire).
5r . W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (New York? 
The Macmillan Company, 19^3)* P* o. felted hereafter as 
Seton-Watson, Masaryk In England).
Of the many subject peoples of the Dual Monarchy, the 
Czechs were the most advanced politically, and nationalism 
developed most rapidly and fully within them* Yet even in 
Bohemia the most advanced leaders sought only autonomy under 
the Habsburgs which would put the Czechs on a level with the 
Magyars of Hungary* "No one yet dreamed of complete, econo­
mic, and customs separation from the other parts of the 
realm,"^ Joseph Redlich, a former Austrian official has 
written*
Unfortunately for the Czechs, however, they were not 
the only racial group at work within the Empire in the quest 
for national recognition and self-determination* Most im­
portant among the others were the Magyars of Hungary, who
t
wielded a much greater influence than was warranted by their 
numbers, and who proved more effective than the Czechs in 
realizing their ambitions* Czech aspirations of federation 
on an equal footing with the German-Magyar elements of the 
Empire, suffered a severe blow in February, 186?, when the 
famous Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich (Compromise) was con­
cluded, transforming the Empire into the Austro-Hungarian 
("Dual") Monarchy *
It was in effect an alliance between the Germans of 
Austria and the Magyars of Hungary against the rest of 
the nationalities, or more especially an alliance be-
^Joseph Redlich, Austrian War Government (New Havens 
Yale University Press, 1929), p. 69#
7tween the ruling classes of Austria and Hungary* The 
statement, "You take care of your Barbarians, and we 
shall take care of ours," which von Beust is supposed 
t o :have made to the Hungarian representative, Francis 
Peak, is probably aprocryphal, but it expresses perfect­
ly the purpose of the Ausgleich from the point of view 
of the ruling classes of Austria and Hungary.?
A dozen years later, in 1879, Graf Eduard von Taaffe, 
premier for a second time (the first, briefly in 1868-1869), 
made limited concessions to the Czechs, including a provi­
sion that Czech delegates would be seated in the Reichsrat 
(Parliament) in Vienna* The immediate effect of the 
Ausgleich* however, was that many Czechs began to work for 
full independence from the Habsburgs and the Dual Monarchy* 
As Woodrow Wilson was to write in The State * Elements of 
Historical and Practical Politics:
No lapse of time, no defeat of hopes, seems suffi­
cient to reconcile the Czechs of Bohemia to incorpora­
tion with Austria* Pride of race and the memories of 
a notable and distinguished history keep them always 
at odds with the Germans within their gates and with 
the government set over their heads* They desire at 
least the same degree of autonomy that has been grant­
ed to Hungary * °
^Mamatey, op* cit*, p. 12*
^Woodrow Wilson, The State. Elements of Historical 
and Practical Politics * Revised Edition, 1911, p* 7^0, 
cited by Alel Hrdli&ka, "Bohemia and the Czechs*" The Na­
tional Geographic Magazine * XXXI, No. 2 (February, 19lTT, 
163. An interesting account of how the Czechoslovak pub­
licists In the United States used the first sentence of 
Wilson*s statement, quoted above, as a rallying cry during 
the World War is recounted in Charles Pergler1s America In 
the Struggle for Czechoslovak Independence (Philadelphia: 
Dorranee and Company, 1926), pp. 39-^0,
8Many Czech leaders realized that such a Slav partner­
ship within the Monarchy would be of great benefit to their 
people. Mot the least of these was 'Thomas G. Masaryk, a Slo­
vak of humble parentage, born in Moravia, who became a pro­
fessor of philosophy in the Czech University of Prague. As 
he became interested in the political welfare of Bohemia, he 
took an active part in the political affairs of the day and 
was elected to parliament in 1907. Outlining his beliefs, 
he was to write, while a member of the governing body:
We want a federal Austria. We cannot be independent 
outside of Austria next to a powerful Germany, having 
Germans on our territory....Therefore we are going to 
fight for the reorganization of the Austrian state so 
that it may be useful to us nationally and politically.9
This study proposes to trace the steps followed in 
the realization of the dream of the re-establishment of a 
sovereign Czechoslovak State. It will attempt to show how 
a small band of Czechoslovak leaders, well supported by edu­
cation and propaganda, planned and carried out their pro­
gram. In the achievement of the goal, these men employed 
the Czechoslovak Legions which were formed as a result of 
the Austro-Hungarian defeats during the great war of 191^- 
1918, and were effectively employed on far-flung battle­
fields in the Interests of the aspiring Republic of Czecho­
slovakia *
^Mamatey, op. clt.. p. 18, citing Cas, May 18, 1909, 
quoted in Evzen Stern, Nazory T. G. Masaryka (The Opinions 
of T. G. Masaryk), Prague, 1918, p. 66 i
CHAPTER II
THE WAR OFFERS A CHANCES THE STEP IS TAKEN
Farseeing Austrian leaders did not fail to realize 
the problems which the reviving Slav nationalism of the 
Nineteenth Century created* The baiting of Russia and Ser­
bia, during the Bosnian Crisis (1908-1909)* gave more rabid 
Austrians the satisfaction which can result when opponents, 
as the Slavs were now considered, are humiliated* The suc­
cessful annexation— brought off thanks to Germany® s support 
of her ally— failed to resolve Austria0s difficulties with 
the Slavs, both within and without the Empire and, in fact, 
merely postponed its solution for a short time* The Serbs, 
and other Balkan and Central European Slavs, turned after 
1909, with ever greater frequency, to Russia for advice and 
leadership, "with whom**.they were bound by the two powerful 
ties of Slav kinship and Orthodox religion."1
The Dual Monarchy won another diplomatic victory over 
Serbia in 1913, when she forced the withdrawal of Serbian 
troops from Albania. Backed by Germany, as in 1908-1909, 
the Austrians allowed the Serbs only eight days in which to 
call back their military forces. Belgrade, while reluctant,
•^ R* W* Seton-Watson, Sarajevo (London: Constable and 
Company, Limited, 1925), p* 16; Cf.T Sidney Bradshaw Fay,
The Origins of the World War (New Xorks The Macmillan Co., 
1932), pp. 3831 399.
was forced to comply.2 Despite this second and sharp setback 
the Serbs gained increased stature in the eyes of the world, 
and those Slavs living inside the Dual Monarchy came, as a 
result, to look more and more toward Serbia as the potential
f
leader in the forming of a fully independent South Slav State
The growing threat of a "Slav Piedmont,” adjacent to 
the borders of the Dual Monarchy, in turn, led the non-Slavs 
in the Habsburg domains— the Germans and Magyars— to believe 
that Mthe Monarchy must either crush Serbia or be destroyed 
by it*"-^ The rapid acceptance of this view, by both Aus­
trians and Hungarians, must be considered a primary factor 
behind the ultimatum and declaration of war against Serbia 
in 1914. Victor S. Mamatey expresses It In these words:
The declaration of war on Serbia in 1914 was also 
motivated by an internal political consideration: the
inability to solve the mounting Yugoslav problem at 
home* A little victorious war to wipe out Serbia, the 
supposed source of Yugoslav agitation, was just the 
medicine needed♦
The assassination at Sarajevo of the Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, which was 
used by the Austrians as the reason for the 1914 declaration
2Fay, op. cit., pp* 474-75•
3Robert J. Kerner, (ed.), Yugoslavia (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1949), p. 
51* (Cited hereafter as Kerner, Yugoslavia).
^Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Cen­
tral Europe, 1914-1918s A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and 
Propaganda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957)* 
p. 19.
11
of war on Serbia-was, therefore, looked upon as an event that 
might ;serve to finally remove the South Slav threat. The re­
sult was otherwise. MSerbla was intended to reassert the 
position of Austria-Hungary as an independent Great Powerj 
instead, it ended both greatness and independence,"5 says 
the English historian, A. J. P. Taylor.
The war was not popular with the Czechoslovak peoples 
for two reasons* The fact that they were forced to serve in 
the Austro-Hungarian armies under other than their own offi­
cers, and often under German rather than Austro-Hungarian 
leadership, caused resentment. More important, however, was 
the fact that they were forced to fight against other Slavs, 
including the Serbians and Russians. During the war, both 
Czech and Slovak soldiers proved to be the most determined 
and implacable foes of the Empire, manifesting this antagon­
ism by wholesale desertion to the enemy* In this they were 
supported by a stubborn and growing resistance to the au­
thorities on the part of the civil population.
At first many Czech patriots were encouraged by the 
advances of the Russian forces on the Eastern Front* Quick­
ly they came to believe that it would soon be possible to 
link themselves with their great Slav protector and, thus, 
secure for the Czech cause recognition as a step towards
^A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy. 1809-1918.
4  History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary. New 
Edition (Londons Hamish Hamilton, 1955)? P* 233. (Cited 
hereafter as Taylor, Habsburg Monarchy).
freedom from the Habsburgs• They were, therefore, inclined 
to be content to await the seemingly assured defeat of the 
Austro-Hungarians by Czar Nicholas’1 forces, and limited them 
selves to combatting the German-Magyar rule as well as they 
could on the home front* When, however, the Russian armies 
were driven back with terrible losses, and as the German 
High Command took over complete control of the armed forces 
of the Central Powers, and the tides of war seemed to set 
in against the Russians, many Czechs became despondent, 
fearing that the help upon which they had counted so strong­
ly would not come*
But while the ultra-Russophils (all Czechs were Rus- 
sophils up to a certain point) were depressed by the 
terrible reverses which followed upon the, first vietoi- 
ries of the Tsarist armies, Masaryk never lost his 
balance, and soon realized that the fate of his nation 
was bound up with that of the Western democracies and 
America, and also that a great educational and propa­
gandist work would be required before the Western public 
could be expected to understand the Czech problem in its 
Austrian setting, and to accept the idea of active co­
operation*^
Professor Thomas G. Masaryk was almost alone among 
his countrymen, at the start of the war, in the belief that 
the; ultimate fate of the Czechoslovak Nation was closely 
linked with the attitude of the Western Powers, particular­
ly America, to their ambitions* A few Czechs and Slovaks, 
realizing that all avenues of help must be explored, looked 
toward the other members of the Entente for assistance, but
^R. W # Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (New York? 
The Macmillan Company, 19^3), p. o* "TCited hereafter as 
Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England)*
13
it was Masaryk5s special genius, at this time, to see across 
the mists of the Atlantic the future importance of the United 
States in Central European affairs*
Masaryk.•.was one of the few great European intellec­
tuals who appreciated America at a time when she was 
still completely an unknown quantity in Europe. In 
looking from the beginning of the war to the Western 
Allies for support and sympathy, not only was he soli­
tary among the Czechs and Slovaks, but he also defied 
conceptions generally held in the Dual Monarchy. Prom 
the vantage point of Prague, Vienna, and in Budapest 
alike, Bussia was the principal Entente Power; France 
was only very secondary, and Insular Britain hardly fig­
ured at all.?
In his own words, Masaryk points out this divergence 
of opinion among the Czechoslovak leadership— those awaiting 
national redemption at the hands of Bussia, and those who 
determined to seek assistance from other sourcesi
Therefore, I favored vigorous action abroad, not in 
Bussia alone, but also in the other Allied countries, 
so as to gain for us the good will and the help of all.
I insisted that, like me, Dr. Kram££ should get away, 
so that we could share the work abroad; but he, I was 
told (for I had no chance of approaching him personally) 
was determined to stay at home since he expected that 
the Bussians would themselves settle the Czechoslovak 
question once for all.°
Immediately after the outbreak of the war, Masaryk 
made three trips abroad to determine what the possibilities 
were of securing Western aid for the Czechoslovak cause.
^Mamatey, op. clt.. p. 32.
8Dr. Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a State. 
Memories and Observations (New York; Frederick A. Stokes, 
Company, 1927)* P* 15• (Cited hereafter as Masaryk, Making 
of a State).
lb
Early in August, 191® he preceded to Holland, where he made 
contact with his friends, Henry Wickham Steed, Foreign Edi­
tor of The (London) Times, and Dr*. S.* W* Seton-Watson, a 
leading British student of Slav problems* Both of these men 
were very influential publicists in Great Britain, and both 
promised to give him what support they could. They proved 
to be, throughout the long struggle for Czechoslovak inde­
pendence, true friends of the Czechs and Slovaks, and im­
placable enemies of the Habsburgs. Thus, Masaryk early in
*
the war demonstrated an amazing.ability to draw to him men 
capable of great accomplishments and willing to make person­
al sacrifices for the cause of Czechoslovak independence. 
Seton-Watson was especially helpful to Masaryk through his 
preparation of many of the latter5 s papers for publication 
in English. In addition, the Britisher wrote many articles 
favorable to the Czechoslovak cause himself
Shortly after his return from this first wartime trip, 
Masaryk called together a meeting of his friends in the Pro­
gressive Party, “...this meeting, like several of those
which followed, was a focus from which later was formed what
i owas known as the '■Maffla'*" Recalling the meeting, Masaryk
^S. Harrison Thomson, Czechoslovakia in European His­
tory (Princetons Princeton University Press, 1 9 ® ) Y  p. 2 ® ;  
Masaryk, Making of a State, pp. 87-88.
lC>Dr. Eduard Benes, My War Memoirs. (trans.), Paul 
Selver (Boston and Mew Yorks Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928),
p. 26.
later wrote:
We discussed the situation at home, as well as in 
Austria and Germany and among the Allies, in a word, 
everything that mattered* We agreed upon our whole 
planof campaign and also about our helpers at homeand 
abroad. As long as possible Bene¥ was to remain at home 
and to organize communications with me after the fashion 
of the Russian Secret Societies... .So arose our secret 
organization* the "Maffia," which was led at first by 
Bene&, Slimal and RaSin; and after the arrest of Ra^in 
and the departure of BeneS, by SiSmal and others.H
Eduard Benel, Czech scholar and ardent disciple of 
Masaryk, in his book, My; War Memoirs, points out the value 
of the "Maffia" during the long and bitter struggle for 
liberation:
1. It enabled us to establish our first revolution­
ary organization abroad, while systematically keeping 
in touch with the responsible politicians at home 
throughout the war...
2. At critical moments it enabled us either to send 
our news home or to interpret authentically in the. 
Allied countries, on the basis of news received from 
our friends in Prague, the trend of events at home.
This gave us an opportunity of exerting a considerable 
Influence upon the development of political affairs 
both.at home and in the Allied countries.
3. From its very beginnings the "Maffia" sent 
abroad valuable reports on political, economic and 
military affairs in Austria-Hungary, which often 
proved of service to the Allies in military opera­
tions, in political action, and in economic or finan­
cial measures. This served our cause by enabling us 
to gain the sympathies of various Allied official 
circles, and thus the "Maffia" had a great practical 
significance.12
11Masaryk, Making of a State. pp. 27-29*
12BeneM, op. pit... pp. 7^-751 Cf., Robert J. Kerner, 
"Winning Czechoslovak Independence," Foreign Affairs. VII 
(January, 1929), 313*
Following a meeting in Prague of this secret organi­
ze v
zation in 1915$ ®r* Karel Kramar, outspoken foe of the 
government and leader of the Young Czech party, was arrest­
ed by the Austrian police*
On May 1 of that year, Professor Ernest Denis, a 
staunch supporter of the Czechs in academic circles in 
France, where he was a prominent educator, began publish­
ing a fortnightly paper, under the title of La Nation 
\
which carried news of Interest about the libera­
tion movement obtained from its supporters in Prague and 
elsewhere* It became a medium through which word of the 
movement could be spread to an ever increasing audience, 
especially in the West, and served as a forerunner of 
later companion propaganda news sheets in Bussia, England 
and the United States* Systematic and regular contribu­
tions were obtained by secret couriers, from Prague *^ -3 
Masaryk stated?;
Our first and most urgent task was to organize "sub* 
terranean" work, the sending of messengers to and from 
Prague* It went well, for we all worked with a will**. 
To some extent we communicated with Prague "legally," 
by post* In the early days, at least, non-political 
letters got through.^
Bene&, too, began to travel, and, on returning from 
a trip to Geneva, brought back several copies of La Nation
13Thomas Capek, Jr*, Origins of the Czechoslovak 
State ([New York]i Revell Press, 192o), p* 39; Bene§ 
on* cit* * p*
l^Masaryk, Making of a State* pp. ^8-^9
1?
Tch^que so that the underground workers in Prague could see 
the results obtained from their efforts at provision of news 
materials for outside publication. One of the copies was 
given to Kramar, after the "Maffia" meeting mentioned above, 
with the following results
Kram^y had looked in at the office of Narodni List! 
[chief Prague daily newspaper 1 and then proceeded to bis 
villa. Just as he was about to enter he was arrested* 
Among other things the copy of La Nation Tch^que was 
taken from him and proved to be. ♦ .evidence against him.-*-5
Arrests became common after the Austrian War Govern­
ment , operating under the authority of the "Dictatorship 
Paragraph" (Paragraph 1^) of the Constitution, began to 
issue emergency decrees having the force of law. "There 
were 181 such Imperial decrees from March 16, 193A to May 30, 
1 9 1 ? . . Yet the government, while possessing the neces­
sary legal authority to support its rather regular use of 
arbitrary arrests, was not always assured of the unanimous 
support of such a program by its own leaders. On several 
occasions, key civilian members of the Government tried to 
get the Emperor Pranz Joseph to temper the harsh actions 
stemming from the demands of the military group, as one 
historian has noted s
l-SBenel, ©jo. cit., p. 66.
l^David F. Strong, Austria (October 1918-March 191' 
Transition from Empire to Republic (London1 P* S* Kind & 
Son, Ltd., 1939), p. 38.
When the Supreme Command * without consulting the 
Prime Minister, arrested Dr. Karel Kramarz JTslcTj. a de­
puty, and the most respected leader of the Czech nation 
at that time, Count Stuergkb went to the aged Emperor 
in person and complained in the most bitter terms of the 
evils and dangers caused by the practical dictatorship, 
without success, however. Even in political matters, the 
authority of the army must not be interfered with or 
diminished 1
That little real consideration was given to requests 
for more temperate action is borne out by the fact that 
Dr. Kram^y remained a prisoner from the time of his arrest in 
May, 1915, until after the general political amnesty pro­
claimed by the new Emperor, Charles I, in July, 1918. This 
is further attested to by statements from reliable witnesses 
which Indicate that an “estimated 20,000 Czech civilians 
were Interned as "political suspects,1 and that close on 
5,000 were sentenced to death by courts-martial,” during the 
war-time reign of Franz Joseph.
While diminishing the effectiveness of the Czechoslo­
vak leadership at home, the widespread program of artitrary 
arrests provided excellent fuel for the propaganda fires 
being lighted beyond the borders of the Dual Monarchy. The 
arrests helped prepare the development of a potent, and fin­
ally, overwhelming propaganda against Austria and Hungary, 
based on the need for reform of internal political condi-
l?Joseph Bedlich, Austrian War Government (New Havens 
Yale University Press, 1929), p. 90.
^ H .  W. V. Temperley, (ed.), A History of the Peace 
Conference of Paris (Londons Henry Frowde, Hodder & Stough­
ton, 1920-192^), IV, p. 2^9* (Cited hereafter as Temperley, 
Peace Conference)•
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tions•
It was an Austrian war government, presenting the ex­
ternal appearance of complete detachment from every form 
of national or class politics, which, without knowing 
what it was doing, tilled the soil in which these enemy 
seeds would grow and ripen* The first impulse and the 
chief moral encouragement was given by the emigration 
of leading men among the Czechs and South Slavs. This 
was the initial act of pressure that led to the crystal­
lization of forces working for the destruction of the 
historic union of the various Austrian nationalities 
now struggling for independence.3-9
In view of conditions In Prague, and after several 
surreptitious trips to Switzerland, during which he was aware 
that his actions were under strict surveillance by the Aus­
trian police, Eduard Bene¥ decided to flee to the West at a 
propitious time. He escaped to Paris in September, 1915? 
where he was to serve as the acknowledged Czech leader under 
Masaryk and to work with Milan R. ^tefanik, a colorful Slo­
vak astronomer, meteorologist, traveler and officer In the 
French air service. These two men, working happily under 
Masaryk®s leadership, made a highly effective team. "There 
were no personal rivalries or political differences between 
them. The authority of Masaryk over the two younger mem­
bers of the liberating triumvirate was complete."^®
A division of areas of operation was soon made be­
tween Masaryk, Bene£ and Stef^fnik. Masaryk arrived in Lon­
don in April, 1915? and decided to stay there at least for
^Redlich, op* cit»■. p. 98. 
20Mamatey, op. cit.. p. 32.
a while, as London was the center of Entente political acti­
vity $ meanwhile Bene^ and Stefanik were to work in Paris, 
even more the military headquarters of the Allies.21
Prior to BeneX9 departure from Prague, and while on 
one of his clandestine visits to Switzerland to consult with 
Masaryk, the latter pointed out to Benes that he believed 
the only people who could ultimately assure the success of 
the Czechoslovak movement were the Czechs and Slovaks in the 
New World and the freedom loving peoples of America* Funds 
for continuing the struggle were badly needed, and, Masaryk 
said, "9Somebody would have to be sent there to collect 
money from our friends*9 I mentioned my brother Votza-,
Benes," Eduard Benes reports, "and Dr* Masaryk agreed* ***“22
1
Thus, another very influential worker was added to the move­
ment and a definite plan to secure support on the western 
side of the Atlantic began to take shape* In this plan, 
they were encouraged by the fact that some money from 
friends and sympathizers in America already had been made 
available to Masaryk, who reported, "Mr. Charles Crane 
fchicago industrialist and Masaryk® s long-time friend] sent 
me personally a considerable sum*"23
Money, however, was not overly plentiful and a com-
2lMasaryk, Making of a State, p. 71* 
22Bene¥, pp. pit., p. 52.
23Masaryk, Making of a State, p* 8.
mon fund was’(necessary to assure that all aspects of the
work for liberation could be continued* Following his es­
cape from Prague to Paris, even with his considerable per­
sonal wealth, Beneis reports that the timely arrival of 
money from the United States was necessary to keep his work 
going forwardi
Towards the end of 1915 Professor Masaryk received 
the first funds from the American collections, so that 
he was able to let me keep about 20,000 francs which I 
had brought with me when I escaped from home. This en­
abled me to live from my own resources and remain inde­
pendent in a financial sense. ^
The Czech people have always been known for their 
industriousness and thrift, and it is interesting to note 
that the leaders of the liberation movement proved them­
selves true members of the Czech Nation. Masaryk states:
...in Europe we inverted the Czech proverb, "Little 
money, little music," and got plenty of music for our 
little money...I doubt whether revolutionary propaganda 
abroad has ever been so cheaply carried on; nor does 
modesty prevent me from saying that few political cam­
paigns have been so well thought out as ours was. Here 
is an account of the money I received from America for 
the causes
1914-1915................................. .#37,8?1
191 6  ............ ... 71,185
1917 (up to the end of April)............. 82,391
1918 (from May onwards)................... .48?.4?8
$<574,885
While I was in Russia in 1917-^1918 Dr. Bene& receiv­
ed about $300,000, so that the whole work cost less
than $1,000,000. The subscriptions from America did not 
increase notably until after the United States had en­
tered the war. Almost all of them came from Czechs. 
During the war the Slovaks gave little, though they sent 
$200,000, including some amounts from my American 
acquaintances, after I had become president.2*
The first full year of the war, 1915* was an active 
one for the emigrd' Czechoslovak leaders, marked by the open­
ing salvos fired against the Dual Monarchy from their propa­
ganda guns. Masaryk spoke on John Hus, the Fifteenth Century 
religious martyr and symbol of Czechoslovak toleration, be­
fore an assembled crowd of Czechs at Zurich on July 4, 1915•
...and on July 6, the fifth centenary of his martyr­
dom, Professor Denis and I held a meeting in the Hall 
of the Reformation at Geneva....Even in Austria the 
Geneva celebration of 1915 hit the mark, the "Neue Freie 
Presse" denounced it as "the first Czech declaration of 
war against Austria*1
In England, later in the year, Masaryk continued his 
revolutionary propaganda, supported by the indispensable 
assistance of Wickham Steed and Seton-Watson. Their friend­
ship was instrumental in obtaining for him a professorship 
at the University of London. Here, Masaryk took advantage 
of the excellent opportunity to present the merits of the 
Czechoslovak cause before an influential audience on the oc­
casion of his Inaugural Lecture at the School of Slavonic 
Studies, King® s College, on October 19, 1915* Thus the
25Masaryk, Making of a State. p. 85.
26lbld.. pp. 58-59I Cf., Robert Joseph Kerner, (ed.), 
Czechoslovakiat Twenty Years of Independence (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles i University of California Press, 194(3), p. 53. 
(Cited hereafter as Kerner, Czechoslovakia).
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propaganda campaign which Masaryk had gone to London to wage, 
received an auspicious start, under ideal sponsorship. Lord 
Robert Cecil, member of the British ministry, presided at 
the lecture, in the absence of the Prime Minister, Mr. Her­
bert Henry Asquith, who was prevented, because of Illness 
and not because of any lack of sympathy, from attending in 
person. The gaining of the interest and good will of Asquith 
and Cecil, two pillars in British politics, was a diplomatic 
triumph and of great value to the Czechoslovak cause, and 
did much to assure Masaryk8s acceptance in the West as the 
acknowledged leader of the liberation movement. Cecil read 
a letter from Asquith to the assembled audience, which said 
in part i
First and foremost we are fighting for the liberty 
of small Nations in order that they may be liberated 
from the oppression of their more powerful neighbors 
and in the future be permitted to develop their own 
national life and institutions
,8Masaryk® s lecture, 8The Problem of the Small Nation in the
European Crisis,8 was a sensation, and strenghthened the
logical foundation of the movement in the British mind•M
We soon produced an impression on Western Europe, not 
only because we were well informed politically, and sup­
plied accurate diagnoses of Central Europe, but also be­
cause Masaryk was able to explain from the philosophy of 
history the significance of the World War, and how It
2?Joseph S. Roucek, "President Masaryk of Czechoslo­
vakia, " Current History. XXI (March, 1930)* 1110-1111.
28Thomson> .03c). cit.. p. 249; Cf., Bene¥, o jd .  cit,.-.
p. 87.
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should be regarded by Western Europe.2^
While these activities were being carried on, the 
Czech and Slovak leaders had many other "irons in the fire," 
as they waged an all-out campaign against Austria and Hun­
gary. It was necessary to establish relations with the poli 
ticians, statesmen and Governments of the Allied nations, to 
organize united action among Czech and Slovak people in the 
various Allied countries and, "above all to create an army 
from among Czech prisoners-of-war...Indeed, the idea of form 
ing an army abroad was so natural that Czechs outside Aus­
tria began everywhere to act spontaneously upon it,"30 
Masaryk stated.
The time had come to take public action against Aus­
tria. All Czech colonies abroad expected and demanded 
it* In Russia a Czech Military Unit, or "Druzlna," 
had been formed in the Autumn of 191&. In France our 
fellows had joined the army. In all Allied countries 
our people were vigorously opposing Austria and Ger­
many.. .We made this widely known with good effect.31
The largest Czech and Slovak groups abroad were in 
the United States and Russia, with Chicago, in America, pro­
perly described as the “largest Czech city" outside of Bo­
hemia* Within the United States, several Czech and Slovak 
organizations quickly sprang into being to promote the 
Czechoslovak cause, including: the National Alliance of Bo­
2^Bene^, op. cit., p. 8?.
3°Masaryk, Making of a State, p. 33. 
31ibld., p. 58.
hemian Catholics, the Slovak League of America, the Slovak 
Catholic Alliance, and the Bohemian National Alliance# It 
was soon clear that the Czechs and Slovaks in America must 
finance the movement if it was to be successful# In fact, 
the chief fvole of all the groups mentioned above came to be 
the financing of the campaign for Czechoslovak Independence 
and the influencing of public opinion in America in favor 
of it#32 The important results of the attempt to raise 
money in America have already been alluded to* In Russia, 
on the other hand, It was hoped to raise a Czechoslovak 
army that would fight in the field against the Dual Mon­
archy and, thus, gain recognition and prestige for the 
aspiring new nation that was being dreamed of by so many 
patriots#
In Russia,1 however, the Czechoslovak cause experi­
enced some of its greatest difficulties# The R-usslan atti­
tude, while generally pan-Slav, was often hesitant to sup­
port the liberation movement against Imperial Germany and 
the Dual Monarchy, especially as the political arrangements 
of the Central Powers were more like those of Czarlst Rus­
sia, and because Masaryk”s open, and frequent criticism of 
Russian political Institutions made him persona non grata
32jaroslav F# Smetanka, "Bohemians and Slovaks--Now 
Czecho-Slovaks," The Annals # American Academy of Political 
and Social Science. XCIII (January, 19215, lft-9-1531 
Masaryk, Making of a State# p# 218#
at the Romanov Court*33 Added to this was an open political 
rift between Czech conservatives and radicals living within 
Russia# Russian politicians, complicated the issue by sup­
porting a Czech exile, Josef Durich, a former Agrarian de­
puty in the ?A us t rian .Reichsrat. who had been sent abroad by 
the Czech "Maffia8 to coordinate activities with the Rus­
sians* Soon after his arrival in Russia, in the summer of 
1916, however, Durich had allied himself with the conserva­
tive Czechoslovak elements there and "became involved in the 
intrigues of the ®dark forces* in the Russian capital and 
[jhufiTJ soon discredited himself even in the eyes of many 
Czech and Slovak exiles in Russia.*3^
• ..before long old Mr* Durych [jicT) was superseded by 
the Czech National Council* He had been endeavoring, It 
seemed to take the conduct of negotiations out of Mas­
aryk* s hands and to entrust the fortunes of the Czechs 
to the Russian Ministers for Foreign and Internal Af­
fairs ...many of his countrymen complained that he was 
far too much identified with the Russian Conserva­
tives #35
After the fall of the Romanovs in 191?, Du'rich experienced 
a loss of influence and political oblivion followed. The 
unity of the Czechoslovak movement in Russia, thereafter, 
was not seriously threatened, although minor disagreements 
among the "exiles" were noticeable occasionally. It should
33Mamatey, .op. cit.» p. 32*
3^lbid.. pp. 32-331 £L» > Masaryk, Making of a State,
p. 76.
35Henry Baerlein, .The March of the Seventy Thous­
and (Londons Leonard Parsons, Ltd., 192§), P* 5^*
be recorded, however, that many friendly forces were active 
in Russia, counteracting, in part at least, the difficulties 
raised by Durich and his coterie, even while the Russian Em­
pire was still in e x i s t e n c e . 3 6  These, of course, gained in 
strength after the 1917 Revolutions.
Meanwhile, Masaryk and his followers decided to take 
definite action and make an '"official" declaration of war 
upon the Habsburg Empire* This was: done on Sunday, Novem­
ber 1^, 1915, in conjunction^with a demand of the "Czech 
Foreign Committee" for the establishment of an independent 
Czechoslovak State within the historical boundaries of the 
two peoples*3?
The proclamation, aligning the Czechs and Slovaks 
with the Entente Powers, had been coordinated with and ap­
proved by the Czech leaders in Prague and was signed by re­
presentatives of the Czechs and Slovaks residing in France, 
Russia, Great Britain and the United States*3® Mamatey 
points out the dilemna which faced the Czechoslovaks until 
the fall of the Romanovss
...The declaration said nothing of the future form of 
the Czechoslovak government, but it was a foregone con­
clusion that it would.be a monarchy under a Romanov 
prince. Even Masaryk reluctantly admitted that the
3&Thornson, pp. cit., pp. 255^56; Mamatey, pp. pit.,
P. 33*
3?Masaryk, Making of a State, pp. 78-79! Benes, pp. 
cit., p. 82; Mamatey, pp. cit., p. 331 Capek, pp. cit.,
P* 39*
38«rhomson, pp. cit., p. 252•
Idea was so popular with his countrymen that it was in­
evitable. It was only the fall of the Russian Monarchy 
that permitted him to plan for a republic.39
The prospect of a Russian sovereign ruling Bohemia, however,
caused Masaryk great misgivings:
Privately he quipped that a Grand Duke in Prague 
would mean 1 champagne and French mistresses in the 
Hrad&any," the royal castle In Prague. Such a specta­
cle, he feared, would speedily disabuse his countrymen, 
a people of solid and sober virtues, of their native 
Russophillsm.^°
While Masaryk was establishing connections with influ­
ential persons in England and carrying forward the Czechoslo­
vak propaganda effort there, Bene^ and Stefanik were not Idle 
In France, where the latter was extremely popular with mili­
tary and political leaders. Professor Thomson reports that 
Stefanik was successful In arranging countless Interviews 
for Masaryk with prominent French politicians, Including a 
first visit with French Premier, Aristide Briand, on Febru­
ary 3* 1916. The interview was "very sympathetic, and 
Briand never thereafter wavered in his open advocacy of 
Czechoslovak Independence.
I saw him | Briandf on February 3 $ and laid before 
him a small map of Europe and my view of the war—  
that the division of Austria into her historical and 
natural elements was a condition of the reconstruction 
of Europe and of the real enfeeblement of Germany, that 
is to say of Frenc.h security♦. .but Briand. . .grasped the
39jdamatey, eg. cit.. p. 33*
fr8ibia«
^Thomson, ojd. cit.. p. 2515 Cf*> Baerlein, ojo. elt.. 
pp. kz-kj.
heart of the matter at once. Above all, he accepted our 
policy and promised to carry it out...My visit to him 
was announced in an official communique.*
Benesf, too, achieved considerable success in France. 
Early in his work there he gained the support of many influ­
ential people for the Czechoslovak cause and R. H* Bruce 
Lockhart, writing in the Fortnightly Review, spoke warmly of 
the great contribution the slight Czech lecturer made there­
by to the Czechoslovak movement:
Once more his indefatigable pen stood him in good 
stead--a book appeared which at once aroiased tbe , keen- 
est attention of the Allied leaders, "Detruises I»*Aut- 
rlchel,f— the young Prague lecturer had achieved his 
first great success•..The leading statesmen of the West­
ern Powers grasped eagerly at this new weapon for de­
stroying Germany, and the difficulties of the Czech 
leaders disappeared as if by magic. Theory now gave 
place to action. In France, in Italy and in Russia,
Czech Legions were formed which took their stand in the
trenches side-by-side with the Allied troops.^3
In 1916, to give formal and permanent character to 
the movement, the Czechoslovak National Council was organis­
ed to take over the work of the "Czech Committee Abroad," 
and the "Czech Foreign Committee." The Council was headed 
by Masaryk as president, with Bene^ named to handle the 
duties of the General Secretariat in Paris. To Stefanik 
"fell the task of directing the military activities of the 
various contingents of Czechs serving in the Allied armies.
^2Masaryk, Making of a State. p. 96*
H. Bruce Lockhart, "Dr. Edouard Benes," Fort­
nightly Review. CXX (September, 19235» 424.
^Malbone Watson Graham, Jr., New Governments of Cen­
tral Europe (New York* Holt & Co., 1.924), p. 273*
Following establishment of the National Connell* the 
Czechoslovak movement gathered greater Impetus• Branch 
headquarters of the Council were soon established In all the 
Entente countries* and Denis” La Nation Tcheaue became the 
medium through which news of the Czechoslovak cause was dis­
seminated to an ever-increasing audience. Companion journals 
in Russia, Great Britain and the United States were soon es­
tablished to carry on the growing work of propaganda#^
The Entente governments viewed the activities of the 
.••Czechoslovak Council with mixed feelings. On one 
hand, they were anxious to encourage these activities 
to weaken the Central Powers, but on the other they 
were reluctant to accept their ultimate aims the com­
plete dismemberment of Austria-Hungary...The Habsburg 
Empire had been a part of the European balance-of- 
power system for four centuries, and the Entente states­
men feared the consequences of its disappearance©^6
Nevertheless there was still division in feeling be­
tween the western and eastern partners of the Entente. West­
ern statesmen tended to fear that a breakup of the Danubian 
Monarchy would result in a number of satellite nations with 
a Russian orientation# Czarist statesmen, on the other hand, 
believed that the area might ultimately be filled with west­
ern-oriented democracies. The Russians seemed afraid of the 
possible adverse effects the establishment of such democra­
tic states might have on both the minority groups in Russia 
and the growing revolutionary movement, which was now giving
^5capek, jop. pit., p# 39# 
^Mamatey, _opa cit., p. 37*
the statesmen in St. Petersburg reason for great concern# 
Contrary to popular opinion, and for a great variety of 
reasons, Imperial Russia did not wish to see the complete 
destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire#**'?
In spite of the qualms of many Entente statesmen and 
politicians, the Czechoslovak National Council, now establish­
ed, launched a more active program and soon was at work with 
Czech and Slovak groups and committees all around the world# 
Close liaison and coordination were maintained with the 
1 Maffia1 and other opposition groups at home and, at the 
same time, arrangements for financing their work were per­
fected. This close working relationship between the "Maffla" 
and the National Council was to continue throughout the long 
struggle for independence, despite some minor points of dis­
agreement, and attests to the wholehearted support given the 
leaders abroad because of the favorable impression their work 
made on the leaders and peoples outside the boundaries of 
the Czech and Slovak homeland#**'®
Within Bohemia and Moravia, and to a much lesser ex­
tent in Slovakia, separatist propaganda was carried on with 
an intensity and efficiency unrealized by the outside world. 
That this propaganda was well-directed and well-accepted Is 
probably best demonstrated by the effectiveness of the cam-
**?Ibid.
*^Masaryk, Making of a State, p. 3731 Redlich, cjjd. cit.
p. 148#
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paign to recruit members for the Czechoslovak Legions after 
Masaryk issued his call for volunteers. The Slovaks were 
more cautious In flaunting the authority of their officers, 
even when held prisoner, than the Czechs, and separate propa­
ganda had to be prepared to reach .them effectively. Dr. 
Seton-Watson writes, as follows, of the different propaganda 
techniques employed to reach both roups:
There was the greatest possible difference between 
the propaganda among the Czechs and that among the 
Slovaks, both In Russia and in the West. With the for­
mer the soil had already been sufficiently prepared at 
home, and thus the propaganda bore rapid and ample fruit. 
Among the Slovaks there had been no such preparation, 
and the propaganda met with many difficulties, both in­
ternal and external...for a time, propaganda among the 
Slovaks in Russia and the West had to be confined to the 
insertion of Slovak articles in the various Czech news­
papers and periodicals
i. ■
With the knowledge that they had the necessary sup­
port and backing of the Czech people, and the hope of like 
support among the Slovaks, Masaryk and the National Council 
launched a concerted effort to reap the utmost advantage 
from their chief source of favorable propaganda in the 
Entente countries— the Czechoslovak Legions.
^9r . w . Seton-Watson, (ed.5, Slovakia. Then and Now 
(Londons George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1931)> P* 103#
CHAPTER I I I
THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEGIONS ? A MOVE TO THE FRONT
The Czechoslovak leaders, within and without the Em­
pire, were working toward a single goal— recognition of their 
country;as an independent_nation--and, if not from the be­
ginning, soon realized that the Legions could be the strong­
est force that they could have in the struggle to gain the 
recognition which they sought. After the victory had been 
won, BeneK wrote?
In my opinion, it Is often forgotten that our Siber­
ian army was our strongest political factor at the end 
of the war and during the peace conference. I made use 
of its retention In Siberia to win our peace terms.1
When Austria declared war on Serbia and, subsequently, 
on Russia, both the Czech and Slovak peoples condemned the 
declaration. Very soon the soldiers drawn from Bohemia and 
Moravia, and, perhaps to a lesser extent from Slovakia, 
showed their disapproval by deserting and by joining the 
Allied armies® "This movement, and it is necessary to em­
phasize this fact, was spontaneous and truly popular, the 
Czech soldier-voters refused obedience to the Habsburgs,
iDr. Eduard Bene£, My War Memoirs, (trans®), Paul Sel- 
ver (Boston and New Yorks Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), 
p. 3^8.
^Thomas G* Masaryk, The New Europe. the Slav Stand­
point (London? Eyre & Spottiswoode, Ltd®, 1918), p. ^9.
(Cited hereafter as Masaryk, The New Europe ) 1 Cf.. Robert 
Joseph Kerner, "Winning Czechoslovak Independence," Foreign 
Affairs. VII (January, 1929), 313*
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Masaryk has stated.
Many Czech regiments which did not desert were deci­
mated and then finally dissolved, the soldiers being 
scattered among German and Magyar regiments. This only 
increased the dislocation and disruption of the Austrian 
army, which, within a year was virtually put under the 
control of officers from Germany®3
Bitterly opposed to the Habsburg Crown because of Its 
long record of past discriminations against them and because 
of the continued failure to take into consideration their 
national feelings, Czech and Slovak soldiers, officers and 
enlisted men alike, early showed a disinclination for the 
war against Russia, a nation that they looked upon as a pro­
tector and possible future ally in their struggle for free­
dom and Czechoslovak independence®
Thousands of Czech and Slovak soldiers deserted the 
Austro-Hungarian armies, or were captured while offering only 
token resistance® "This was at first a perilous operation, 
for they had to run the gauntlet between German and Magyar 
machine-gunners in the rear and suspicious Russians in 
f r o n t L a t e r ,  elaborate surrender patterns were worked 
out between the Czech and Slovak soldiers on the one hand
3Robert Joseph Kerner, (ed®), Czechoslovakia % Twenty 
Years of Independence (Berkeley and Los Angeles? University 
of California Press, 19^0), p. 52; Cf*, Ale)S HrdllKka, "Bo­
hemia and the Czechs," National Geographic«, XXXI, No® 2 
(February, 1917), p® 187®
^H* W. V 0 Temperley, (ed.), A History of the Peace 
Conference of Paris (London? Henry Frowde, Hodder Sc Stough­
ton, 1920-192^} 9 IVt> P* 2^9® (Cited hereafter as Temperley, 
Peace Conference)®
and the Russian forces on the other. Before the struggle 
was over, all along the Eastern Front, whole companies, and 
even regiments of men deserted en masse. almost overnight* 
One account reads? 1 ...our soldiers should make themselves 
known to the Russians by singing the song, 1 He j Slovene1,"5 
which served as a code, telling of the arrangements reached 
with the Russians. Careful accounts of the war include 
statements like the following, detailing the extent of the 
desertions:
It has been stated that, of the 70,000 prisoners 
taken by Serbia In the winter of 1914, roughly half 
were Czechs; at least 300,000 more surrendered volun­
tarily to,the Russians, and close upon 30,000 to the 
Italians.
In a desperate attempt to stop the wholesale deser­
tions, the Austrians were forced to reassign Czech and 
Slovak soldiers to Austrian and Hungarian regiments, where 
it was hoped that tighter discipline could be maintained. 
Later, when German troops were transferred to Austro-Hun­
garian sectors to bolster the flagging morale of those 
units, even stricter measures were adopted. By that time, 
however, the damage had been done— the National Council had
^Dr. Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a State. 
Memories and Observations (New York? Frederick A. Stokes 
Company , 1927) . P. 5 1 CfT. Sigmund Munz, "Thomas Garrigue 
Masaryk," (trans.), Catherine Phillips, The Fortnightly Re­
view. CXX (August, 1923), 278.
^Temperley, Peace Conferencea IV,. p. 249; Cf., R. B. 
Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy. 1914-192tTTLondon? 
Edward Arnold Sc Co., 1928), p. 118.
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a large potential force of manpower available, outside the 
borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, from which to draw 
men for the Legions It desired to gain recognition for the 
proposed Czechoslovak State. It was these Legions and their 
exploits that helped the struggling leaders of the national 
movement secure the world-wide support needed as the basis 
for recognition of these national aspirations.
Through his contacts in England, Masaryk early dis­
covered that Lord Kitchener, (Horatio Herbert Kitchener,
1st Earl), Secretary of State for War, and other Western 
military leaders believed the war would last for at least 
three years. This knowledge profoundly influenced his 
whole political strategy, especially as he clearly under­
stood the value of time as a necessity for laying the 
groundwork for complete Czechoslovak independence. A 
shorter period of time might have meant that the Allies 
would have been willing to consider only national autonomy 
within the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy.?
Following their desertion from the Austro-Hungarian 
armies, or capture by the Russians, many of the prisoners- 
of-war quickly volunteered to fight with the Czarist armies, 
provided that they would be put into action against the: 
hereditary enemies--the Habsburgs. Although these prisoners-
?R. W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (New York?
The Macmillan Company, 1943), pp. 21, 54-55* (Cited here­
after as Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England).
of-war made-up■theiJartterof the Czechs and Slovaks in Russia, 
there were■additional sizable ^groups of Czechs andiSlovaks, 
residing in Russia that were subjects of the Czar. "Colon­
ies of businessmen, merchants and artisans resided in the 
larger cities, while in Volhynia and the Caudusus were large
Q
agricultural settlements which possessed...schools." Not 
all of the members of these groups were of the same politi­
cal bent, however, and, as noted earlier, sharp differences 
of opinion separated the conservatives from the more radical 
elements. The principal centers in which these people lived 
were St. Petersburg and Klev.^ But little early use was 
made of either the prisoners-of-war or the "residents" as 
the pro-German faction within the Russian court thought that 
any full-scale force of this sort would ultimately lead to 
the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire along 
national lines, unwanted, so far as Imperial Russia was con­
cerned. The feeling has been expressed as follows?
Naturally, the old Tsarist officials were very much 
opposed to the idea of a national Czechoslovak army in 
Russia. Apart from the fact that they had revolted 
from the Habsburg Emperor, would they not be setting
^George Stewart, The White Armies of Russia 
York? The Macmillan Company, 1933)$ p. 96.
9s. Harrison Thomson, Czechoslovakia in European
History (Princeton? Princeton University Press, 19W), 
p. 254* Temperley, Peace Conference„ IV, p.
an iniquitous example to all other nationalities in Holy 
Russia?*^
Most of the internal differences between the Czech and Slo­
vak groups were Ironed out after the settlements in Russia 
recognized the Czechoslovak National Council, following a 
meeting held in Kiev during April, 1916®^ Actually, the 
Czech and Slovak elements resident in Russia reached an 
early decision to fight against the Austro-Hungarians. On 
August 4, 1914, a day before the Austrian declaration of war 
against Russia, they took action looking to the formation of 
an army of Russian Czechs and Slovaks, and laid a plan for 
a Czechoslovak Legion to accomplish that end before the 
Czarist Government •
On August 12th the proposal was accepted by the Minis­
try and on August 20th the formation of a Ceskii Dru^lna 
(Czech Brigade) was approved of by the Army Council....
On the same day, delegates of the Czech Committee at Mos­
cow were given an audience by the Tsar in the Kremlin, 
and submitted to the Monarch a memorandum dealing with 
the Czechoslovak question. Reflecting the strongly 
Russophil sentiment of the Czechoslovak settlers, the 
delegates expressed the loyalty to the Tsar of the Rus­
sian Czechs...^3
By late October, 191^9 the Dru^ina had departed for 
the feetern Front, the first contingent of anti-Habsburg
l^Henry Baerlein, The March of the Seventy Thousand 
(Londons Leonard Parsons, Ltd., 192^7, p. 47; Cf®, Stewart, 
op. cit., p. 97.
llThomson, op. cit. 9 p. 25^; Stewart, pp. cit.. p. 98.
T^Masaryk, Making of a. State. p. 149.
^Baerlein, pp. cit.» p. 22.
Czechs to take the field against the Dual Monarchy. At 
the front they were used primarily as spies and agitators 
among Czech regiments of the Austrian army. The success of 
the Druzina encouraged Czech leaders in Russia to expand 
their activities by seeking to enroll other Czechs and Slo­
vaks, who were serving in Russian regiments, in the Druzina 
and through attempts to get permission to allow Czech and 
Slovak prisoners-of-war to volunteer for such service 
The results, however, were not very heartening?
Though everything showed that the Government and the 
military authorities did not want a 'Czechoslovak army 
of any size, a regiment of Czechoslovak Riflemen was 
formed out of the Druzina in January, 1916; and in May, 
the creation of a brigade was permitted. It was more 
or less a nominal affair, for its strength was small; 
but it was a beginning. Stef^nik was then In Russia 
and used his influence to this end. ^ 5
Following the audience with the Tsar in mid-August, 
191^, at which the Czechoslovak leaders expressed their 
loyalty to the Romanovs, a special memorandum, entitled, 
Dokladnava Zaplska. was circulated to all the members of the 
Russian cabinet. This memorandum was the first clearly 
formulated program of modern Czechoslovak aims, and became 
the basis for practically all later negotiations with the 
Imperial Russian Government on matters concerning the Czecho* 
Slovak question. 0 As the political situation degenerated
l^Stewart, pp. cit.. p.
•^Masaryk, Making of a State. p. 150 
■^Baerlein, pp. pit.., p. 23*
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with the March and October Revolutions, and as Russia got 
out of the war, this working arrangement was replaced with 
agreements designed to meet the exigencies of prevailing 
conditions, and no permanent arrangement was ever established 
with the Provisional or Bolshevist Governments.
Authority was granted in October, 1916 for the Czecho­
slovaks to organize a division within the Russian Army, but 
this permission was soon withdrawn as differences of Russian 
opinion, and Internal problems among the Czechs and Slovaks 
hindered progress along these lines. Before the end of 1916, 
St efanik left Russia and went to the Roumanian Front, where 
he was soon at work helping to organize hundreds of prison- 
ers-of-war for service on the Western Front in France.1?
Professor Masaryk welcomed the Russian upheavals of 
1 9 1 ? . ^he March Revolution saw the barriers lowered which 
had kept him from visiting Russia and seemed to remove the 
spectre of a Russian Grand Duke taking over the reins of 
government at Prague, at the conclusion of the war. With 
the fall of the Romanovs, who had barred Masaryk from enter­
ing their realms because of his democratic and liberal views,
-^7r # Ernest Dupuy, Perish by the Sword. The Czechoslo­
vakian Anabasis and Our Supporting Campaigns in North Russia. 
1918-1920 (Harrisburg? The Military Service Publishing Co., 
1939), p. 29*
^Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Cent­
ral Europe. 1914-19181 A, Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and 
Propaganda (Princeton? Princeton University Press, 1957^,
P* 99.
he immediately made plans for a trip to Russia, where he ar­
rived from England in May* He had two principal objectives 
— the organization of an independent Czechoslovak army, and 
its transport for employment on the Western Front* By this 
time he was firmly convinced that a Czechoslovak Legion in 
France would have profound political significance*1^
Speaking of his visit, he wrote laters
I decided to go to Russia and carry through the 
creation of an army among our prisoners-of-war. Upon 
Milyukoff fPaveTl as Foreign Minister I counted especial­
ly ...we had met in England during the war and he had 
agreed upon the chief points of a war and peace pro­
gram....! called at once on Milyukoff, whom I found on 
the point of resignation— an unpleasant surprise. How­
ever, I established relations little by little with the 
other members of the Provisional Government...20
Meanwhile, and with great significance for the Czecho­
slovak cause, the Czech Brigade performed with distinction 
at the Battle of Zborov, during the Brusilov offensive in 
1917. As a result the Brigade was officially commended for 
its bravery*
The part played by the Czechoslovak Brigade in the 
June offensive...as well as the heroic incidents of the 
Tarnopol retreat, aroused sympathy, for the Czechoslo­
vak movement both in Russia and beyond the frontiers• 
Kerensky at once altered his policy towards the move­
ment ••.at once gave permission for recruiting to be 
carried on among the prisoners on the widest possible 
scale. This, and the reputation it won for the Czeeho-
F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations. 1917« 
The Decision to Intervene (Princeton; Princeton Univer< 
sity Press, 1958), II, p.
Soviet-Amerlean Relations)
(Cited hereafter as Kennan,
^°Masaryk, Making of a State, pp. 132-33
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Slovaks abroad, was the main success of Zborov.21 
Kerensky®s removal of the former restrictions^ sharply in­
creased the flow of volunteers into the Czechoslovak Bri­
gade, with approximately 30,000 new recruits quickly en­
listed, enabling it to be raised to the status of an army 
corps•
However, Masaryk was not without problems in Russia, 
as he sought to work with the Provisional Government of 
Alexander F. Kerensky. The acknowledged antagonism between 
the liberal and conservative wings of the Czechoslovak move­
ment there, did not make his work any easier, as each of 
these elements tended to work closely with the correspond­
ing elements of Russian society. The liberal socialistic 
Russian group then in power, as the Provisional Government, 
was not overly sympathetic to those conservative Czechs who 
still maintained friendly relations with anti-revolutionary 
Russian groups. This conservative tendency on the part of 
some of the Czechoslovaks almost cost the anti-Habsburg 
movement its Brigade in the Russian army; save for its per­
formance in the Battle of Zborov, which helped bring about 
a change in official thinking, permitting the Czechoslovaks 
to continue building up their small force.
Masaryk soon realized that the prospect of his suc-
2lBaerlein, pp. cit.. pp. ?7-?8. 
22Mamatey, pp. cit.. p. 99.
cess in Russia did not warrant the time involved, nor would 
he, even if finally successful there, achieve the recogni­
tion which he desired in the West for Czechoslovakian ambi­
tions* As a result, he sought to complete negotiations with 
M. Albert Thomas, on behalf of the Government of France, for 
the transfer of the first installment of thirty thousand 
prisoners-of-war to France; which number was to include 
several thousand Southern Slavs as well as Czechs and Slo­
vaks* The group was to include both men for military service 
and for industrial work in munitions factories.2^ The Rus­
sian General Staff, on May 14, 1917, granted the necessary 
request for the transfer* "This Agreement *..was the first 
Treaty to be concluded by our National Council with a State; 
.••France was the first to recognize our National G0uncil as 
a contracting Power**.*11,2^ Masaryk wrote.
The Agreement worked out by Thomas, who was represent­
ing France in its dealings with the Kerensky Government, so 
eagerly sought by Masaryk, was dictated by four considera­
tions which he hoped would centralize the direction of all 
Czech and Slovak military activity by the National Councils
(a) To transfer from Russia to France the greatest pos 
sible number of prisoners-of-war or other troops*
23Benes, oj>* clt■•■* pp* 186, 343, 374; Stewart, on* 
cit*. p* 99; Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs. A 
History of Relations Between the Soviet Union and the Rest 
of the World• 1917-1918 (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1951)» P* 108*
2^Masaryk, Making of a State. p* 166.
(b) To concentrate as rapidly as possible all the pris 
oners on French soil, together with the prisoners it 
might be possible to obtain from the Serbian government*
(c) To undertake an extensive volunteer movement in 
America*
(d) To make full use of the new and large resources 
which were provided by our numerous prisoners, who in 
the meanwhile had been collected in Italy.2*
Although both the Foreign Office and the General Staff 
as agencies of the Russian Government, promised quick action 
to get the convoy on its way through the port at Archangel, 
Interminable delays were encountered at every turn and the 
movement of the anti-Habsburg force from Russia to France 
was held up in the revolution-torn land. As a consequence, 
only two small contingents of troops, totalling about two 
thousand, four hundred men, were sent to France, one in 
October, 1917, and the other in the spring of 1918. After 
the Bolshevist uprising, chaotic conditions in Russia made 
additional troop movements Impossible.2^
The remainder of this group of thirty thousand Le­
gionaries, plus thousands of others who, at that time, were 
still prisoners-of-war, or members of the Czechoslovak units 
in service with the Provisional Government were,.hbwever,to 
contribute their part to Czechoslovak independence in an en­
tirely different theatre of operations, far removed from the 
Western Front as envisioned by Masaryk. Their contribution
25bene&, o jd .  clt *. p* 186*
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was to be made in the fields of Russia and along the steel 
ribbons of the continent-spanning Trans-Siberian Railroad*
The Czechoslovak Legion, aided by a limited Allied inter­
ventionist force, plus a motley array of anti-Red or White 
Russian forces, was to harass the armies of Soviet Russia for 
a period of many months.
The change of plans was occasioned by the October 
Revolution of 1917, and the subsequent desire of the new 
Soviet Government to conclude a separate peace with Ger­
many and the Central Powers--at any price. As long as the 
Bolsheviks continued the struggle against the enemies of the 
Czechs--Germanyand Austria-Hungary— members of the Czecho­
slovak Legions in Russia continued to fight at their side 
with dedication and distinction* However, when Soviet sup­
port of the Allied cause came to an abrupt halt with the 
opening of negotiations for the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 
December 2, 1917, Masaryk decided that all the Czechoslovak 
groups should be transferred to the Western Front where they 
could best be utilized to further Czechoslovak ambitions*
From the moment that the Bolshevists opened peace 
negotiations— they did so formally on December 2, 1917, 
by asking for an armistice, the Peace of Brest-Litovsk 
being signed on March 3, 1918— It was clear to us that 
our army had nothing more to do in Russian^slcT] * 
Therefore we began as early as possible to march out of 
the Ukraine into Russia on the way to Vladivostok and 
France.27
During the period from December, 1917, until the sign-
2?Masaryk, Making of a State, p* 184; Cf., Kennan, 
Sovlet-American Relations. $.1, “'f>7.137*
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ing of the treaty which took Soviet Russia out of the,war in 
March, 1918, the German Armies advanced deep into the Ukraine, 
where they placed the Czechoslovak forces in an untenable 
military position* Falling back with the last of the resist­
ing Russian forces, the Czechoslovaks gained commendations 
from the Soviets for their efforts in a four-day battle 
against the Germans at Bachmach, where they lost some 600 
men* As a result of their assistance to the retreating Red 
troops, the Czechoslovaks were given permission to leave 
Russia through Siberia as free citizens,28 an(3 Vladimir An­
tonov-Ovseenko, the Soviet Commander in Chief, authorized 
the Czechoslovaks to leave the Ukraine in an announcement 
dated March 6, 1918, which read as follows:
Our comrades of the Czechoslovak Corps, who have 
fought faithfully and valiantly in the region of 
Zhitomir*..,' Grebenko and Bachmach, are now leaving 
the Ukraine and are returning a part of their arms*
The revolutionary troops will never forget the frater­
nal help which the Czechoslovak Corps has rendered the 
working people of the Ukraine in their struggle against 
the imperialist looters. The revolutionary troops accept 
as a token of friendship, the arms which the Czechoslo­
vaks are leaving. Antonov.29
The sudden collapse of Red Army units under German 
pressure, provided the Czechoslovaks the opportunity to get 
desperately needed supplies and materials from former Imperi­
al Russian military depots with which to support their long
28stewart, op. cit*, p. 102; James Bunyan, Interven­
tion. Civil War and Communism in Russia (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1 9 3 6 ) , p* 76.
29Bunyan, op* cit *, p. 80.
retreat across Russia and Siberia to the port of Vladivostok. 
"We had to take what we wanted, for it was out of the ques­
tion to make arrangements with the authorities, so great was 
the prevailing uncertainty and so rapidly did the authorltlea 
change," said Masaryk In a later comment on the?situation.30
There Is much Information to support the claim that, 
at least in the beginning, both Masaryk and Bene¥ opposed 
active intervention against the Soviet regime and direct 
fighting with the forces of the Red Army. In the end, how­
ever, the Czechoslovaks, were forced to engage in open com­
bat against Red Russian units in order to extricate them­
selves from Russia and Siberia. Masaryk says,
...the revolutionary conditions in Russia dictated cate­
gorically the principle of non-interference— conditions 
the more complicated because districts and towns as well 
as races made themselves more or less independent....In 
Russia, though not yet in Siberia, the Bolshevists were 
beginning to organize an army.. To the East and in Si­
beria there were fewer troops, and therefore the Siberian 
route was the surest way to France.31
After nearly a year in Russia, negotiating for the 
withdrawal of Czechoslovak forces from that war-torn land, 
Masaryk took leave of his countrymen on March 6, 1918, in a 
special farewell proclamation which recognized the possibil­
ity of many difficulties on the Legion's long journey to 
Vladivostok. "...I was convinced that," he said later, "by 
avoiding interference in Russian affairs, It would end by
30Masaryk, Making of a State, p. 16?.
3iibia.. p. 190.
48
reaching its transports safely."32
The Czechoslovaks found themselves, at this time, in 
a position at once favorable and unfavorable* They were the
■t
only large body of troops on the Eastern Front with any re­
maining semblance of cohesion, discipline, and loyalty to the 
Entente cause, but, "the Corps found its position near the 
front an exposed and —  in view of the overwhelming superior­
ity of the**.Central Powers on the other side of the line—  
a dangerous one."33
There was, in .the unfolding of events as between the 
A l H e s  afndRuasia in the summer of 1918, no single factor 
that played a more significant role than the unique armed 
force known subsequently as the Czechoslovak L e g i o n . 34
While the above events were taking place in Russia, in 
December, 1917, an "Autonomous Czechoslovak Army," composed 
of Czechoslovak forces serving with the Western Allies, was 
recognized by the Allied powers as a regular Allied mili­
tary force, subordinate to the French High Command. During 
the course of the following winter, arrangements were made to 
incorporate the Czechoslovak Legions in Russia and Siberia as 
an integral part of this organization, "and agreement was 
reached with the French Government that the Corps should be
32lbld.. p. 1971 CT*, Kennan, Sovlet-American Rela­
tions, SI," pi* 139*
33Kennan, Soviet-American Relations* II,Ip*.138.
3^Ibid.. p. 136.
evacuated to Prance as rapidly as possible.“35 Good reason®
for this hoped for speedy transfer of the Czechoslovaks to 
the Western Front were clearly apparent to the military 
leaders of the Ententes
The Russian collapse meant that perhaps six hundred 
thousand Germans would be released for duty on the west­
ern front, while it seemed that Allied strength might 
fall off...an equal n u m b e r . 36
Prior to leaving Russia and his beleaguered country­
men for the long trip, via Vladivostok, to Washington and a 
meeting with President Woodrow Wilson, Dr. Masaryk felt that 
he had made satisfactory arrangements with the Soviets for 
the Legions to move peacefully over the Trans-Siberian rail­
road to Vladivostok and the sea. Eventually, under his plan, 
they would arrive on the Western Front, to enter actively in 
the fighting on the Allied side against the Central Powers.
As he reported later %
On March 26 a treaty was signed with the Bolshevists 
guaranteeing our men an unmolested passage to Siberia and 
Vladivostok. True, this had been already agreed upon 
with Muravleff 1N. N.. Muraviev, Soviet Administrator in 
the Far East I after the Bolshevist troops had reached the 
Ukraine; but, to make assurance doubly sure, we negotia­
ted also with the Moscow Soviet. On March 26, indeed the 
Moscow Commissar, Stalin, telegraphed to the local Soviets 
that the Czechoslovaks were not going through as an armed 
unit but as free citizens, and that they carried a cer­
tain number of weapons as protection against the counter-
35Ibid., p. 138; Cf*, Temperley, Peace Conferenee* IV, 
pp. 260-61; Stewart, op. cit.. p. 102; Bunyan, op. cit., pp. 
75- 76*
36samuel Flagg Bemis, (ed.), The American Secretaries 
of State and Their Diplomacy (Mew Xorks Alfred A. Knopf,
revolutionaries. He addedt "The Soviet of the People’s 
Commissars wishes every assistance be given to them on 
Russian soil."3/
Events which appeared to be moving smoothly when Masaryk
left Russia, were to take a new turn, with the addition of
violence, before long— -and the violence was to continue for
many months in the future.
While the Legions in Russia were preparing to fulfill 
their as yet unknown mission, Czechs and Slovaks in other 
lands, were making their contribution to the winning of in­
dependence for Czechoslovakia. From the very beginning of 
the war, Czech Emigres had been enlisting in the French Army 
until, by the war’s end, some twelve thousand were serving 
honorably on the Western Front. Included in this number 
were many Czechs and Slovaks resident in London and else­
where in Great Britain, who had enlisted in the British 
forces.
It was...Masaryk who realized that by the formation 
o.f Legions, that on entering the Allied armies under 
their own flag, that by showing a willingness to shed 
blood for their country, a most convincing argument 
would be presented of the sincerity of the Czechoslovak 
claims.38
3?Masaryk, Making of a State, p. 200; Cf., Baerlein, 
op. cit.. pp. 109-10.
38Thomas $apek, Jr., Origins of the Czechoslovak 
State (Hfew YorkTI Revell Press, 192^7, p. 57* ££•> Maibone 
Watson Graham, Jr., New Governments of Central Europe (New 
Yorks Holt & Co., 1924), p.2?4; Temperley, Peace Conference 
IV, p. 259*
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Even if the number of Czechs and Slovaks serving with the 
Allies on the Western Front was small, it made it possible 
for the National Council to use the fact of their service in 
its propaganda and education campaign, especially among the 
leaders and people of France. By conference, and through 
private interviews, Bene¥ and his General Secretariat in 
Paris were able to support their thesis— that the dissolu­
tion of the Habsburg Empire and the liberation of the subject 
peoples within the Dual Monarchy, was an absolute require­
ment to assure lasting peace after the w a r . 39
In an article written in 1918 for The Nation, en­
titled, "The Czecho-Slovak Nation," Masaryk declared, "Our 
army, then fighting on three fronts— in France, Italy and 
Russia— Is, on the basis of our historical and natural rights, 
a regular army. . . As early as December 16, 1917, the 
French Government had recognized the Czechoslovak forces as 
an autonomous army, fighting under its own flag against the 
Central Powers, which, while It acknowledged the military 
authority of the French High Command, was under the pollti- 
cal control of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris. 
Realizing that every such recognition of Its armies would
39Thomson, op. cit.. p. 197; Benes, e>p. cit.. p. 276.
^Thomas G. Masaryk, "The Czecho-Slovak Nation," The 
Nation. CVII (October, 1918), 387.
^Temperley, Peace Conference. IV, p. 261; Jfapek, 
op. cit., p. 58.
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help secure greater recognition for the National Council* the
leaders among the Czechs and Slovaks all over the world bent
every energy toward achieving that end. The effect of the
French action and the recognition of other nations is pointed
v
out by Thomas Capek, Czech author, "This, and similar de­
crees, coming from the other Allied nations, gave them a 
special military status which eventually led to a recognition 
of belligerency*"**'2
With Czechoslovaks enrolled in the armies of France, 
Britain and Russia, there still existed the large, and vir­
tually untapped, numbers of Czechoslovak prisoners-of-war 
even in the West that might be drawn upon to build up En­
tente forces— especially those prisoners controlled by Italy* 
Until the disaster at Caporetto (October 24-November 1, 191?) 
Italian leaders were not particularly receptive to repre­
sentations made by the National Council, nor did they show 
great interest in the possibility of these prisoners-of-war 
being formed into a Czechoslovak unit for service with the 
Italian Army* Following that debacle, however, and after 
lengthy preliminary negotiations, Milan Stefanik was instru­
mental in concluding a treaty on April 21, 19X8, with Italian 
Premier Vittorio Orlando, ^  to permit formation of an Inde­
pendent Czechoslovak Army, commanded by General Andrea
^2fiapek, o^* cit * * p* $Q9
^Masaryk, Making of a State * p« 215*
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Grazlani, but led by both Italian and Czechoslovak officers.
}
Like the early arrangements with the French, political con-
I-
trol was to remain with the Czechoslovak National Council in 
Paris *
The Italian treaty was the first concluded by the 
National Council which clearly recognized it as a 
sovereign political body* The diplomatic victory was 
all the more significant in that an initial prejudice 
against the Czechoslovaks had to be overcome*^
Although scarcely noticed in England, shortly thereafter,
when the Prince of Wales visited Home on May 23, 1918, the
guard of honor was formed by Czechoslovaks, The honor,
nevertheless, caused a profound sensation throughout Austria
Hungary*^5
Recognition by Italy came as a fitting reward after 
many months of patient labor on the part of all the members 
of the Czechoslovak National Council, during which they had 
to overcome the strongest resistance to their cause, be­
cause of deep suspicion on the part of the Italian Govern­
ment* This suspicion stemmed from the increasingly bitter 
dispute over the Adriatic coast lands between the Italians 
and another group of Slav peoples fighting for separation 
from the Habsburgs, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes* The 
Czechoslovaks were not concerned with the quarrel between 
the South Slavs and Italy, but their cause suffered harm as
^Thomson, op* cit *■« p* 264*
^Temperley, Peace Conference, IV, p* 261*
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this enmity became more pronounced* The Czechs, therefore, 
were hampered by the animosity of the Italians for the Yugo­
slavs, all the while they were working to create an atmos­
phere more favorable to their own cause* Much was done to 
create a favorable climate for Czechoslovak aims in Italy 
during 1916 and '1917, as Czechoslovak propaganda began to 
give the Italian leaders a better understanding of the 
Czechoslovak problem* As a result, several prominent poli­
ticians and publicists openly advocated independence for the 
Czechs and Slovaks, and urged that their prisoners-of-war be 
used in the Italian armies, and “In 1917 Benito Mussolini 
supported the claims of the Czechs to an independent nation­
al existence in his paper, Pooolo d 0 Italia.
With the signing of the Italian treaty, which was 
soon followed by the organization and participation of 
Czechoslovak forces on the Southern Front, news media be­
gan to point to the accomplishments of the new allies and, 
thereby, built for a wider popular acceptance of the Czecho­
slovak cause in Italy* One influential American weekly news 
magazine carried the following account:
Many Bohemian troops, according to the London Daily 
Mail, have joined the Italian colors against Austria*
The detachments belonged to a Czechoslovak army which 
is being formed in many centers from former subjects 
to Emperor Charles* Their defection has caused much 
anxiety among the Austro-Hungarian commanders, who
^Thomson, op# cit *, p* 247*
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fear the effect on their Slav t r o o p s * ^ 7
As the Czechoslovak soldiers on the Italian battle­
fields continued to perform with distinction, bearing out 
Masaryk* s statement, 1 Our Czech soldiers are good fighters, 
brave to the point of heroism,”*1'® Italian acceptance and sup­
port of the war aims of the National Council strengthened* 
Fortunately, the Czechoslovak troops that saw action along 
with the Italians were seasoned veterans and often were 
cited for conspicuous bravery, as in the official Italian 
communique of General Armando Diaz, of September 22, 1918*^9 
The Legion was in action on the Piave from late, June until 
the end of October, the battle that marked the last serious 
effort of the Austrian armies to mount a successful offen­
sive* Here, as wherever they were utilized in Italy, the 
Czechoslovaks proved to be excellent soldiers* Again, It 
should be noted that these former prisoners-of-war actually 
were in double jeopardy during their front-line duties? 
they faced, as all soldiers do, the threat of death in ac­
tual combat, plus the almost assured death if they were 
captured by the Austrians, as technically, they were still 
subjects of the Dual Monarchy, and their actions were con-
^7,lBohemia Ablaze With Revolt,” The Literary Digest, 
LVIII (July 6, 1918), 30*
**®Masaryk, Making of a State* p* 173*
^Thomson, cit * * p. 264*
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sidered traitorous by that government*
When the United States entered the war on April 6, 
1917, Czechoslovak volunteers enlisted in the American 
Expeditionary Force in considerable numbers* Bene^ points 
out the result of this enlistment practice on the enrollment 
of volunteers for the army being recruited by the National 
Council, saying: "...accordingly the recruiting of volun­
teers for our own army In France, which had been arranged 
in the United States by ef^nik, met with comparatively 
limited success."5® Nevertheless, about 3$000 Amerlcan- 
Czechoslovaks volunteered for service with the Czechoslo­
vakian army in France and saw action on the Western Front* 
These were the most enthusiastic of the Czechs and Slovaks 
residing In the United States, who volunteered for duty out 
of a deep love for their old homeland. Many of them were to 
return to Czechoslovakia following the war to assist in form­
ing the new nation. Even greater numbers of American-Czecho- 
slovaks, who on immigrating to the United States, had made a 
definite decision to become citizens of the land of their 
new residence, saw action as volunteers and conscripts with 
the American Expeditionary Force* They served with honor 
and distinction with this great force, in the service of 
both their new nation and their old interest, as the two 
were Interwoven by events*
5®Bene¥, og. cit.. p. 101*
Czechoslovaks, thus, were fighting on three battle-' 
fields— France, Italy and Russia* The Legions were to add a 
fourth "front"*— Siberia— to their distinguished record of 
service before the fighting ended* Circumstances determined 
a line of action there not envisioned by even so far seeing^ 
a man as Dr. Masaryk at the time when actual hostilities 
were at an end in most of the theatres of war*
CHAPTER IV
ACTION AT THE FRONT HAS MANX EFFECTS AT HOME
Within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Czech and Slovak 
nationalists, particularly the former, constantly maintained 
opposition against the German and Magyar rule throughout the 
whole period of the 1914-1918 war. This internal dissention 
provided many anxious moments for the Habsburg leaders In 
Vienna and Budapest, and made it necessary for the Dual Mon­
archy to devote a great deal of time, effort, and manpower 
to maintain control of the areas of Bohemia, Moravia, and 
Slovakia* This, the Government could ill afford to do dur­
ing such a bitter struggle and, as a result, the two minor­
ity groups seriously embarrassed the Habsburg regime on 
numerous occasions* Situations, like that of Dr* Kramlr, 
already mentioned, were duplicated thousands of times over 
and the rebellious Czechoslovak leaders, especially adamant 
in their opposition to the Imperial war aims, constantly 
sought means to prevent the successful conduct of military 
operations by the Austro-Hungarian forces*
Czech obstructionism, even prior to the declaration 
of war was considerable* In the Austrian Relchsrat it vir­
tually stopped the conduct of business by that body. Every
\
possible type of noisemaking equipment was used by opposi­
tion Deputies to disrupt Relchsrat sessions? trumpets, 
snare drums, the slamming of desk tops, stamping of feet
and other means of expressing audible disapproval of the 
Governments activities were employed* "The Eelchsrat be­
came notorious for its forensic— and physical— battles, 
carping and singularly unconstructive criticism, filibuster­
ing, and incapacity to act," Mamatey points o u t T h i s  op­
position finally lead to the proroguing of the Chamber in 
March, 191^, setting the stage for the subject peoples® 
claims that they were not consulted in any <way concerning the 
declaration of war against Serbia, and the following broaden­
ing of the war subsequent to that initial declaration*^
On the ground that they were not consulted, the Czechs 
and Slovaks declared that, since they had no part in the de­
claration of war, their men should not be used in its prose­
cution* This feeling, which was widespread, resulted in 
mass desertions from the Habsburg armies to the Hussians 
and the Serbians, as sympathy for the latter people was
strong throughout Bohemia and Slovakia* Evidence of this
/v
feeling is found in the roles played earlier by Kramar and 
Masaryk in exposing Austro-Hungarian tactics in the period 
just before the Austro-Hungarian annexation of the Bosnian
■^Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Cen­
tral Europe * 191^-19181 A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and 
Propaganda (Princeton? Princeton University Press * 1957T7” 
p* 17 •
^David F* Strong, Austria (October 1918-March 1919) 
Transit ion from Empire to Republic (London? P* S„ Kind’ &
Son, Ltd * , 1939) s> P* 38*
area, during the Balkan Crisis of 1 9 0 8 - 1 9 0 9 Throughout 
the war this feeling of friendship for the Serbs was extend­
ed to include all the peoples who were to make up the new 
Yugoslav State* the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and was 
often evidenced by the actions of the Czechoslovak leaders*
4
The Czechoslovaks, for example, worked diligently to create 
an understanding between the Yugoslavs and the Italians so 
that a united front of the subject peoples could be main­
tained against the Habsburgs; and the joint actions taken 
by emigr£ leaders of both the Northern and Southern Slays
in many propaganda and education activities in the Entente
hcountries, attest to this close, friendly relationship*^
It has been argued that the Czechoslovaks,as a result, were 
Instrumental in the formation of both their own State and 
that of the Yugoslavs*^
Despite constant obstructionism, desertions and In-
3h . W* V, Temperley, (ed«), A History of the Peace 
Conference of Paris (Londons Henry Prowde, Hodder & Stough­
ton, 1920-192^), IV, p* 2^9* (Cited hereafter as Temperley, 
Peace Conference)*
^Dr. Thomas Qarrigue Masaryk, The Making of a State„ 
Memories and Observations (New Yorks Frederick A* Stokes Com­
pany, I927), PP* 120-21*
5r . W* Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (New Yorks 
The Macmillan Company, 19^3)a PP« 2^-25; A. J* P* Taylor,
The Habsburg Monarchy* 1809-1918* A History of the Austrian 
Empire and Austria-Hungary* New Ed 11 i on (Lond on s Hamish 
Hamilton, 1955 K  P * 247• (Cited hereafter as Taylor,
Habsburg Empire)*
ternal difficulties fomented by the Czechoslovaks and their 
leaders, only a few people, other than the most ardent of 
the revolutionaries and extreme pan-Slavists, however, 
sought the complete dissolution of the Monarchy at the be- 
ginning of the war* Most of the minority leaders asked 
only for equality within the Empire* With better leader­
ship, Austria-Hungary might have survived the conflict, and 
even might have been spared the ordeal had It been willing 
to establish a federal state with autonomy for the principal 
minority groups within Its boundaries*
Many students of the Austro-Hungarian problem claim 
that the autonomy of the several nationalities as mem­
bers of a federal empire would be a better solution 
than the creation of new independent s t a t e s . °
In any case, It seems clear that the Czechoslovaks, destined 
to become the bitterest foes of the Habsburgs, were not, at 
least early in the war, fully united on a program of inde­
pendence from the Empire* In fact they appear to have been 
the most sincere minority group in the Empire in their de­
sire to achieve federalism* Separatist movements among them 
were negligible, if not entirely absent, in 191^» and senti­
ment among them was chiefly directed towards the attainment 
of equality with the dominant German and Magyar groups * 7
For the Czechs, from the first awakening of the demo­
cratic national spirit until the dissolution of the mon­
archy, were not disinclined to accept the plan that the
^Charles G. Fenwick, '“Notes on International Affairs, 
American Political Science Review * XII (November, 1916), 715
^Strong, op* pit.,- pp. 15-16.
future Bohemia would become a part of a federal state 
and they would have willingly participated in a cen­
tral parliament including all the nations of the 
monarchy as equal members*°
Men, who were later to become avowed foes of the Dual Mon­
archy, expressed a desire, early in the war, to develop an 
autonomous system under the Habsburg Crown. Eduard Benes, 
later one of the most ardent anti-Habsburg leaders among the 
Czech emigres. was one of these# Professor Kerner, writing 
after the war, points out this change in Benes® beliefs:
He [Benes] had believed In the possibility of a demo­
cratic federalized u Austria-Hungary ^ but when the World 
War began, Eduard Benes was among the first to see that 
such a conflagratIon could create much more formidable 
forces against the Empire from without than the German 
Alliance or any binding forces from within.9
The Austro-Hungarian government, under the aged and 
senile Franz Josef, however, was not sympathetic to an Em­
pire-wide federal system. Its strength, it was thought by 
Its leaders, was dependent upon a highly centralized, bureau­
cratic organization* The Dual Monarchy comprised eleven na­
tions, speaking ten languages| yet the government demanded 
that the administration be conducted through the media of 
two legal and official languages, German and Magyar*
"The actual possessors of power, and the indispensable sup­
port of the dynasty, were the bureaucrats, German to a man,"
8q scar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy 
(Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 19295, p * 3^8.
^Robert J. Kerner, "The Winning of Czechoslovak In­
dependence, " Foreign Affairs, VII (January, 1929), 310*
Redlich reports of the Austrian half of the Monarchy.10 In
yars in a similar exclusive fashion*
Of the many Slavic peoples In the Austrian portion of 
the Dual Monarchy, the Poles of Galicia enjoyed preferential 
treatment above the others, having obtained, at least in a 
de facto manner, approximately the position of the Magyars, 
This resulted from a "tacit understanding that in exchange 
for a free hand In Galicia, the Polish delegation in the 
Relchsrat in Vienna would support the Crown,1111 Nothing of 
the same sort of arrangement was made for either the neigh­
boring Czechs or Slovaks, and the Austrians, varying their 
tactics to meet current situations, managed to maintain their 
supremacy In the Relchsrat. until that body was prorogued*
The challenge to the Habsburgs, coming in the main from the 
Czechs, developed as the war advanced. Of all the subject 
peoples, they alone had growing, and clear, understanding of 
who was their real enemy, "The Czechs were threatened only 
by the Germanss they had everything to fear from a German 
victory and nothing from a German defeat," says one of the 
most distinguished historians of the period,12 Coupled 
with their growing realization that the Germans had no in­
Hungary, the positions of authority were manned by the Mag-
luJoseph Redlich, Austrian War Government (New Havens 
Xale University Press, 1929)* p. 8,
Strong, op. cit,, p. 191 Cf., Redlich, oo. cit
p* 78*
Monarchy, pp. 238-39Taylor
terest in assisting in the restoration of Czech independence, 
the Czechs soon saw that the Austrian Government’s role was 
maintenance of German supremacy.
This*,,gave rise to a sense of despair among the'in­
tellectual classes of the non-German peoples, which, 
spreading through the population, found expression In 
the mass desertion of Slav divisions from the army In
the field, 3
Suppression of opposition movements within the Empire 
became Increasingly ruthless as the war advanced, as the men 
responsible for Austria’s military, political and administra­
tion activities saw little hope of maintaining the Empire and 
their positions, save through a decisive victory of German 
arms. Thus "until the change of regime which followed the
death of Francis Joseph, the Czechs were as completely mdz-
1 ij/zled as any people in Europe," While the most ardent
leaders of the oppressed nation slipped over the frontiers
to carry on political and military action against the Habs­
burgs, those who remained at home faced a stern and implacable 
foe, determined to use every means of repression at his com­
mand to counteract the flood of propaganda which threatened
to Inundate the Empire. Such repressive measures, coupled 
with the hardships encountered at home, created "despair and 
indignation, with the result that anti-Habsburg propaganda 
found fertile soil. And, slgnificantly, this was particu-
^Redlich, op. cit*, p* 98*
^Temperley, Peace Conference„ IV, p. 251*
larly true of the peasants," reports David F. Strong, an 
able historian of the Central-European scene.^
One of the earliest manifestations, as we have seen, 
of opposition to the established regime was the formation of 
the strong "Maffla" organization in Bohemia. Besides pro­
viding Information for the emigres to use with Entente lead­
ers, the "Maffla" also served as a rallying point for the men 
and women who remained behind. Close contact was maintained 
between Masaryk, Bene? and all the leaders in the Entente
V
countries, and Kramar, Dr, P. Samal and their supporters in 
Prague— which kept the fires of revolution burning through­
out the conflict. Because of the conditions within the Em­
pire under which the resistance forces had to operate, says
/ /
Strong, it is easy to understand why the emigres seemed to 
have the more advanced political ideass
In general it may be said that the Czech National 
Council at Paris, working with the tacit encouragement 
of the Entente, and later with its benediction, repre­
sented the most advanced position, while the Czech 
leaders at home followed their leaders in Paris#1®
Constant pressure was exerted on the Czech leaders 
in the Empire by the Austrian War Government, and Czernln 
exacted from the Parliamentary clubs of the Czechs, Yugo­
slavs and Deputies of other subject nationalities, state-
^Strong, 0£. cit., p. 72.
l6Ibld.. pp. 75-76.
ments affirming their loyalty to the Empire*1? For example, 
the Czech parliamentary association, “while upholding the de­
mands for the Bohemian Staatsrecht * had proclaimed, 8 their
1 ftattachment to the dynasty and its historic mission*In The 
Austrians were quick to use this statement in an effort to 
drive a wedge between the Czechoslovak National Council in 
Paris and the Czech and Slovak peoples at home. Little, if 
any, success attended these efforts, as the Czechoslovaks 
in the Dual Empire and Masaryk and the National Council in 
the West both realized that the statement was issued under 
duress•^  Considerable Allied credence was given to the 
statement, however, and, for a time at least, it delayed 
recognition and international support of the Council under 
Masaryk®s leadership* It was another hurdle which he and 
his devoted followers had to take in stride in their drive 
toward independence, as Masaryk points outs
We also had to convince the Americans that we meant 
to be free and were fighting for freedom* Again and 
again we were told that the Czech leaders at home were 
not in opposition to Austria, and the disavowal which 
we had received•«.was constantly thrown in our teeth*20
^Mamatey, 0£. cit* * pp. 47-48.
^Robert A* Kann, The Multinational Empire * National­
ism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy * 1848-191^ 
(New Yorks Columbia University Press, 1950), II, p. 2^1. 
(Cited hereafter as Kann, Multinational Empire)*
■^Mamatey, ojgu cit* * p* 48.
20Masaryk, Making of a State, p. 2?4*
As the war dragged on into 1917, and as secret peace 
negotiations were being conducted behind the scenes by the 
Entente and Charles* Government,21 the subject peoples were 
becoming increasingly active In their opposition to the Habs­
burg Empire* In May, 1917, on the initiative of Jaroslav 
Kvapil, Czech poet and dramatist, the Manifesto of Czech 
Writers was addressed to Bohemian members of the Relchsrat. 
"If you cannot carry out all that the nation demands of you 
and charges you with, then resign your right to sit and ap­
peal to the highest authority— to your nation," the Manifes­
to charged*22 The Czech Deputies responded to this stirring 
appeal when the parliamentary assembly reopened later in the 
month. On May 30, Frantesek Stan&k, spokesman for the Czech 
Parliamentary Club, offered a resolution demanding the trans­
formation of Austria-Hungary "into a federal state of free 
and equal national states," and the union of the Czechs and 
Slovaks "In a single democratic Bohemian State.**2^ Included
21Perhaps the most Interesting peace attempt was the 
celebrated "Sixtus Affair," secret discussions carried on by 
Emperor Charles and Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, his 
brother-in-law, an officer in the Belgian Army. Discussed 
fully In Kann, Multinational Empire * pp* 26?ff*
22Robert Joseph Kerner, (ed*)* Czechoslovakiai Twenty 
Years of Independence (Berkeley and Los Angeless University 
of California Press. 1940), p. 53* (Cited hereafter as Ker­
ner, Czechoslovakia)♦
v 2^Temperley, Peace Conference. IV, p. 255, Cf*, Thom­
as Capek, Jr., Origins of the Czechoslovak State (TWew YorTcTl 
Revell Press, 192o), pp. 77-78. Complete Resolution.
In these demands was recognition of the historic rights of 
the Czech Nation and acceptance of the principle of national 
self-determination* Among other things, this was a direct 
challenge to Hungary, as Czechoslovak unityc©oi»ld^hot-'b© 
achieved without dissolving the Kingdom of Hungary, as con­
stituted under the Ausglelch of 1867* The Czechoslovak ques­
tion was, thus, the key to the life or death of the Habsburg 
Empire, as Mamatey points out, r6 the threat of complete dis­
memberment# •.was clearly understood by the statesmen of Vi-
25enna, and they were terror-stricken.19 ■
Another important event, destined to have a powerful 
effect on the future of the Dual Monarchy, took place in the
summer of 1917* In the Declaration of Corfu of July 20,
1917s the South Slavs made Yugoslavian union an official Ser­
bian and South Slav war aim.2^ Partial unification was re­
jected, and Southern Slav leaders within the Monarchy dis^ 
carded all thought of further cooperation with either the 
Austrians or the Hungarians. Prom this time forward, "South­
ern Slav Deputies in the Relchsrat conferred frequently with 
the Czech Deputies, and supported the latter in their parlla-
2^Robert J. Kann, The Habsburg Empire. A Study in In­
tegration and Disintegration (New Yorks Frederick A. Praeger, 
1957)P P« 1$7* (Cited hereafter as Kann, The Habsburg Em- 
plre)*
2^Mamatey, op. clt.„ p. ^7.
26Ibld., p. 114.
mentary opposition and obstruction, [,<crStrong has noted.
Events continued the rapid drift in the direction of 
a Czechoslovak plan for complete independence during 1916.
On January 6, all the Czech Deputies in the Reichsrat held a 
meeting in Prague with leaders of the literary and business 
world, marking the real break of the Czech leadership with 
the dynasty. This Epiphany Day meeting reaffirmed the prin­
ciple of self-determination for the Czechoslovak peoples and 
strongly protested the Austrian policy in the negotiations 
for the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. As a result of his part in 
the negotiations, Count Czernin was accused of forsaking
O Q
true Imperial interests for the benefit of Germany.
Hopes for an intra-empire national compromise, if 
they ever existed, vanished completely. The Czech poli­
tical declaration of Epiphany 1918 in Prague, the last 
move before the actual outbreak of the revolution, pro­
claimed in much stronger terms outright self-determina­
tion as the principle goal of the Czech people. There 
could be little doubt now that this was only a thinly 
camouflaged advance notice of their goal of complete in­
dependence.^
Czernin angrily struck back, attacking "the miserable Masa- 
ryk" and those other Masaryks within the Monarchy, who used
2?Strong, op. clt., p. 7^*
2®Temperley, Peace Conference. IV, p. 258l Taylor, 
Habsburg Monarchy. pp. l Charles Pergler, America in
the Struggle for Czechoslovak Independence (Philadelphiai 
Dorrance and Company, 1926), pp. 1P7-X3*
2^Kann, The Habsburg Empire, p. 1^9#
their immunity to encourage the enemy.3P But the Czechs 
were not to be cowed by the Foreign Minister, who had long 
since lost their confidence and respect, and some six thou­
sand demonstrators assembled in Prague on April 13 to answer 
the allegation that the Czechoslovak people did not stand 
behind their leaders* A solemn oath to "hold on till victor 
ry" and i n d e p e n d e n c e w h i c h ,  while in no way official, 
showed the growing strength that the separatist movement had 
with the rank and file in Prague.
Nationalist sentiment reached a fever pitch during 
the Jubilee celebration of the Czech National Theatre held 
in Prague on May 15. Held ostensibly in celebration of the 
anniversary of the theatre, the Jubilee actually was staged 
to serve as a demonstration against the Empire, and was at­
tended by representatives of all the Czech and Slovak par­
ties and by prominent Polish, Italian, Yugo-Slav and Ruman­
ian figures. The names of Masaryk and Wilson were repeatedly 
acclaimed by the crowd, which, In a turbulent session, de­
manded full Independence for Czechoslovakia and the estab­
lishment of a democratic government.32
30Temperley, Peace Conference„ IV, p* 83.
^1Ibid., p. 258.
32United States Department of State, Papers Relating 
to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1 The World War. 
1918, Supplement 1,(Washingtons Government Printing Office, 
1933), I, p. 80 6. (Series cited hereafter as For. Reis. of 
U. S., 1918» M r .  1).
Four days later, Emperor Charles added further fuel 
to the fires of anger consuming the Czechoslovaks, when, in 
an Imperial Rescript, he declared that the dominantly German 
districts of Bohemia would, on January 1, 1919, he separated 
from the Czech districts# This determined the Czechs to work 
harder for complete independence and the defeat of the Cen­
tral Powers# "Henceforth, it was to be either complete in­
dependence or partition for B o h e m i a . T h e  Rescript welded 
even closer the bonds between the Czechoslovak leaders at 
home and the National Council abroad. On July 16, 1918, 
Vlatismil Tusar, a militant Czech Deputy, declared in the 
Relcbsrat that "the war must end with the creation of a 
Czecho-Slovak State," while the next day, M# Stribrny, an­
other Czech Deputy, sang the praises of the Czech troops 
fighting for the Entente against the Central Powers#3^
These revolutionary statements were made in the Relchsrat 
less than a week after the "Czech Maffia boldly came into 
the open and constituted itself as the Czech National Com­
mittee of Prague#"35 with Kramar as its president, the com­
mittee represented\ all political parties in Bohemia, with 
membership based on party strength in the last Austrian elec­
tion of 1911.36
. 33strong, op. cit#, p. 75.
3^Temperley, Peace Conference. IV, p. 262#
35Mamatey, op# cit.# p. 318.
3^Ibid., ,
When the Reichsrat reconvened in October, 1918, Baron 
Max von Hussarek, Austrian Premier, told the assembled dele­
gates that the introduction of national autonomy must be re­
garded as inevitable* But this concession to the desires of 
the subject peoples was too late* Their representatives had 
not come to the Reichsrat to listen to plans designed to 
strengthen or save the Empire; instead they were there to 
announce their intention of withdrawing from it* During 
the first session of the body, the Czech Deputy, Frantisek 
Stanek, speaking for all Czech Deputies, rejected autonomy 
under the Habsburgs and declared their solidarity with the 
Czechoslovak movement a b r o a d *37 n@ Said in part, as quoted 
by Temperley:
The Czech Legions, fighting in conjunction with the 
Allies, had been called a rabble, but it is just with 
them that the Austrian Government will have to discuss 
the future of the Czecho-Slovak nation, ,fand that is 
why we will not discuss it with you here*1138
Masaryk attributes a similar statement to Dr# Alois Has in, a
prominent Czech leader who remained in the Empire throughout
the war as an active member of the MMaffiarl* Dr* Basin said
to the gathered deputies in the Reichsrat s
You wished to exclude us from the peace negotiations, 
but now, against your will, you will find Czechs taking 
part in them, as representatives of the Czechoslovak 
brigades* With them you will have to negotiate upon the 
Czech question, not with us; and hence we decline to
37ibld.. p. 323.
38Teaiperley, Peaoe Conference. IV, p. 9^.
negotiate with you* This question will be solved else­
where than in Austria* Here there are no factors com­
petent to solve it.39
Following the Austrian Note of October b to Presi­
dent Wilson, offering to negotiate peace on the basis of the 
Fourteen Points, Baron Hussarek admitted to the Reichsrat 
that such objectives were incompatible with the existing 
structure of the Monarchy* As soon as the Intention to 
negotiate on these terms was made known, "Magyar public 
opinion stampeded for separation” from Austria as a partner 
in the Dual Monarchy.^ The peace note, tendered by Count 
Stephen Burian, a Magyar serving as the Austrian Foreign 
Minister, which arrived in Washington through Swedish dip­
lomatic channels on October 7, had offered to
♦.♦His Lordship the President of the United States.*.to 
conclude with him and his allies an armistice...and to 
enter immediately upon negotiations for a peace for whicl 
the fourteen points•..should serve as a foundation...^1
In a last desperate effort to save the Empire, Em­
peror Charles issued his famous Manifesto "To My Loyal Aus­
trian Peoples,” on October 16, 1918, agreeing to the federal- 
ization of Austria in a futile attempt to comply with the
saryk, Making of a State, p. 386*
^^Temperley, Peace Ctonferenoe. IV, 95 •
^ J a m e s  Brown Scott, (ed*), Official Statements of 
War Alms and Peace Proposals. December 1916 to November 
1918 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1921)j p.
ideas expressed by President Wilson in his declaration of 
January, 1918, relating to Austria-Hungary* By the terms of 
the Manifesto. Austria in the future would be composed of 
four national States— German, Czech, Yugo-Slav and Ukranian; 
Trieste was to be made a free port, while the Poles of Gali­
cia were to be free to unite with Poland if they wished.**2 
Under existing conditions, with the Dual Monarchy reeling 
under Allied military attacks and subjected to ever-greater 
pressures for dismemberment from within, the Manifesto 
pleased no one and was universally accepted as a formal 
notification of the death of the Empire.**3 "The boldest 
blueprint ever drawn up in the Hofburg to rebuild the Em- 
pire,M said Gordon Shepherd, "was used Instead as its demo­
lition order. ”****
Just three days later, the Czech National Committee 
in Prague declared that the Czech people could no longer 
negotiate with Vienna, and that the Bohemian question was, 
in the future, an international question which could be 
solved only on the basis of absolute national independence. **5
**2&apek, op. cit.. pp. 89-90. Complete text*
*K3Temperley, Peace Conference. IV, p. 26b; Redlich, 
op* cit♦» p. 163| Strong, op. cit., pp. 9^-96; Graham, op*
cit*. pp. 501-2.
^ G o r d o n  Shepherd, The Austrian •Odyssey (Londons 
Macmillan & Go*, Ltd*, 195717 P * §9•
^Temperley, Peace Conference, IV, g. 102.
This declaration was based on President Wilson’s reply (de­
layed purposely for eleven days) to Count Burian' s peace pro­
posal. In his answer, the President stated that the situation 
had changed since January 8, when he had announced his Four­
teen Points,**^ and for the men In the Ballplatz, as well as 
those of both the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris and 
the Czechoslovak National Committee in Prague, this could 
mean but one things
an armistice could be obtained only by the official re­
cognition of the independence, not only of the Poles, as 
hadJbeen agreed, but also of a Czechoslovak1 State, in­
volving a loss' to Atfstria~'of Bohemia and MOraviai and a 
loss to Hungary of Slovakia, as well as the complete 
separation of the Southern Slav lands of both halves of 
the Monarchy, to mention the larger blocs only....While 
the Central Government hesitated to sign its own death 
warrant in this manner, the various heirs and executors 
were busy establishing their own administrations.^?
The stage was thus set for the final dissolution of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the demise of the Habsburgs, 
one of Europe's oldest and most powerful ruling families, 
just as the last sounds of the long struggle of the World 
War of 191^-1918 were about to recede into history.
^^For. Reis, of U. S., 1918, Sup. 1, I, p. 368; Scott, 
op. cit.. pp. 428-29.
**?Strong, op. cit., p. 100.
CHAPTER V
ACTION AT THE FRONT AFFECTS 
ALLIED DIPLOMACY
When Dr. Masaryk left the capital of his native land 
in the winter of 1914, a fugitive from the Austrian police, 
because of his nationalistic ideas, he knew that he faced a 
long bitter struggle before he would be able to return to 
Prague-— especially if his homecoming was to be tto_the c&pi- - 
tal of a new and independent state. His role as leader of 
the anti-Habsburg elements of the Czech nation was made more 
difficult early in the war, when the German Empire took over 
the conduct of military operations for the Central Powers.
To all intents and purposes, this was the only reason that 
the Austro-Hungarian armies were able to remain in the field. 
Nevertheless, Franz Josef and his subjects won a certain de­
gree of sympathy in some places because of this Germanic 
ascendancy and American demands for war with Austria-Hun­
gary did not gain much favor until late in the struggle.
The leaders of the subject peoples early had deter­
mined that they would have to engage in a long propaganda 
battle if their ultimate objectives were to be realized*
For that reason they conducted a strong education and pro­
paganda campaign during the whole of the war in the United 
States and in the Entente countries. As one of the most 
politically knowledgable of the anti-Habsburgs, Masaryk
clearly understood the problems that he faced:
♦..there was little knowledge of, or interest in 
these subject races; how few knew or cared anything 
about the Czechs, let alone the Slovaks, or Slovenians, 
or Slovaniansi It took three years of carefully organi­
zed propaganda before the leading members of the British 
Government had been won over to the scheme.1
On his arrival in Great Britain from Italy in April, 
1915* Masaryk quickly turned to his few, but energetic and 
able, friends there in an effort to start the propaganda 
battle intended to win supporters for his country's objec­
tives. Wickham Steed, Seton-Watson and others came to his 
aid and wrote authoritative articles for influential news 
media Informing the British people of the justice of the 
Czechoslovak cause and the ultimate benefit which would ac­
crue to Britain from the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy.2 
Seton-Watson points out the result of this effort:
...On three successive days in September, The Times 
printed letters, written quite independently of each 
other, by Sir Valentine Chirol (whom Steed had recently 
succeeded as foreign editor), George Trevelyan and my­
self, intended to bring home to an uninformed public 
some of the main issues involved in the so-called 
"Question of Nationalities" in Central Europe.3
1Sir James Headlam-Moreley. "Fall of Austria," Atlan­
tic Monthly. CXLIV (October, 1929), 560-61.
2S # Harrison Thomson, Czechoslovakia in European His­
tory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 2^9.
3r . W. Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (Cambridge:
At the University Press; New York: The Macmillan Company, 
19^3)» P* 36. (Cited hereafter as Seton-Watson, Masaryk in 
England)•
G. M. Trevelyan \ the George Trevelyan mentioned by Seton- 
Watson, above [. one of the great British historians, in an 
article for the influential publication, The Fortnightly Re­
view. earlier had written:
The Empire of Vienna and BUda-Pesth is an anachronism, 
dependent for support upon the Prussian arms. It is the 
domination of the two races, the Austria-Germans and the 
Magyars, over a half-dozen other races.^
Again, Trevelyan carried the cause of the subject peoples 
into public print, writing, "There will be no peace in Eu­
rope until the subject populations of Austria-Hungary obtain 
liberty in one form or another. The rule of the sword can­
not give permanent peace."5
Seton-Watson, in his colorful writing style, gave the 
emigre leaders a substantial boost, declaring:
Poland, Bohemia, and Jugoslavia— these three together 
form the keystone to the arch of European liberty. With­
out the emancipation of the Southern Slavs and the 
Czecho-Slovaks from German aggression, Austrian inertia 
and Magyar tyranny,...there can be no regeneration of 
the European commonwealth, no permanent settlement, no 
durable peace after the horrors of the Great War
Wickham Steed, not to be outdone by his friends, devoted con­
siderable space and writing ability to the Central European 
problem, and wrote telling editorials against the Dual Mon-
4 g . M. Trevelyan, "Austria-Hungary and Serbia," The* 
Fortnightly Review. CIII (June, 1915)? 980.
^George M. Trevelyan, "Serbia and Southeastern Eu­
rope," The Atlant1c Monthly. CXVI (July, 1915)? 126*
^R. W. Seton-Watson, "Pan-Slavism," The Contemporary 
Review. CX (October, 1916), 429.
archy• In his program for peace, published in The Edin­
burgh Review. "the constitution of an independent, or at 
least autonomous, Bohemia, Including Moravia, and the Slo­
vak country of north-western Hungary, "T was a major point.
In another article he blasted away at the "sympathetic" 
view of the Austro-Hungarian Empire held by some of his com­
patriots, "no false solicitude, for the welfare of 9 those 
nice people, the Austrians,9 ought...to militate against... 
formation of an Independent Bohemia, or Czech.o-Slovakia." ® 
Popular support for the Czechs and Slovaks built up slowly 
in Great Britain and spread throughout the free world9s press, 
where it began to gain for them much-needed sympathy and sup­
port, when war aims and peace terms came up for discussion.
With each succeeding article and Introduction to an­
other politician, Masaryk intensified his campaign to influ­
ence opinion, which he realized was entirely uninformed on 
questions relating to the Dual Monarchy and her subject 
peoples. The help of his friends was invaluable to the 
Czech leader, and to repay the friendship in part, Masaryk 
furnished Information to Allied Intelligence services both 
in Europe and the United States, gathered by members of his
?Henry Wickham Steed, "A Programme for Peace," The 
Edinburgh Review. CCXXIII (April, 1916), 381.
^Henry Wickham Steed, "Austria and Europe," The 
Edinburgh Review. CCXXV (January, 1917)> 15*
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Czechoslovak organizat ions, who were located in many key 
areas around the world*
Czechoslovak propaganda in the United States had be­
gun shortly after the outbreak of the war, directed by Eman­
uel Victor Voska of the Bohemian National Alliance* Voska
r
was an influential member of the Czechoslovak counter-espi­
onage organization which, in 1915 $ had turned over informa­
tion to the United States Government, implicating the Ger­
man Army and Naval Attaches, Captains Pranz von Papen and 
Karl Boy-Ed, in sabotage activities,9 leading to the expul­
sion of the two Attaches* The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 
at Washington, Dr. Constantin Dumba, who had been detected 
in some rather bungling attempts to slow munitions manufac­
ture for the Entente Armies, also was recalled when the 
Czechoslovak organization provided information on his acti­
vities* Such acts gained friends for the Czechoslovaks, but 
it took a long period of time before the war aim expressed in 
the following article became accepted by the American peoples
Certain nations built up in flagrant denial of the 
rights of nationalities— Austria-Hungary, for example—
^Stephen D* Kert esz, The Fate of East Central Europe. 
Hopes and Failures of American Foreign Policy. (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press7~~195o *, pp. 32-33*
3-© A m e r i c a n  joUrnal of International Law, Supplement, 
Vol. X, Special Number, Diplomatic Correspondence Between the 
United States and Belligerent Governments Relating to Neutral 
Rights and Commerce (New York; Baker. Voorhis & Company,
1916), pp* 36I-65I Ernest R. May, The1World War and American 
Isolation (Cambridges Harvard University Press, 1959), pp* 
164-65.
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can claim no absolute right of existence. National 
boundaries must be completely retraced before inter­
national law may be properly invoked in defense of an 
alleged right to exist.il
Before the Allied and Associated Powers came to be­
lieve that Austria-Hungary should be broken up, however, 
several years of bloody warfare had to be fought, countless 
speeches had to be made, news articles written, and personal 
contacts completed to create popular support for this radical 
departure from the status quo. Even in the lands held by the 
Habsburgs, such a deviation from the established order had 
not been seriously considered by any sizable segment of the 
population, until the war had been in progress for some time. 
It was on autonomous principles that the Entente countries 
first based their plans for post-war settlements In Central 
Europe. The breakup of the Dual Monarchy into its component 
national parts, was not foreseen until late in the conflict.
Behind this radical change in thinking, by the Entente 
leaders and the broad masses of people living both within and 
without the Dual Monarchy, was a brilliantly conceived plan 
of education and propaganda. The plan was put into effect 
by Masaryk and Implemented by the National Council, using 
excellent timing and daring diplomatic maneuver— and was, at 
all times, backed by the dauntless courage of the Czecho-
liphllip Marshall Brown, "Elements of a Just and Dur­
able Peace," The Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, LXXtl (July"j 1917), 81.
Slovak Legions in every theatre of the war.
The headlines of the popular press and the thoughtful 
articles in the opinion-forming periodicals of the day were 
not made available to the Council and its leaders merely for 
the asking. On the world scene, Austria-Hungary, as a major 
force in the balance-of-power politics prevalent in Europe 
for centuries, held a position of extreme importance, even 
to her opponents In the great conflict which had engulfed 
the world. However, the thought patterns were changed* En­
tente leaders eventually made the decision to dismember the 
once-great Empire, and a new Republic, Czechoslovakia, emer- 
ged from the rubble as a bright contribution to the finally 
expressed goal of the Allies to give self-determination to 
the subject peoples of the Habsburgs. The Allied leaders 
were guided to their unprecedented decision by a handful of 
men, some of whom fought their battles in the halls of inter­
national diplomacy, while the others fought in the trenches 
of Prance and Italy, or on the broad and endless battlefields 
of Russia and Siberia*
Czechoslovak leaders had decided that it would be ne­
cessary to extend their efforts over a wide portion of the 
world if they were to achieve their aspirations. Because of 
the great exodus of Czech and Slovak peoples from the Dual 
Monarchy by emigration to other lands, such a base upon which 
to work was available. Roucek reports that during the forty 
years preceding World War I, "No fewer than 793>665 Slovaks
emigrated, mostly to the United States".^2 These and other 
large settlements of peoples of Czech and Slovak heritage, 
resident In many countries of the world, had drawn closer to 
each other in their new homelands* Because of the common 
heritage and similar customs which made them recognize their 
kinship in their new homes, many minor difficulties which 
sometimes plagued them within the Empire were disregarded. 
With the clearer perspective that distance gives, the some­
time rivals within the Empire could see that they had a com­
mon goal and heritage that would lend themselves to a joint 
community effort. "To Masaryk, himself perhaps more Slovak 
than Czech, such a united effort had been a self evident 
necessity from the beginning of the war," Thomson states.^ 
Czechoslovak National Committees and Congresses sprang up
V
around the world— in January of 1915 organizations were 
formed in Switzerland, the United States, Russia, Serbia, 
and Bulgaria All difference® between the Czechs and Slo­
vaks did not disappear, it must be note$,btotot-lflini.fekte'lftfiifeM 
States, at the great Congress held at Cleveland, Ohio, In
^ Joseph S. Roucek and Associates, Central-Eastern 
Europe, Crucible of World Wars (New Yorks Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 194(c), p. 82.
13Thomson, op. cit., p. 252.
l^Dr. Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a State. 
Memories and Observations (New Yorki Frederick A. St"okes 
Company, 192 7 > P* 15* (Cited hereafter as Masaryk, Making of
October, 1915# the majority of the Slovaks supported the 
joint Czecho-Slovak cause. Masaryk writes, "The Slovaks and 
Czechs agreed upon unity and cooperation5 and the American 
Slovak leaders were among the signatories of the first anti- 
Austrian manifesto of November 14, 1915*1 ^  The "Czech For­
eign Committee", which threw down this gauntlet to the Habs- 
burgs on that memorable day, soon became the Czechoslovak 
National Council and bent every effort toward the creation of 
an effective fighting force capable of gaining prestige and 
diplomatic stature for the Czechoslovak Nation, for which 
they yearned. On the basis of Its Legions, the National 
Council hoped to "gain the political recognition of a de 
facto and de lure existence of a Czechoslovak Government from 
all the Entente powers."^
In an around-about way the Central Powers provided the 
means by which tlhe idea of Czechoslovak Independence became 
included as one of the Entente war aims. On December 12, v 
1916, from what they considered a position of great strength, 
the Central Powers sent a message to the United States, of­
fering to negotiate peace and asking that the United States 
transmit this intelligence to the Entente members.^7 From
^ Ibld., p. 223*
^Thomson, op. cit., p. 253*
^?James Brown Scott (ed.). Official Statements of War 
Alms and Peace Proposals. December 1916 to November 1918 WT 
(Washingtons Carnegie ISndowment for International Peace,
1921), pp. 2-3*
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his position of neutrality, and with a natural desire to end 
the bloody conflict, President Wilson at the time was work­
ing on a peace program which he had intended to submit to the 
warring nations* The Central Powers' offer caught him off- 
balance, but he decided to ask the war aims of the combatants 
anyway, and on December 18, 1916, instructions were sent to 
all American diplomats, to representatives accredited to the 
belligerent governments, and to all neutral governments for
*1 o
their information*
The President is not proposing peace; he is not even 
offering mediation. He is merely proposing that sound­
ings be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral 
nations with the belligerents, how near the haven for 
peace may be for which all mankind longs with an in­
tense and increasing longing.•.and he confidently hopes 
for a response which will bring a new light into the 
affairs of the world.19
Thus read the dispatch of Robert Lansing, the United States 
Secretary of State. The Central Powers did not send an out­
line of their war aims in reply, but suggested a direct ex­
change of views between delegates of the warring states at a 
meeting to be held on neutral grounds*20 On the other hand, 
the Entente Powers came up with a definite proposal, includ-
•^United States Department of State, Papers 
to the. Foreign Relations of the United States«
element. The World War (Washingtons Government Printing 
Office, 1929), p. 99.
^ s c o t t , op. cit.. p. 15.
20lbld». p* 22*
ing this important point, "a brilliant success,"2-1* as Masaryk
states, for the Czechoslovak causes
But the civilized world knows that they PtRe objec- 
tives of the war | imply in all necessity and in the 
first instance, the restoration of Belgium, of Servia, 
and of Montenegro.•.the liberation of Italians, of Slavs, 
of Roumanians and of Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domina­
tion. . .22
This was an important milestone in the Czechoslovak quest for 
recognition, and its inclusion in the war aims of the Allies 
ean be attributed in great part, to the interest of the 
French Government in their cause, fostered by the continuing 
efforts of Beiies and the National Council in Paris
And they [ the French 1 added some suggestions of their 
own, namely, the inclusion in the Entente program of the 
liber4tion of the Czechoslovaks, to Whom no previous 
secret or public pledge had been made....With good 
French logic, the French leaders concluded that the in­
clusion of the Czechoslovaks in the Entente program would 
give it greater consistencyi after all, if the Italians, 
Yugoslavs, Rumanians and Polet were to be liberated in 
the name of President Wilson's principle of National 
self-determination rather than under the terms of specific 
Entente agreements, why not also the Czechoslovaks? 24
The exchange of notes did nothing to settle the basic 
differences between the belligerents, and was quickly follow­
2^Masaryk, Making of a State. p. 124.
■ ^ ^United states Department of State, Papers Relating
to -the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1917. Sup. 1? 
pp. £-9; Cjf •, Scott, oj). Cit., p. 3?| J. A. R. Marriott, The 
Eastern Question. An Historical Study in European Diplomacy. 
Fourth Ed it ion (Oxfo rdI At the Clarendon Press, 1940), p. 511*
23Mamatey, cp. cit.. p. 46.
2^ Ibid.» p. 46; Cf,., A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Mon­
archy. 1809-1918. A History of the Austrian Empire and Aus­
tria-Hungary . New Edit1on (Londoni Hamish Hamilton, 1955)$ 
p. 246.
ed by the German decision to use unrestricted submarine war­
fare to cut off all commerce by sea with the Allied countries 
In reply to this German decision, delivered by her Ambassa­
dor to the United States, Count Johann von Bernstorff, the 
United States severed diplomatic relations with the German 
Empire, and on April 2, President Wilson addressed a joint 
session of Congress, asking for a Declaration of War. Con­
gress answered the President's request by declaring war on 
Germany on April 6, 1917«2^ No action was taken by Congress 
at this time, to declare war on the allies of Germany, but 
within a few days, diplomatic relations were broken off with 
the Dual Monarchy and Turkey. Bulgaria, alone of the Cen­
tral Powers, thus, was represented in America.2^
Although not at war with the Dual Monarchy, the Uni­
ted States was thus placed in the opposition camp, fighting 
against her allies, and in a position to become more closely 
aligned with the anti-Habsburg elements operating within 
the United States. The latter did not delay long in increas­
ing their efforts for recognition by the United States. On 
June 18, 1917, Stefanik, then Vice President of the National 
Council, arrived in the United States, bent on a dual mis­
sions to win the sympathy of Americans of all ranks for the 
Czechoslovak cause, and to seek permission from the United
23scott, op. cit.. p. 93*
2^Mamatey, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
States Government to recruit soldiers among the Czech and 
Slovak immigrants
V /
Stefanik met with limited success in his recruiting 
campaign, but he was able to draw the Czech and Slovak ele­
ments closer together and scored a propaganda success by 
promoting a great public meeting held in New York's Carnegie 
Hall on September 14, 1917* The meeting was prominently re­
ported in the New York press, and shortly thereafter, the New 
York Herald printed a long 1 Interview with Stefanik which 
appears to have been the first serious discussion of the 
Czechoslovak problem in the American press.Il2^
When entering the war against Germany in April, 1917, 
President Wilson purposely did not call for a declaration of 
war on Austria-Hungary, hoping that the Dual Monarchy would 
respond to the separate peace efforts conducted by the Allies. 
However, efforts to draw the Emperor Charles into an early 
peace failed, and at last, on December 7, 1917, war was de­
clared against Austria-Hungary* In his speech calling for 
this action, given on December 4, the President did not call 
for dissolution of the Dual Monarchy, but said?
...we do not wish in any way to impair or rearrange 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours 
what they do with their own life...we only desire to
2?Ibia.. p. 129. 
28ibid., p. 132-33.
see that their affairs are left in their own hands * in 
all matters great and small.29
President Wilson1® speech to Congress caused widespread com­
ment in Great Britain, "the militants approved the will to 
victory*».and the endorsement of the aspirations of subject 
nationalities in Austria-Hungary and Turkey *"3^ The emigre 
Czechoslovaks were encouraged by the President1s request for 
war against the Dual Monarchy, "but discouraged by his assur­
ance against dismemberment*"31 They had cause for greater 
encouragement, however, in President Wilson’s famous Four­
teen Points speech of January 8, 1918, which followed close 
on the declaration of war* Although the President did not 
call for independence of all subject peoples, a marked 
change was noted as he stated in Point Tens "The peoples of 
Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to 
see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest 
opportunity of autonomous development*"^2 Further in an ad-
29say Stannard Baker and William E* Dodd, (eds*■■)-+ The 
Public Pacers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. Ill, War and Peace«
(New York; Harper & Brothers Publishers, 192?}, I, p. 132; 
Scott, c>R* cit *. p. 196*
^ C a r l  P. Brand, "The Reaction of British Labor to the 
Policies of President Wilson During the World War," The Ameri- 
can Historical Review, XXXVIII (January, 1933)> 277 .
^ M a m a t e y , op* nit*, p* 162*
3 % .  S* Department of State, Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918« Supplement JL, 
The World War, Vol. I (Washington? Government Printing Of­
fice, 1933T 5 P • .15* (Series cited hereafter as For* Reis*
I. S., 1918, Su e * 1)*
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dress to Congress on February 11, 1918, he emphasized the
principle that territorial settlements must be made In the
interest of the populations concerned— -saying that "all well-
defined national aspirations should be granted the fullest
satisfaction that can be afforded them... "33
The Allied leaders, it appeared, all were approaching
much the same program of peace. Three days before Wilson
gave his Fourteen Points address, Prime Minister David Lloyd
George made a statement of British war alms, the content of
which was so near to that proposed by Wilson that the latter
very nearly decided not to make his speech.3^ Lloyd George
referred to the December 4, 1917, address of the President
in his speechs
Similarly, though we agree with President Wilson that 
the break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war 
aims, we feel that unless genuine self-government on true 
democratic principles is granted to these Austro-Hungar­
ian nationalities who have long desired it, it is im­
possible to hope for the removal of these causes of un­
rest in that part of Europe which have so long threat­
ened its general peace.35
Fortunately for the subject peoples who needed the support
his speech offered, the American Chief Executive decided to
33ibld... p. 112; Cf., Scott, on. cit.. p. 270.
3^Charles Seymour, American Diplomacy During the World 
War (Baltimore? The Johns Hopkins Press, 1934), p. 287.
3-5David Lloyd George, The Great Crusade, Extracts from 
Speeches Delivered During the War, F* L. Stevenson (arr.), 
(New Yorks George H. Doran Company, 1918), p. 260; Cf., Ray­
mond James Sontag, European Diplomatic History. 1871-1932 
(New Xork: Appleton Century-Crofts, lacT, 'l933'J , T T 2 5 f i  
Scott, op. cit., pp. 230-31.
continue with his plans to make the address, even though it 
was closely related to that of Lloyd George, and It became a
primary rallying point for emigr^ leaders. His remarks re-
\
fleeted a growing conviOtion that the territorial matters of 
the Dual Monarchy should be considered carefully before peace 
terms were discussed, thus giving the Czechoslovaks added 
cause for hope. J. A. M. De Sanchez, Director of the Eco­
nomic Division of the French Commission in the United States 
from 1919 to 1921, pointed out the value of the Fourteen 
Points speech and the other statements of war aims to the 
Allied cause in an article written after the wars,
...the Fourteen Points were as definitive a part of 
the military campaign of the last year of the war as 
were the operations of the American Army in the St.
Mihiel Sector* Whether they were intended as such is 
not yet perfectly clear; that they became such is
certain.3o
Although the Czechoslovak leaders were somewhat dis­
appointed in the Fourteen Points, especially because of the 
autonomous development feature,37 the pronouncement gave them 
some encouragement and spurred the National Council to renew­
ed propaganda activities.38
\
Yet it was almost the summer of 1918 before the Czeoho-
36j# A # M. de Sanchez, "Certain Barriers to a Revi­
sion of the Treaty of Versailles,,1 The Annals of the Ameri­
can Academy of Political and Social Science. CVIII (July, 
1923), 24.
37Mamatey, op. cit., p. 215.
38strong, op. cit., p. 77*
Slovak National Council in Paris, with its American af­
filiate, the Bohemian National Alliance, was able to ob­
serve a change in the American Government’s attitude to­
ward the Czechoslovak cause. The autonomy promised in 
the Fourteen Points was,.•.hardly satisfactory.39
Despite the popular appeal and the very strong propaganda 
value of the Fourteen Points address, Robert Lansing, Wil­
son’s Secretary of State, was not entirely satisfied with the 
speech and wrote a memorandum on it;
.*,1 think that the President will have to abandon 
this idea and favor the erection of new states out of 
the Imperial territory and require the separation of 
Austria-Hungary* This is the only certain means of end­
ing German power in Europe.
Convinced of this, I think we should consider the 
erection of a Polish State, a Czech State and possibly 
a Ruthenian State..
Others also saw the coming disintegration of the Austro-Hun­
garian Monarchy and more and more propaganda activity was di­
rected into the effort to obtain political support among the 
Great Powers for the eventual recognition of new sovereign 
states. Fenwick, writing on the possible realignment of 
nations in the Balkans, stated, w.•*an Independent Czecho­
slovak State, especially if supported by an Independent Jugo­
slav State, would be a permanent barrier to the plan of a 
Pan-German M i t t e l - E u r o p a . S u c h  an arrangement, it was
39Kertesz, op. cit,., p.
^Robert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing (New 
Yorks The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 19357$ pp. 261-52.
^Charles Fenwick, "Notes on International Affairs,” 
American Political Science Review. XII (November, 1918)j ?!?.
believed, would be a military advantage for the future, as 
well as a present-day recognition for services rendered dur­
ing the war. Late in the conflict; the popular Magazine, 
Outlook, however, questioned the advisability of placing too 
much emphasis on parts of the Fourteen Points, stating:
Professor J* Holland Hose (noted English historian] of 
Cambridge, England, distinctly claims that the tide of 
events has swept forward with such speed since January 8, 
1918, that several of the Points are entirely inadequate 
and that the Central Powers would not concede nearly 
enough even if they gave a bonafide assent to the Points 
as formulated.^2
Articles in the popular press began to echo the opinions of
Lansing, and other figures in American Government called for
support of the subject nationalities. Congressman Adolph J.
Sabath of Illinois, for example, introduced a resolutions
"That Bohemia be made free and independent and be given a
rightful place among the nations of the world,
Early April, 1918, was a period of great activity 
which was to have an important significance in Czechoslovak 
history. The German Armies launched a massive offensive on 
the Western Front and the weakened Allies sought more and 
more replacements for the trenches in this great struggle of
•■I1
attrition. Although coincidental, the subject peoples chose
^2joseph H, Odell, "The President0 s Fourteen Points—  
Are They Clear and Final?" Outlook, CXX (November 6, 1918),
^ G u i d o  Kisch, "Woodrow Wilson and the Independence of 
Small Nations in Central Europe," Journal of Modern History<, 
XIX (September, 19*7), 235.
at this time to hold a "Congress of Oppressed Nationalities 
of Austria-Hungary" at Rome* The Congress, therefore, met 
under highly favorable conditions and was able to demonstrate 
not only the "anti-Austrian solidarity of the oppressed 
peoples but also to convert and firmly commit the Allies... 
to a strong anti-Austrian policy."^
Delegates representing the Yugoslavs, Czechs, Slovaks, 
Roumanians and Italians, along with Allied representatives, 
met and developed a series of resolutions, under which they 
agreed to lay aside their national disputes until after a 
victory had been won. One resolution stated, "Each of these 
people proclaim its right to constitute its own nationality 
and state unity or to complete it and to attain full politi­
cal and economic independence*"^5 The Congress did not go 
unnoticed by the friends of the subject peoples living in 
the United States, or by the American Government. Secre­
tary of State Lansing stated on May 29, that the "national­
istic aspirations of the Czechs and Jugoslavs for freedom 
have the earnest sympathy of this Government. On June 3, 
following the example set by the United States, Clemenceau, 
Lloyd George and Orlando, meeting at Versailles, issued a 
declaration concerning the Congress, expressing their
^ M a m a t e y , op. clt * * p. 244.
^5j. A* R. Marriott, op. cit., p. 493*
46por, Reis, of U. S., 1918« Sup. JL, I, p. 112.
"earnest sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations towards 
freedom of the Czechoslovak and Yugo-Slav peoples."2*? Later, 
on June 28, Lansing issued a new statement, emphasizing in 
stronger fashion, the position of the American Government to 
be, 1 that all branches of the Slav race should be completely 
freed from German and Austrian ruley'r J This was a "deci­
sive advance as compared with President Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points which spoke only of the rights of the Austrian nations 
to autonomous development,"^ an able historian later wrote.
The vaguely defined intention of Wilson’s Point Ten 
was now clarified* The clarification meant recognition 
of the independence of smaller nations••*a disruption 
of the Dual Monarchy,50
as Guido Kisch, a modern-day writer, has pointed out. Events
favoring Czechoslovak independence moved rapidly thereafter,
in the Entente countries and in the United States. On
June 7, the British Government stated that in view of the
formation of Czechoslovak military units in Italy, France,
and Russia it was prepared to recognize the Czechoslovak Army
"as an organized unit labouring In.the cause of the Allies."5^
^ ?Ibld* * p. 809*
^ Ibid.» p. 816; Cf •, Francis Whiting Halsey, The Lit­
erary Digest History of the World War (New York and Londons 
Funk & Wagnalls Company, 1919), Vol. VII, p. 37^*
^Joseph S* Houcek, "President Masaryk of Czechoslo­
vakia," Current History. XXXI (March, 1930), 1113.
5°Kisch, op. cit•, p. 237*
5Ipor. Reis. M S *  S., 1918* Sup. 1, I, 810*
Equally Important to Masaryk and his co-workers* His Majes­
ty’s Government was prepared to recognize the National Coun­
cil in Paris as the political agency representing the army*52 
The Government of Prance followed suit and stated that it 
would recognize "publicly and officially the National Coun­
cil as the supreme organ of the general interests and policy 
of the future Czechoslovak G o v e r n m e n t #»53
While these events were taking place, Masaryk arrived 
in Washington on May 9, having left Russia and the Czecho­
slovak Legions more than two months earlier* He had been 
greeted royally by the Czech and Slovak residents of the 
United States* Charles Pergler, a member of the Bohemian 
National Alliance, reported, "At least one hundred thousand 
Czechs and Slovaks greeted him*** in that city (Chicago) •
He had been out of touch with the National Council much of 
the time while with the Legions in Russia, and only learned 
of the Rome Congress on his arrival in Tokyo, enroute to the 
United S t a t e s b u t  he recognized the Importance of the 
actions taken there, particularly the agreement upon common 
action against the Habsburgs.3^
5%Ibid * t £ai pek, op* cit*, pp. 80-81.
53$apek, op* cit*, p. 81.
-^Charles Pergler, America in the Struggle for Czecho­
slovak Independence TPhiladelphia s DoTrance' arid Company, 
192557 p. 47.
^^Masaryk, Making of a State * p. 206.
56lbid., p. 2^2 .
On his arrival in America, Masaryk at once addressed 
himself to the important task of gaining public favor for the 
Czechoslovaks* He turned to the press to achieve popular and 
widespread publicity, and before long placed "interviews and 
articles in the largest and most influential daily papers, 
weeklies and reviews, and [established] personal relations 
with prominent writers of all opinions*"^7 Recognizing the 
value of this editorial comment and support, later Masaryk 
wrote, "to American journalism in general, I owe a debt of 
gratitude*
Working with leaders of other subject nationalities 
in the United States, particularly the Xugoslavs, Masaryk 
gained many new friends for the cause of Czechoslovak Inde- 
pendence, and at the same time helped further the national 
aspirations of these subject peoples* Masaryk®s enthusi­
astic reception by the Slovaks, as well as the Czechs, 
proved an important factor in the success of his mission in 
the United States* In Pittsburgh, after a mass rally at 
which he received a public ovation, Masaryk drew up and 
signed with American Czech and Slovak representatives, the 
"Pittsburgh Convention," under which the Slovaks were to be 
given a. degree of autonomy within the Czechoslovak State•
This agreement, signed on May 30, 1918, established Masaryk
57ibia., p. 235 
58ibia.
in the minds of the American Government as the leader of all 
the Czech and Slovak peoples, and "American officials never 
questioned his right to speak in the name of the Slovaksi (,*59 
Professor Thomson has since written;
The organization of Czechoslovak sentiment and war 
effort proceeded harmoniously and enthusiastically 
under the guidance of Masaryk from this time on until 
independence and union of the two peoples In their 
native land were achieved*60
Lansing and Masaryk held their first interview four 
days after the signing of the Pittsburgh document, and Mas­
aryk pleaded his case for American assistance in transport­
ing the Czechoslovak Legions from Russia to France. At the 
time of the interview, neither knew that the Legions had be­
come involved in a conflict with the Bolsheviks, and the 
American Secretary of State was non-committal, as the "whole 
project seemed to him fantastic"
When the story of the Czechoslovak uprising in Russia 
became known, the situation was altered greatly for Masaryk 
and his fellow workers in the United States. Doors were 
opened to him that hitherto had remained closed* He has 
described the situation as follows;
The effect in America was astonishing and almost in­
credible— all at once the Czechs and Czechoslovaks were
5^Mamatey, op. cit., p. 20^*
6°Thomson, op. cit., p. 273 •
OJ*Mamatey, op* cit. * p. 28^#
known to everybody. Interest in our army in Russia and 
Siberia became general and Its advance aroused enthusi­
asm. .•.Our control of the railway and our occupation of 
Vladivostok had the glamour of a fairy-tale, which 
stood out jfcheemore brightly against the dark background 
of German successes in F r a n c e .62
The Czechoslovak Legions caught the public fancy, and the 
popular press clamored for news of the movements of the al­
most legendary force.
Until May, 1918, the New York Times index had mention­
ed Czech and Czechoslovak only under the general heading, 
"Austria-Hungary"* In July and September, two full pages 
in the index were given to the Czechoslovak Army and a 
half-page to other aspects of the situation* This de­
monstrates Masaryk* s wisdom in Insisting that it would 
be necessary for the Czechoslovaks to have an army be­
fore they could expect to exert influence on the states­
men of the world.
Most Americans recognized the Czechoslovaks as a people al­
most entirely through the daring exploits of the Legions, 
fighting their way toward Vladivostok. Helping this recogni­
tion were many newspaper and magazine articles published dur­
ing the closing months of the war*
Then at last came the amazing truth about Vladivo­
stok; part of the Czechoslovak army had fought its way 
six thousand miles across Siberia to the Pacific port; 
the remainder of the army was stretched put along sec­
tions of the Trans-Siberian Railroad*.*^
62fiasaryk> Making of a State. p* 276.
^Robert Joseph Kerner, (ed.), Czechoslovakia; Twenty 
Years of Independence. (Berkeley and Los Angeles; University 
of California Press, 19^0), p. 75* (Cited hereafter as Ker- 
ner, Czechoslovakia)*
6^George MacAdam, "Czechoslovakia, The Nation Without 
a Country," The World9 s Work. XXXVI (October, 1918), 630*
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Another typical article reads
A report came across the seas that a Czechoslovak 
Army of less than one hundred thousand men had practi­
cally freed Siberia from the misrule of the Bolshevists 
in one of the most dramatic adventures in h i s t o r y . ^ 5
These and many similar newspaper and periodical arti­
cles built a ground swell of public approval for the fighting 
forces of the Czechoslovaks, and for the independence of the 
nation* As it was recognition that he had sought, and as he 
had planned to use the Legions to achieve that recognition, 
such public Interest in the Czechoslovak troops was extreme­
ly valuable to Masaryk and the others working for Czecho­
slovak independence*
After June 19, 1918, when Professor Masaryk, as head 
of the Czechoslovak National Committee, met with President 
Wilson, the cause of the Czechoslovaks began to advance even 
more rapidly. It has been said that Masaryk® s presence in 
Washington at this time, and the Legions In Siberia, Italy 
and France, were most important factors in gaining Czecho­
slovak recognition. One editorial writer summed it up in 
the following manner, attesting to Masaryk®s great personal 
influence, "Masaryk in Washington is worth an extra regiment 
In France.
^Herbert Francis Sherwood, "A New Declaration of In­
dependence," The Outlook. CXX (November, 1918), 406.
^Editorial, "Czechoslovak Independence," The Inde­
pendent . XCVI (November 9, 1918), 1^9*
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Great Britain, on August 14, recognized the Czecho­
slovak National Council as the ,f supreme organ of the Czecho­
slovak national.interests, and as the present trustee of the 
future Czecho-Slovak government * * *1167 This gave the Govern­
ment of the United States further reason for all-out support 
of the Czechoslovaks, and on September 3 , a statement was 
published recognizing "that a state of belligerency exists 
between the Czechoslovaks thus organized and the German and
Austro-Hungarian Empires*"68 Included in the declaration
was the following statement:
It also recognizes the Czechoslovak National Council 
as a de, facto belligerent government clothed with proper 
authority to direct tlpe military and political affairs
of the Czechoslovaks*^
Following quickly on the heels of this recognition 
by the various members of the Allied and Associated Powers,
a second great meeting was held in New York's Carnegie Hall,
under the motto, "The Will of the Peoples of Austria-Hun­
gary* " George Creel, head of the American Committee of Pub­
lic Information, gave his support to the meeting, and all of 
the subject peoples were represented by important emigre
6?For* Eels* of U* S>*, 1918» S u p * 1, I ,  p. 824*
United States Department of State, Papers Relating
t o the Foreign Relations of the United States * The Lansing 
Papers« 1914-1920r rWas'hlngtoni Government Printing Office, 
19^0), II, p* 1^5•
Ibid. | Cf,., Scott, ©e . cit. . pp. 379-80.
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l e a d e r s A n  outstanding propaganda maneuver, the meeting 
demonstrated the solidarity of the subject peoples, and the 
American public applauded a resolution which was adopted 
stating, "we demand the dissolution of the present empire and 
the organization of its freed peoples according to their own 
will."71
The stage was thus set for the final act in the events 
leading to the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy and the es­
tablishment of the new sovereign states* A look behind the 
scenes, on the actual fighting fronts, will show how the 
Czechoslovak Legions profoundly affected the recognition 
sought by Masaryk and his followers.
?0Mamatey, op* cit *. p. 316*
7lHerbert Adolphus Miller, "The Bulwark of Freedom," 
The Survey» XLI, No. 1, (October 5* 1918), 7*
CHAPTER VI
RETURN TO THE EASTERN FRONT I 
THE ALLIES INTERVENE
During the year he remained in Russia, Masaryk worked 
diligently to smooth out differences between the Czechoslovak 
Legions and the Soviet Government, and as long as the Red 
Armies occupied the trenches opposing the Central Powers, 
there was little friction* After the signing of the Peace 
of Brest-Litovsk, which took Russia out of the war, however, 
he realized that the safety of his soldiers was endangered, 
and that they must leave Russia to go into action on the 
Western Front, where they could achieve greater recognition 
for Czechoslovak ends. At that time, the major concentration 
of Czechoslovak troops in Russia centered near Kiev, where 
some forty thousand men opposed the Austro-German armies* ^
By March 15, Czechoslovak leaders had been given approval by 
the Soviets to make the overland journey to Vladivostok,2 
with one of the requirements being that the Legions would 
hand over part of their weapons to the Soviet Army* Again, 
after some difficulties arose between the Legions and local
r  -^Thomas ^apek, Jr., Origins of the Czechoslovak State
(j|~New York % 1 Revell Press, 1926) , p. 35 •
2Dr# Eduard Bene¥« My War Memoirs» (Trans.) Paul 
Selver (Boston and New Yorks Houghton—Mifflin Company, 1928), 
P. 355 o
IQ**
Soviets, on March 26, the Soviets approved movement of the 
Czechoslovaks "as a group of free citizens11,3 (this was the 
agreement signed by Stalin referred to earlier) and the long 
anabasis to Vladivostok again got underway. Bene?? has indi­
cated the wholehearted desire of the Czechoslovaks to leave 
Russia for Frances
From the moment when, in February and in March, 1918, 
the transfer of our troops to France had definitely be­
come the order of the day, no serious-minded person 
amongst us reckoned with the possibility of intervention 
in Russia. The one endeavor was to reach France as 
rapidly as possible.^
The Czechoslovak agreement to turn over part of their 
arms and equipment, thereby gaining approval to move through 
Russia and Siberia, worked satisfactorily for a short time, 
but distrust on both sides finally caused the Soviets to 
change the conditions of the movement. The Red Government 
ordered that all weapons be surrendered by the Czechoslovaks, 
and called for the enlistment of most of the Czechoslovaks in 
Red Army units or in labor pools#5 Neither the rank and file
^Ibld», p. 355®
^Ibld o. pp. 391-92; Cf., Charles Pergler, America in 
the Struggle for Czechoslovak Independence (Philadelphias 
Dorrance and Company, 1926) * PP* 52-53; George F. Kennan, 
"Soviet Historiography and America's Role in the Interven­
tion." The American Historical Review. LXV, No. 2 (January, 
I960), 312. (Cited hereafter as Kennan, Historiography).
5James Banyan, Intervent ion. Civi1 War, and Communism 
in Russia. April-December 1918. Documents and Materials 
"(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), p. 86; George F. 
Kennan, Soviet-American Relations. 1917-19201 The Decision to 
Intervene (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958 
p” 137.((Cited hereafter as Kennan, Soviet-Amerlcan Relations).
nor the officers of the Legions subscribed to these terms as 
they wished to get into action against the Germans, and re­
lations between the Legions and the Bolsheviks became in­
creasingly strained* Masaryk, disturbed at this unwarranted 
interruption of the movement of his troops, later writing to 
the Soviets concerning their attempts to detain^the Legions, 
said;
I would not oppose your demand of disarmament if you 
can guarantee us free and unmolested passage to France.
I assure you our soldiers' only wish is.to fight the 
common enemy and help, by that, Russia*°
The Bolsheviks continued their demands, however, and 
in May, 1918, relations between the Czechoslovaks and the 
Soviets finally were stretched to the breaking point at the 
little way station of Chelyabinsk in Siberia, and the Czecho­
slovaks determined to fight their way through Russia and Si­
beria, if necessary, to reach their homeland. Prior to this 
time, there was little, if any, antagonism on the part of the 
men of the Legions towards the Russians* Lansing, in fact 
had been In touch with Masaryk in Washington and wired to the 
American Ambassador in Russia, David R* Francis, that the 
Czechoslovaks "are determined to fight Austro-Germans and not
S. Department of State, Papers-Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918. Russia (Wash­
ingtons Government Printing Office, 1931), II, p* 213* 
(Cited hereafter" as For. Reis * of, U. J|., 1918, Russia) *
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fellow Slavs, except when provoked, In self-defense.1 ?
The affair at Chelyabinsk, virtually determined the 
trend of future relations between the Legions and the Soviets* 
Enroute to Vladivostok, under terms of the agreement with 
Stalin, a train of Czechoslovaks pulled into the station 
alongside a train loaded with Hungarian prisoners-of-war 
being returned in accord with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
An altercation developed between the two groups, easily under­
standable under existing conditions, and one of the Hungar­
ians killed a Czech, with a heavy piece of iron.
The Czech's friends retaliated by killing the Hungarian, and 
were arrested by the local Soviets and taken to the city for 
a hearing. This brought about a full-scale effort on the part 
of their fellow Legionaries, and a detachment of Czechoslo­
vaks went into the city and secured their release. In a 
pitched battle, following this incident, the Legions were 
victorious and returned to their unit.®
Although the Chelyabinsk incident in itself was settled 
between the conflicting groups a few days later, the damage 
had been done. On receipt of the news of the Legions' action 
at the railroad station, Leon Trotsky, Soviet Commissar for
^For. Reis. of U. <5*, 1918. Russia. I, p. 571*
8john Albert White, The Siberian. Intervention (Prlnce- 
ton; Princeton University Press, 1950), pp. . 2 ^ 7 Kennan, 
Soviet-American Relations. II,' pp. 150-51.
War, directed the Siberian Soviets to detrain all Czecho­
slovaks in their regions and to "organize them into labor 
artels or draft them into the Soviet Red Army1 .9 Some eight 
thousand, four hundred members of Masaryk1s forces were in 
Chelyabinsk at the time, attending a "Congress of the 
Czechoslovak Revolutionary Army," called to determine the 
further course of action to be followed by the Legions. The 
Chelyabinsk Incident occurring during the Congress, immedi­
ately followed by Trotsky's peremptory order, angered the 
Czechoslovaks who, defying the directive, proclaimed their 
decision to keep their arms and proceed to Vladivostok.-*-® 
Trotsky then telegraphed the local Soviets?
All Soviets are hereby ordered to disarm the Czecho­
slovaks immediately. Every armed Czechoslovak found 
on the railway is to be shot on the spot; every troop 
train in which even one armed man is found shall be un­
loaded, and its soldiers shall be interned in a war 
prisoner's camp.•.•Inform all railway workers that not 
a single car of armed Czechoslovaks is to be allowed to 
move eastward. Those who submit to violence and assist 
the Czechoslovaks in their movement east will be severely 
punished . H
The Legions were determined to get through to Vladivo­
stok and from this time on, "a state of open warfare existed
9Kennan, Soviet American Relations. II, p. 151®
10Bunyan, ojd. cit.. p. 89.
11Ibld... p. 91.
1 ?between Red Russia and the Czechs•1 This struggle was to 
continue until an armistice was signed (February, 1920), per­
mitting the last of the Legions to sail from Vladivostok in 
September, 1920, more than two years after the Chelyabinsk 
incident * The Legionaries were convinced that safety lay in 
the strength of their arms and they deployed rapidly along 
the Trans-Siberian railway until a Soviet official is re­
ported to have exclaimeds "France, through concerted action 
with the Czech troops, has taken Siberia in twenty-four 
hours•" ^ 3 Control of the Trans-Siberian was necessary if the
Czechoslovaks were to have uninterrupted lines of.communica-
tion, and the Legions accepted this as their first challenge* 
The leading spirit of the Legions in the Chelyabinsk area
was Rudolph Gajda, strongly anti-Bolshevik, a fire-eater
thirsting for action and the opportunity to attain Czecho­
slovak aims, he had risen rapidly in the ranks of the 
L e g i o n s G a j a a  was to play am important role in the entire 
Siberian operation*
♦••it is easy to see that the Czech Corps, represent­
ing at the moment— as it did— the strongest compact and 
unified armed force in all of Siberia, could hardly fail 
to become, willingly or unwillingly, a factor in the
-^George Stewart, The White Armies of Russia« A Chron­
icle of teounter-Revolution and Allied Intervention (New Yorks 
The Macmillan Company, 1933)V PP* 105-d*
^-3stewart, og* cit *.« p* .107*
l^Kennan, Soviet American Relations. II,pp» 163-6^*
state of smoldering evil conflict that had been brought 
into being throughout Siberia by the sudden Communist 
seizure of power* ^ 5
, The Legions, some seventy-thousand strong, thus were 
destined to aid the cause of Czechoslovak independence in an 
entirely different theatre of operations, and become one of 
the most important factors in bringing about an Allied in­
tervention in Russia and Siberia*
The disposition and timing of the Czech revolt, acci­
dental though they were, happened to be of the first im­
portance to the entire counter-revolutionary movement. 
The Czechs who had no real interest in the domestic af­
fairs of Russia and no real wishes other than to com­
plete their roundabout itinerary to Europe, now found 
themselves by this strangest of fatalities forming a 
liaison force and linking together all the aimless, 
planless, anti-Bolshevik groups throughout eastern 
Russia and Siberia*1^
It must be noted that this decision to combat the 
Soviets was made by the men attending the Congress at Chelya-
V  v
blnsk and their leaders, Gajda, Cecek and Voitsekhovsky, were 
given the task of carrying out the decision*1'7 There was no 
contact on a regular basis with the National Council, except 
through Allied channels, and events were happening too rapid- 
ly to depend on this slow means of communication* As an in­
tegral part of the French Army (since December of the pre-
^ Ibld.. p. 165 .
l°Frank P. Chambers, Christina Phelps Harris, and 
Charles C. Bagley, This Age of Conflict, a Contemporary 
World History» 1914 to the Present (New Yorks Harcourt, 
Brace and Co*, 1950)> P* 262*
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vious year) the Legions had regular French Army officers 
assigned in a liaison capacity* The two French officers, 
Major Alphonse Guinet and Captain Pascal attending the 
Chelyabinsk Congress, were unable to stay the decision of the
i
Legions, and the French desire to move the Czechoslovaks out 
of Russia and Siberia with the least possible delay, so that 
they could embark for the Western Front, was pushed into the 
background * Because of other diplomatic maneuvers being 
carried on by the Entente, however, the delay of this well- 
trained military organization in the East was not unwelcome 
to many British and French politicians*
Major Guinet, in fact, was instructed to tell Czecho­
slovaks a short time later %
The French Ambassador makes known to Commander Guinet 
that he can thank the Czechoslovaks for their actions, 
this in the name of the Allies* They, the Allies, have 
decided to intervene the last of June and the Czechoslo­
vak Army and the French Mission form the advance guard 
of the Allied Army*19
The statement, at least as far as the United States was con­
cerned, was without authority, and its acceptance by the 
Czechoslovaks led them to believe that an Allied interven­
tionist force would soon come to their aid in Western Siberia. 
Behind ,this apparently unauthorized message was a long-stand-
■^Kennan, Soviet "•American Relations * II, p* 155 J For* 
Reis * of U* S * , 1918* Russia. II, p* 158*
19stewart, op* cit», p. 114; Cf *, Bunyan, op* cit * ,
p. 106*
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ing effort on the part of certain Entente leaders to effect 
an intervention of Siberia and Russia, with the intent of 
opening an Eastern Front and thus relieving the ever increas­
ing pressure of the Germans on beleagured French and British 
forces in the West*
Entente military and political leaders, for the most 
part, had hailed the Russian Revolution as a release of the 
Russians from an autocratic regime and a step in the direc­
tion of democracy* With the signing of the ignominious 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and withdrawal of the Russians from 
the war, however, they recognized that more than twelve 
million troops were lost to the Allies, and more than seven­
ty German divisions, previously tied down on the Eastern 
Front, were made available for duty on other battlefields 
Other considerations of the Russian "defection" were pointed 
out by Lloyd George in his War Memoirs:
•..the fact that there was at Vladivostok a big accumu­
lation of military stores intended for use by our Rus­
sian allies against the Central Powers* We did not 
want these to be used by the hostile Bolsheviks for ex­
terminating those non-Bolshevik movements in Russia 
which were still opposing the Germans; still less did 
we want them to be seized by Austro-German forces in 
Russia, or surrendered by the Bolsheviks to the enemy 
as a condition of peace. In the second place, Vladi­
vostok remained our one channel of communication with 
the Anti-German forces operating in Russia— the Cos­
sacks of the Don and the Kuban, the non-Bolshevik 
governments of the Caucasus* Thirdly, it was impera­
tive to prevent the Germans from penetrating into
20Stewart, c>£. cit * * p. 82.
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Siberia and securing a hold upon it and its great natural 
resources *21
Early Entente attempts to interest the United States 
in a Russian intervention had failed and, in December, 1917* 
Clemenceau and Alfred Lord Milner, British Secretary of State 
for War, signed a convention in Paris, calling for joint 
action and creation of spheres of interest in Rumania and 
southern Russia, including the Ukraine.. As part of the ar­
rangements made with Stef'einik and Benes", recognition was given 
to the Czechoslovak army as a co-belligerent, serving under 
the French Government for military matters.22 Masaryk did 
not hear of this agreement until early in January and caused 
great embarrassment to his colleagues in Paris and displea­
sure to the French by refusing to commit the Legions to this 
use. The Ukrainians, however, had other ideas, and aligned 
themselves with the Central Powers against the Soviets, 
thereby calling a halt to immediate British and French plans 
in that area.2-^ The Allied decision, referred to earlier, 
was then made to transport the Legions to France, using the 
port at Vladivostok. In an enclosure to a letter to Seton-
2^David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd 
George« 1918. (Bostons Little, Brown and Company, 1937), 
VI, p. 1 6 2 .
22Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Cen­
tral Europe» 1914-1918. A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and 
Propaganda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 
p. 170; Kennan, Historiography, p. 309*
23Mamatey, op. cit,« pp. 219r2275*
Watson, dated March 31, 1918, Masaryk indicated the impor­
tance of a Czechoslovak force in France, and that the French 
themselves understood the political implications of such an 
army i
The significance of having a whole Czech army In 
France Is obyious; and I must acknowledge that France 
understood the political meaning of the matter from the 
beginning....In present circumstances, 100,000--nay, 
even 50s000--trained soldiers may count a great deal.2^
Unforeseen at that time, however, were other factors which 
were to change this French and British decision. Masaryk 
was not to get his one hundred thousand, nor even fifty 
thousand trained soldiers to the front in France— one auth­
ority has written, that at the end of the war, Czechoslovak 
forces numbered approximately one hundred eighty-two thou­
sand men, of which, only some twelve thousand were serving 
on the Western Front. The balance of the Legions were di­
vided, with seventy-eight thousand men fighting in Italy and 
some ninety-two thousand under arms in Itussia and Siberia.25
Late in 1917, Clemenceau, at an inter-Allied confer­
ence in Paris discussed with Colonel Edward M. House (United 
States representative to the Supreme War Council) the possi-
p  It f
^ R .  W. Seton-Watson. Masaryk in England (Mew Yorks 
The ffecmillan Company, 1943), p. 11. T c i t e d  hereafter as 
Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England).
2^Robert Joseph Kerner, (ed.), Czechoslovakiai 
Twenty Years of Independence (Berkeley and Los Angeles i 
University of California Press, 1940), pp. 350-51. (Cited 
hereafter as Kerner, Czechoslovakia).
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bility of sending a Japanese expeditionary force to Russia• 
House was adamant in refusing to consider such a course as
!
one entirely in opposition to the principles of his govern** 
rnent* "Any effort at intervention except at the request of 
the Russian government would be a mistake," he was convin­
ced *2^
During January and February of 1913, almost constant 
pressure was put on President Wilson and his advisors, urging 
that he approve Japanese intervention* All such counsel was 
declined, but the arguments mounting one on another, began 
to have an effect on the President* The Entente requests, 
coupled with similar appeals from his own diplomatic staff 
a b r o a d , b u i l t  a strong ease for intervention, which be­
came increasingly difficult for him to resist* In late Feb­
ruary, Arthur J* Balfour, British Secretary of State for For­
eign Affairs, again appealed to the President and this re­
quest was backed up by the French Embassy stating that Japan 
agreed to meet all Allied demands concerning her actions in 
Siberia* Wilson decided to accept the proposal and drafted 
a declaration of policy stating that although
the United States has not thought it wise to loin the 
governments of the Entente in asking the Japanese
^ B e t t y  Miller Unterberger, America0 s Siberian Exped i- 
tion, 1918-1920s A Study of National Policy (Durham, N* C* j 
Duke University Press, 195^5» P* 19*
J 7 lbid. * p® 2.1*
Government to act in Siberia, "it would not object to 
such a request being made by the other Allies"*
Hardly had he sent the statement to the State Department for 
information of the Allied ambassadors, when he received other 
intelligence from some of his personal advisors which caused 
him to reconsider his decision and recall the note that was 
to have been sent to Japan*29 The time was not yet right for 
the President to want the Japanese to enter on an interven­
tionist course alone in Russia, nor was he then inclined to­
ward United States participation in a joint endeavor*3°
Among his advisors, the military, particularly, did not favor 
intervention® Newton D, Baker, the Secretary of War, con­
sistently resisted all proposals for intervention in Russia, 
and was vehement in his opposition to the suggestion that 
American troops be diverted from Prance to other fronts*3l 
General Peyton fc. March, American Chief of Staff, also con­
sidered intervention impracticable saying that it would not 
divert a single German division from the Western Front, while 
General John J* Pershing, Commander in Chief of the American 
Expeditionary Force, refused to authorize transfer of any 
troops from his command in F r a n c e . ® 3 2  with such divergent
28Ibid*, p. 30*
29lbid®. p® 31*
3 % u nyan, up* cit » * p* 60*
3 1Mamatey, pp* cit*, p* 74*
32William Appleman Williams, American-Rus sian Relations * 
1781-194? (New Yorks Rinehart & Co®, Inc®, 19521, p® 151*
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counsel offered by key diplomatic and military advisors*
coupled with almost incessant appeals from the French and
British for Japanese intervention, President Wilson was
faced with a most difficult decision, informing House that
3 3he was 85sweating blood,(l over it*
Intervention was brought closer, however, when the 
Japanese landed a force at Vladivostok on April 5 > citing 
the murder of three Japanese nationals as the basis for the 
action.*^ The British also sent a small detachment of Ma­
rines to guard the Embassy in the face of possible internal 
disorder, but the United States declined to participate* 
Behind the British move was an effort to insure that any
action taken wpuld be an Allied one, not an independent Ja-
35
panese venture. The Soviets reacted quickly to the Ja­
panese landing at Vladivostok, and George V* Chicherin, Act­
ing Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, decried the use of 
force in a situation in which the local Soviet had not even 
been given an opportunity to investigate, and "instructing 
the Soviets in Siberia to oppose any forcible invasion of 
Russian territory.n^6 Later in the month, on April 28,
33unterberger, op. cit., p. 21.
3^For. Reis. of U. S., 1918. Russia. XI, pp. 100^01.
35Lloyd George, op* cit., VI, p. 16?.
3^Jane Degras, (ed), Soviet Documents on Foreign 
Policy (Londons Oxford University Press, 195lT7 pp. 67-68.
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Lansing and Viscount Kikujiro Ishil, Japanese Ambassador to 
the United States, discussed a proposed Japanese intervention 
in Siberia, at which time the Ambassador indicated that his 
Government would welcome Allied participation in an expedi- 
tion to Siberia*-^ Outlining the participation of Nipponese 
troops, Viscount Ishli implied that Japan0s sphere of inter- 
est would extend only to Irkutsk in Siberia--covering only 
about half the territory that the British thought they would 
be able to bring under control* On learning of this self- 
imposed limitation, American diplomats again lost interest, 
seeing in Japan’s proposals only self-interest, rather than 
a sincere desire to reopen an Eastern Front, so that they 
could come into direct contact with the Central Powers*^8 
Events followed in rapid successions the start of 
the Czechoslovak Legions toward Vladivostok, the Chelyabinsk 
incident, and the Legions0 break with the Soviet— all began 
to call for definite action on the part of the Allies, as 
tension mounted in the Russian Far East*
The Entente leaders moved desperately to obtain Amer­
ican approval of intervention* At the seventh session of the 
Supreme War Council, held at Abbeville on July 2, the Allies 
prepared a note which was submitted to President Wilson on
^Unterberger, e>p* cit * * p. M k  
38ibia.
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the following day* Lord Reading pointed out the reasons 
an Allied intervention in Siberia was an imperative necess-
(l)the action of the Czechoslovaks had transformed 
"the Siberian eclipse" and presented an opportunity to 
seize control of this important area which might never 
return; (2)the Allies were under moral obligation to 
"save" the Czechoslovaks, and failure to do so would 
alienate the Slavs of Austria and the Balkans; (3)the 
Allies were also under moral obligation to help the 
"liberal and democratic" elements in Russia against 
the Bolsheviks, whose power was crumbling anyhow, as 
well as against the reactionaries, who hoped with Ger­
man support to restore the Tsar; (4)Allied interven­
tion would be a step towards restoration of the East­
ern Front, which was indispensable if the Allies 
hoped to win the war in 19191 and (5)the Japanese were 
prepared to intervene if only the United States would
assent *39
The skillful interjection of the "moral obligation"'to^sa^e 
the Czechoslovaks in the Allied proposal finally moved the 
President into accepting intervention by the Allies* On 
July 5» 1918, President Wilson consented to American parti­
cipation in a limited Allied action in Siberia for the pur­
pose of supporting the withdrawal of the Czechs * ^  The fol­
lowing day at a White House Conference, called to discuss 
the Russian situation, Lansing made the following memorandums
• ••That'the present situation of the Czechoslovaks 
requires this Government and other Governments to make 
an effort to aid those at Vladivostok in forming a junc-
39Mamatey, .op* cit•* p. 289s quoting from For, Reis. 
of U. S., 1918. Russia• II, pp* 241-48; Cf*, Bunyan, op* cit•* 
P. 10?*
^Oppr* Reis• of U 0 S*•■ 1918, Russia« II, pp* 241-43; 
Stewart, qq* cit* * p* 114*'
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tlon with their compatriots in Western Siberia; and that 
this Government on sentimental grounds and because of 
the effect upon the friendly Slavs everywhere would be 
subject to criticism if it did not make this effort and 
would doubtless be held responsible if they were defeat­
ed by lack of such support.^1
The memorandum continued that because the United 
States would be unable to provide any considerable number of 
troops within a short time, that the Japanese should furnish 
small arms and ammunition to the Czechoslovaks, with the 
United States to share expenses and supplement the supplies 
as soon as possible*^2 Those attending the conference which 
established the program of the joint intervention wereiPresl* 
dent Wilson; Secretary of State Lansing; Newton D. Baker, 
Secretary of War; Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy; 
General March, Chief of Staff, and Admiral William S* Ben­
son, dhief of Naval Operations* Although this group was not 
in complete accord concerning the adventure,^ the United 
States was committed to participate*
The American proposal for a joint expedition to 
Siberia for the purpose of assisting the eastward movement 
of the Czechoslovak Legions was formally submitted to the 
Terauchi Cabinet of Japan for deliberation on July 12* The 
Japanese decided not only to accept the American proposal,
^ ^For, Reis« of U* S .t 1918. Russia. II, p. 263*
^Ibld.
^3unterberger, op. cit., p. 70.
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but also to dispatch an 1 independent expedition" on its own 
initiative*^ This was the Invitation that Japan had been 
awaiting, as military elements of the Island Empire had made 
expansion one of the primary objectives of Japanese govern­
ment and society* John Albert White sums up the situation 
well in the following statements
Japan wanted to Intervene at the time of the Chinese 
Revolution in 1911, stating that the continuation of 
hostilities in China might make it necessary for her to 
intervene* Finding the Powers unreceptive to a sole 
Intervention, however, she next proposed a joint inter­
vention, first with Great Britain and then jointly 
with Great Britain and the United States* The inter­
vention as proposed did not, of course, take place*
But it is interesting to notice that within a mere six 
years, these almost Identical conditions prevailed and 
would be followed by the same proposals from Japan*
On this- occasion, however, the revolution occurred in 
Russia and the fact that the world was at war made it 
possible for Japan to obtain consent to the interven­
tion she desired*^?
The basic American position in regard to the inter­
vention was outlined in an Aide Memoire* dispatched to the 
Allied Governments on July 17, and given to General William 
S * Graves, the American Commander of the expeditionary 
forces to Siberia* Briefly, the United States policy re­
volved around the following points?
1. Military action is admissable in Russia, as the
^Tatusuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese 
Empire (Garden City? Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc*,
1935 ) 9 P« 205| Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry. (New Yorks 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc*, 1949), pp« 364-56*
^5white, qq* cit • *. p. 67#
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Government of the United States sees the circumstance*©;*;, 
only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces 
and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic 
kinsmen*
2* To steady any efforts at self-government or self- 
defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing 
to accept assistance*
3* To guard military stores which may subsequently 
be needed by Russian forces in the organization of their 
own self-defense*
4* This policy is not Intended as a criticism of 
the activities in which any other government might see 
fit to engage*
5* Solemn assurance is given to Russia that It was 
not contemplated that the intervention should involve 
"any interference of any kind with the political 
sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal 
affairs, gr any impairment of her territorial integ­
rity* , * "^6
It was in the matter of assignment of troops that the 
basic differences between the American and Japanese Govern­
ments came to light. Originally the joint agreement had been 
to send seven thousand troops from each nation to assist the 
Czechoslovak Legions* The Japanese soon stated that the Uni­
ted States, in sending its seven thousand men, plus two 
thousand additional non-combatants, had violated the agree­
ment, and immediately rushed great numbers of men into the 
Siberian area, establishing a force of some seventy-two 
thousand combat effectives*^7 By October 18, General Graves
46pora Reis * of U, S *, 1918 * Russia * II, pp* 287-90*
^Charles Seymour, (arr,), The Intimate Papers of • 
Colonel House (Bostons Houghton-Mifflin Company),III, p* 
416>; Russell H. Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the Far East 
(New York? Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1952), p* To5*
reported to the War Department that, "Japan had at least 
sixty thousand troops in Siberia and it was disclosed later, 
that I had underestimated..*by twelve thousand* There was no 
military situation demanding this increase.. Wilson®s 
belief that this Japanese move violated an agreement on the 
number of troops to be sent to Siberia alienated him further 
from that country.^9 Further difficulties associated with 
relations between the United States, the Allies, and the 
Russians, led him to the decision that he should disassoci­
ate the United States from activities in Russia at the 
earliest possible moment* On September 26, messages were 
sent to the Allied Governments notifying them "with the 
deepest of regret" that the United States found it impos­
sible to give them further assistance in Russia and the Far 
East*50 This notification of termination of American sup­
port for the intervention was dispatched just one month 
after the first American troops, the 2?th Infantry, arrived 
in Siberia from Manila* Although anything other than nor­
mal reinforcements were not to be sent to Siberia, the Am­
erican detachments were to remain in the Far East until
^William S, Graves, America ° s Siberian Adventure. 
1918-1920 (New Yorks Peter Smith, 1931)$ P* 6^*
^9Roy Watson Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern 
Policy, 1913-1921 (New Yorks Bookman Associates, 1957)$ 
p* 24B*
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April 1, 1920o Through strict compliance with the rather 
vague instructions of the Aide Memoire„ they were to act as 
a steadying force in the maelstrom, which was Siberia.
Mo other foreign representatives in Siberia were held 
to such definite instructions as were the American forces. 
From the standpoint of active intervention in Russian af­
fairs in which the mood and enthusiasm of the moment car­
ried the French, the British and the Japanese a long way, 
General Graves' instructions were a handicap and won for 
him and the American military miI little unpopularity.51
To the Japanese, the British and the French, the "Aide
Memoire was but a scrap of paper containing an idealist's
dream, to be torn and scattered to the four winds*"52 As an
American military author later wrote, this was not to be
d one:
But in Siberia this flouted paper was bound in a 
steel frame* Major General William S. Graves, U. S. 
Military Academy, '89» who first saw service on the 
western plains *..was not a man to be h o o d w i n k e d .53
Graves was determined not to become involved in Russia's in­
ternal affairs and relationships between the United States 
and Japan could not be easy under these conditions. In ad­
dition, the fact that the Japanese had incurred the dis­
pleasure of the American President did not deter them from
51 Stewart, oj). cit.. p. .138 j Cf., Kennan, Historic^
52R. Ernest Dupuy, Perish by the Sword * The Czechoslo­
vakian Anabasis and Our Supporting Campaigns in North Bus- 
sia. 1918-192Q (Harrisburg, Pa.5 The Military Service Pub­
lishing Co., 1939), p. 213.
53ibia.. p. 2 U w
following their established policy* The Bolshevik Revolu­
tion with the consequent civil war and chaos offered them a 
chance to establish a Japanese sphere of influence over the 
Maritime Province, Siberia, North Manchuria and all of Mon-
For the Bolsheviks, intervention was another imperi­
alist venture and the Soviet did not wish any part of it.
In response to earlier Allied landings at Murmansk and Arch­
angel in North Russia, 55 Vladimir Lenin (President of the 
Soviet of People's Commissars) and Trotsky stated the 
Bolshevik position clearly and bluntly:
English landings must be considered an inimical act 
against the Republic. Their direct aim is to unite 
with the Czechoslovaks and, in the case of success, 
with the Japanese, in order to overthrow the power of 
the workers and peasants and to establish a dictator­
ship of bourgeoisie. We have ordered the dispatch of 
troops necessary for the defense of the Murmansk rail­
way against the violators«...All assistance, direct or 
indirect, to the Intervening violators will be re­
garded as state treason and will be punished accord­
ing to military law*56
Following the Allied landings at Vladivostok, Trotsky, 
on August 23 s again blasted at the Intervent ion, saying in 
an interview translated from Izvestla (one of the leading
5^Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917- 
1924 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), p. 133*
55Leonid I* Strakbovsky, The Origins of American In­
tervention in North Russia (1918). (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 193?)• Full account of this expedition*
56ibid. *■ p. 58.
Bolshevik newspapers)
According to the American statement the Aide Mem­
oirs |, the intervention of the Allies is for the pur- 
pogeHof assisting the Czechoslovaks against the Ger­
man and Austro-Hungarian war prisoners who are at­
tacking them* The participation of these prisoners in 
the struggle against the Czechoslovaks is the most 
monstrous invention, as is the Japanese statement 
about the threat to the Siberian road from the 
Germans *57
Adding to the confusion in Russia and Siberia were 
the White Russian forces and the other ant1-Reds, not neces­
sarily favorable to the Czar and the Imperial cause,. The 
relationships which developed between these groups, the Al­
lied interventionists, and the Legions created a fluid situ­
ation, constantly changing as the tides of war ebbed and 
flowed•
The Legions, meanwhile, the center of this great 
power struggle, were almost totally disregarded as the major 
Powers attempted to push through their particular projects. 
On June 25® shortly before the American decision to call for 
a joint intervention, Czechoslovak commanders in Vladivostok 
made a momentous decision, casting the Legions directly into 
the conflict* About fourteen thousand Czechoslovaks had 
made the journey overland to Vladivostok and were waiting 
transportation to take them to France. On learning that the 
Bolsheviks had cut their lines of communication along the 
Trans-Siberian Railway, they decided to move westward to ef-
feet a juncture with their comrades, now ringed about by the 
Bolsheviks.3®
Representatives of the Legions in Vladivostok ap** 
proached Admiral Austin M. Knight, Flag officer of the U,S®.S 
Brooklyn. based at the Siberian port, and the Admiral states 
that the following was among the questions they asked?
If they Czechs remain in Russia to fight on a new 
Eastern Front they ask to be informed minimum [whether! 
this force will be accepted by the Allies as the equi­
valent of fighting on the Western Front and as entitling 
them to same consideration when terms of peace are fin­
ally agreed upon, as if they had proceeded to the West­
ern Front in accordance with their original agreement 
with the French government.59
The decision of the Czechoslovaks on the spot was to 
remain and try to liberate their countrymen from the depths 
of European Hussia and Western Siberia® The Czechoslovak 
National Council and Masaryk in the United States, out of 
direct touch with the Legions, were forced to agree, albeit 
reluctantly, to conditions over which they had little con­
trol* With Independence of Czechoslovakia as their primary 
goal, J'they were compelled to abstain from any adverse 
criticism of the use that the Great Powers contemplated for 
their eastern army.1 ^  The die was east, and the Czechoslo-
ey, op. cit., p. 288.
59f o t . Eels, of U. S., 1918. Bussla. II, p. 230.
• I
6°Felix John Vondracek, The Foreign Policy of Czecho< 
Slovakia. 1918-193<> (New Yorks Columbia University Press,
vaks, remaining in Russia and Siberia, were deeply involved 
in action there, as Stewart points outs
Eager to win favor with France, England and America, 
the Legions••.remained, a provocation to the Reds and 
an Irritation to many Whites. Their presence was the 
cause of much . suffering on their own part.- and no little 
blood-shed during the winter of 1918-19*
^Stewart, .o]D. cit. * p. 115
CHAPTER VII
THE ANABASIS TO VLADIVOSTOK S ON THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE
Following the Congress at Chelyabinsk, the Czechoslo­
vak leaders returned to their units on May 2^, agreed among 
themselves to 1 shoot their way through” to Vladivostok, 
should such a course become necessary. The Legions were to 
begin their push toward the Far Eastern port immediately and 
were to prepare for any eventuality.^ At this time the 
Legions were spread all the way from Penza, a city west of 
the Volga in European Russia, to Vladivostok, on the east­
ern coast of Siberia* General Mikhail Dietrichs of the for­
mer Cz^r1st and Provisional armies (be had been Chief of 
Staff to General Nikolai Dukbonin, acting Russian Commander- 
In-Chief in 1917) led the first echelons of about twelve 
thousand men from Penza to Vladivostok, arriving there in 
early May, 1918* There they waited for the balance of the 
force to join them, fully expecting that the Entente Powers 
would provide the shipping necessary to transport them to 
the Western Front.
On May 25, Leon Trotsky, Soviet Commissar for War, is-
■^George F* Kennan, Soviet-American Relations * 1917- 
1920 (Princeton University Press, 19585, II, p. 152. (Cited 
hereafter as Kennan, Soviet-American Relations); George 
Stewart, (The White Armies of Russia„ A Chronicle of Counter- 
Revolution andAllied Intervention (New York 1 The Macmillan 
Company, 1933)? P* 1-Q^ # ’
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sued an order requiring the disarming of the Legions, bring­
ing about the first serious clash between the Bolsheviks and 
Czechoslovaks on the same day, at the little railway town of 
Marianovka, west of Omsk. The Reds were defeated and from 
this time on the Legions deployed along the railway line, be­
gan to take matters into their own hands, initially with 
great success. Kennan reportsi
• •■♦in' the course of the fortnight following Sunday,
May 26 , the greater portion of the stretch of the rail­
way from a point west of Samara, on the Volga, to one 
somewhat west of Irkutsk— a distance of about 2,500 
miles— was wrested from Bolshevik hands either by Czech 
forces strung out along the railway or by anti-commun­
ist Russian groups who took advantage of the Czech action 
to seize points independently and to set up a new civil 
authority.2
The success of the Czechoslovaks along the Trans-Si­
berian reads like a railroad time schedules May 27, Chelya­
binsk occupied; May 29, Penza occupied 3 May 31, Tomsk; June 
6-7, Omsk; June 8 , Samara; June 19, Krasnoyarsk.3 All along 
the line, and a number of its branches, the Czechoslovaks 
wrested control of the area from the Soviets in Siberia and 
the Volga region.
The American Consul General at Irkutsk, Ernest L. 
Harris, innocently was the cause of one of the greatest 
stumbling blocks for the Legions in their drive along the
2Kennan, Soviet-American Relations. II, p . .277#
3Dr. Eduard Benes, My War Memoirs, (Trans.), Paul 
Selver (Boston and New Yorks Hougbton-Mifflin Company,
1926), pp. 366-68.
Trans-Siberian. Harris bad arrived at Irkutsk on May 23 and 
was just getting settled into his new position (he had been 
manager of the Petrograd office of the National City Bank of 
New York) when the uprising began, and he was unaware of the 
scope of the activity connected with the Czechoslovak upris­
ing. While at the Irkutsk station on May 26, he watched a 
detachment of the local Red Guards attempt to stop and dis­
arm a train taking Czechoslovaks to Vladivostok. The Sov­
iet attack was brushed aside by the Legionaries and the 
train continued toward its destination. The next day, an­
other Soviet-Legion incident developed west of the city, 
and Harris, assisted by the French Consul General, M. Bour- 
gois, and Deputy Agent Geitzman, of the Moscow Commissariat 
for Foreign Affairs at Irkutsk, mediated with the conflict­
ing groups and persuaded the Czechoslovaks to continue their 
trip to the e a s t T h e s e  two trains of Legionaries had been 
designated as the units to capture Irkutsk in the Czechoslo­
vak plan to gain control of the Trans-Siberian Railway which 
represented the only means by which they could move through 
to the ports of the Far East. When he heard the details of 
the incident at Irkutsk, Gajda,
...was furious.*.told Americans if ever he caught up 
with the officers of these first trains he would have
^Kennan, Soviet-American Relations« II, pp. 283~34.
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them court-martialed for accepting the mediation and 
consenting to proceed.3
Because these Legionaries had moved from the area, by-pass­
ing their objective, the Soviets were able to control Irkutsk 
until July 11, and only surrendered the city after undergo­
ing a prolonged attack begun on June 21. Even Colonel George 
H. Emerson, an American railroad specialist making a tour of 
inspection of the railway and its facilities, entered into 
negotiations to compose Czechoslovak-Soviet differences, suc­
ceeding in several instances. Emerson helped ward off a 
major engagement at Marinsk at the time of the uprising, by 
talking the Czechoslovaks into proceeding eastward to Vladi­
vostok. ^  By June 8 , however, Consul General Harris deter­
mined that the Czech uprising had developed into a civil war, 
and that he and other Americans would have to drop efforts at 
their mediation, as he now considered them a definite inter­
ference in Russian internal affairs,? and he returned to his 
post at Irkutsk.
The large Czechoslovak contingent in Vladivostok
5 Ibid., p. 286; Cf•, William S. Graves, America1 s Si­
berian Adventure, 1918-1920 (New Yorks Jonathan Cape & Har­
rison Smith, 1931)? P* W .
^Graves, pp. pit., pp. 37-^0 ; Betty Miller Unterberg- 
America1 s Siberian Expedition. 1918-1920 3 A Study of 
National Policy (Durham, N, C.t Duke University Press, 1956), 
pp. 58-59*
7iCennan, Soviet-American Relations . II, p. 290.
(some fourteen thousand men) was not involved during the 
early stages of the uprising. On June 25? however, the com­
manders of the Legions there reached a decision to retrace 
their steps along the railway line in an effort to help 11-
V v
berate the eight thousand Czechoslovaks under General Cecek 
in the Volga area. On June 29? after a three-hour conflict 
with local Soviet troops, the Legions took control of Vladi­
vostok® in order to assure protection of their base and, a 
few days later, the movement back to the west was begun. 
Within hours of the Legions® uprising in Vladivostok, the 
Allied powers. Great Britain, Japan, China and the United 
States landed detachments of troops and the occupation was 
given official sanction.^ At the time of the decision to 
return westward, General <5ec£ek and his forces had gained 
complete possession of the railway centers in the Volga re­
gion. Simultaneously, General Gajda had captured Ekaterln- 
berg to the northeast, and had swept down another line of 
the railway toward Omsk. The Red Guards, opposing the 
Legions, were ex-soldiers, for the most part, with some units
®Unterberger, pp. cit.. p. 57*
^Department of State, Papers RelatIns to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States. 1918« Supplement II« Russia 
(Washingtons Government Printing office, 1931), I, p. 235. 
(Cited Hereafter as For. Reis. of TJ. S,. ,■ 1918. Russia).
l°Henry Baerlein, The March of the Seventy Thousand
(Londons Leonard Parsons, Ltd., 1926T, p. 136+
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"entirely composed of German and Magyar volunteers, the Ger­
man officers in command being anxious...to hinder the Czechs 
from setting out for the front in France"• The success of 
the Czechoslovak offensive threatened the existence of the 
Soviet Government by loosening its control on the Volga, the 
Urals and all of Siberia, and these areas became the centers 
of various White or anti-Bolshevik movements#^2 One writer 
reportsi
.•.everywhere the anti-Bolshevik elements of the 
population rallied to the Czechs and began to establish 
democratic governments. The Siberian atmosphere was 
wholly different from that of European Russia, and the 
anti-Bolsheviks were very far from being in sympathy 
with the old Tsarist regime.13
Among the many anti-Communist political groups opposing the 
Soviets in Russia and Siberia, the Czechoslovaks were most 
closely associated with the Social Revolutionary Party* Po­
litically, this group was formed of people very similar to 
the Czechoslovaks themselves, representing the farmers coop­
eratives and the middle-class elements of Siberian society. 
Centers of the Social Revolutionary activity were at Samara 
on the Volga, in Russia proper, and in the Omsk-Novo-Niko- 
layevsk area of Siberia, where the Social Revolutionaries
11Ibid.. p. 147.
^ F e l i x  John Vondraeek, The Foreign Policy of Czeoho-
Slovakia. 1918-1935 (New Yorks Columbia University Press, 
193?), PP. 119-20.
•*-3Baerleln» op. cit,.,. p. 162.
had laid plans for revolt long before the actual uprising of 
the L e g i o n s A s  Novo-Nikolayevsk was Ga jda's headquarters, 
he at once coordinated his operations with those of the local 
underground officers® group to overthrow the Soviet author­
ity and, In a matter of days, control of the entire area from 
Omsk through Novo-Nikolayevsk to Krasnoyarsk, passed into 
their hands.15
Captain Gajda seized Novonlkilajevsk Qfovo-Nikola- 
yevslcj, thereby changing the war from a purely defen­
sive journey out of the country to an active offensive- 
occupation and the holding of the region against the 
Bolsheviks. In this manner, this hitherto unknown cap­
tain, on his own responsibility, caused international 
complications of a serious nature...Gajda played into 
the hands of Great Britain and France, with the result 
that the Czechoslovak authorities at Paris were forced 
into acceptance of a situation entirely beyond their 
control•
General Graves refers to a statement made on July 2?, 
1918, by a member of the branch of the Czechoslovak National 
Council at Washington, pointing out the trend of thinking of 
some of the Legions® commanders 1
A week ago (July 20th), Professor Masaryk received a 
lengthy cable report from the leader of the Czecho-Slo- 
vak forces in which the following words are found, indi­
cative of the present desires of these men; *® In my opin­
ion, it is most desirable and also possible to recon­
struct a Russia-Germany front in the East. We ask for 
Instructions as to whether we should leave for France or 
whether we should stay here to fight in Russia by the
^Kennan, Soviet-American Re la t i on s . II, pp. 161-62.
15xbid., p. I63.
°Vondracek, op. cit.» p. 119*
side of the Allies, and of Russia”. Professor Masaryk 
has since then instructed the forces in Siberia to re­
main there for the present•^7
The decision to remain in Siberia was a bitter disap­
pointment for many of the Czechoslovaks, but they willingly 
obeyed the instructions of Masaryk, made at the request of 
the Allies. The Legions established recruiting stations in 
every community under their control and a general mobiliza­
tion of Czechoslovaks in the region was ordered.-*-® "Czecho­
slovaks throughout Siberia were rallied, thousands more 
drifted into the ranks as prisoner-of-war camps fell into 
the Druzina11^  f Legions*?"] hands."-*-9 The total strength of 
the Legions soon was brought to approximately one hundred 
thousand men, which represented a sizeable force that could 
be of great value to the Entente. Benes, commenting on an 
interview In which he participated in May noted, "Mr. Bal­
four, who, as an Englishman, appreciated plain facts, was 
particularly impressed by my reference to the hundred thou­
sand volunteers fighting on the three Allied fronts."20 The
^Graves, op. cit.. pp. 333-3iH  Cf., R. B. Mowat, A 
of European Diplomacy. 191^-1925 (Londons Edward 
Arnold & Co. , 19285, p. 121.
-*-®Stewart, op. cit.. p. 113*
^9r0 Ernest Dupuy, Perish by the Sword. The Czechoslo­
vakian Anabasis and Our Supporting Campaigns in North Russia, 
1918-1920 (Harrisburg. Pa.i The Ml1itary Service Publishing 
Co., 1939), P« 82.
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British and the French were to appreciate even more the 
greatly enlarged Czechoslovak force which developed in Si­
beria .
Late summer and autumn of 1918 found the Legionaries 
moving on through the Urals and westward, with the months of 
June, July and August devoted, primarily to uniting the scat­
tered elements of the Legions. While the Czechoslovaks were 
gathering and preparing to make their supreme effort at the 
request of their friends, the Allies threw the weight of he 
their diplomatic support Into the balance against the Sov­
iets. On June 4, diplomatic representatives of the major 
powers, in a joint demarche, confronted Georgi V. Chicherin, 
Soviet Commissar for foreign Affairs, in Moscow, declaring 
that "as the Czechoslovaks were to be regarded as a consti­
tuent part of the Allied Army, any attempt to disarm them 
would be treated as a hostile act against the Allies.
Most of the Allied diplomatic contingent wanted to retain 
the Czechoslovak forces in Russia and Siberia and on June 13, 
Paul S* Reinsch, the United States Minister in China, cabled 
from Peking?
It is the general opinion of Allied representatives 
here, in which I concur, that it would be a serious 
mistake to remove the Czecho-Slovak troops from Siberia. 
With only slight countenance and support they could con­
trol all of Siberia against the Germans. They are sym­
21lbld.. p. 369; Cf., Kennan, Soviet-Amerlean Rela­
tions o II, pp. 306-8.
pathetic to the Russian population, eager to be acces­
sories to the Allied cause*.*22
General Gajda and his units of the Legions pressed 
westward, early in August occupying the important town of 
Kazan on the Volga.* When the city fell, the Czechoslovaks 
found that they also had captured the gold reserve of the 
State Bank of Russia* Later the treasure, worth millions of 
rubles,, was turned over to the White Government at 0msk.23 
The victory at Kazan marked the high point of the Czecho­
slovak advance in the Volga region, however, as the Reds 
launched a counterattack on the city on September 5 ? with 
the result that Kazan had to be evacuated five days later* 
Simbirsk was lost by the Czechoslovaks on September 15, and 
on October 8 , eight thousand weary, discouraged Legionaries 
were driven out of Samara by twenty-five thousand Soviets*2^ 
Although the Czechoslovak forces were meeting with serious 
reverses in European Russia, their position was much better 
in Siberia, where their principal task, until the Armistice, 
was to protect themselves and guard the railway line as their 
one means of communication*
An interesting facet of Czechoslovak life during this 
period was that many Legionaries lived on trains while pa-
22For. Reis, ot U* S., 1918. Russia, II, pp. 206-7* 
2^Stewart, op. cit., p. 116; Dupuy, op. cit., p. 194. 
2^Dupuy, op. cit., pp. 194-95*
trolling the Trans-Siberian Bailway* Among the ears in each 
of the trains were the broneviki (armored cars), first used 
by the Czechs and later by all the combatants. Major B* Er­
nest Dupuy, a military student in the United States Army, has 
given a concise description of such an armored train?
This offensive vehicle, in Its original state, con­
sisted of any kind of car, preferably of the gondola 
type, which was re-enforced by wooden baulks and iron 
plating. Buttressed by sandbags banked along its sides 
and bristling with machine guns peering through embras- 
sures, it presented a formidable, moving fortress. 
Sometimes a field-piece, anchored on a concrete base, 
peered from above the sides. Ahead rolled a flat-car 
loaded with rails. Behind the broneviki came the loco­
motive, and in rear of it rolled the box-ears of the 
crew. The Czechs began to use the broneviki from the 
time they left Bachmach jJune, 19lfi . Most famous of 
the Druzina® s broneviki was the "Orlik," or "Little 
Eagle," a victor of many encounters, whose name struck 
terror into the hearts of Red commanders*25
The Czechoslovaks did not try to achieve their ends by 
force of arms alone, as they carried with them a strong de­
sire to inform their men of events happening within the Dual 
Monarchy, so that they could understand the reason behind 
the bitter struggle in Siberia, thousands of miles from home* 
Propaganda and education had been important parts of the 
Czechoslovak movement from its inception, and the Siberian 
branch of the Legions, did not slight this practice* A spe­
cial unit of the Legions published the ^eskoslovensky Denik 
(Czechoslovak Daily) on board trains in a hundred different 
places. First Issued in Kiev In 1918, the newspaper was
23lbid., pp. 197-98.
printed wherever its train happened to be on its roving pa­
trol* Special editions were printed in Magyar and German so 
that prisoners-of-war whose homes were in the confines of the 
new state might be acquainted with conditions t h e r e
The Czech press also printed paper money for Admiral 
Kolchak’s government. The Kolchak administration dumped 
bundles of old Kerensky rubles over the Red lines with 
. a statement printed across their face, ’You can have 
these for notbingi” The Reds did likewise, turning out 
bushels of forged notes which were sold by the pound.2?
The turn of the fortunes of war on the Western Front 
in Europe in favor of the Allies, the recognition of the 
National Council in Paris as a government, followed by the 
signing of the Armistice, proved very heartening to the 
Legions in Siberia, but they still were asked to remain as a 
buttress against the Communists.
The anti-Communist elements, led by Admiral Aleksandr 
(Alexander) Kolchak, announced the formation of a Siberian 
Government at Omsk, a week after the Armistice. Kolchak be- 
same titular Supreme Ruler of the country, receiving encour­
agement from the French, the British and part of the Czecho­
slovak Legions. The latter, headed by Gajda, represented 
only a small portion of the Legions, as the majority did not 
wish to support Kolchak because of his extreme reactionary 
m e a s u r e s .2® Because of this conflict with the majority of
2^Stewart, op. cit., p. 120.
27lbid.
2®Baerlein, ojd. cit.. p. 222.
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his countrymen, Gajda lost much of his following and influ­
ence in Czechoslovak actions from that time forward.2^
Kolchak was the strongest anti-Communist force in 
Western Siberia, and although he called himself "Dictator*1 
over all of Siberia, his Influence in the Far East was never 
well-established. Indeed, in no area of the vast country did 
he have the full .support of the Russian peoples to the ex­
treme reactionaries, he was a liberal; to the middle classes 
he seemed too reactionary* The peasants and poorer classes 
did not enter into his consideration at all.30 Lieutenant 
General Dmitri L* Horvath was Kolchak's deputy in the Far 
East and called himself the 1 supreme representative of the 
Kolchak Government," indicating the nature of his concept of 
the government required to establish order in Siberia. Hor­
vath had chosen as his military commander, Major General 
Pavel Pavlovic Ivanov-Rinov, an extreme reactionary, who 
terrorized and pillaged villages throughout Eastern Siberia. 
Although nominally under General Horvath as Kolchak's repre­
sentative, Ivanov-Rinov actually acknowledged no superior, 
and conducted his rapacious actions at will. Further compli­
cating the anti-Bolshevik cause in the Far East were two 
other unsavory, completely undisciplined characters, Ataman 
(Cossack Chief) Gregorii Semenov and Ataman Ivan Kalmikov,
2 9 Q ra v e s ,  ojd. c i t . * p p .  1 1 3 -1 6 .
3°Unterberger, op. cit.* pp. 118-19.
14-1
who used the unsettled conditions of the time to their own 
advantage* Both were supported by the Japanese who acknow­
ledged no responsibility for their actions, however merci­
less and disruptive they might be*3^ General Graves, the 
highly disciplined graduate of the United States Military 
Academy and commander of America's Siberian forces, had 
many conflicts with these unprincipled "leaders" in the dis­
charge of his duties and aptly described them as follows; 
"Kalmikoff murdered with his own hands, where Semeonoff or­
dered others to k i l l * A l t h o u g h  supposedly accepting the 
leadership of Kolchak, Semenov did his utmost to disrupt any 
stabilizing tendencies which the Omsk Government might have*
Prom the beginning, the intentions of the Japanese, 
as represented by their support of the lawless Cossack 
Chiefs, seemed clear to General Graves and his staff:
• ••■their leaders intrigued for political influence in 
the country, and the lesser ranks meddled in local af­
fairs* •*treated the local population with a high-hand­
edness and even with a brutality explainable only by 
the assumption that they smarted with resentment at the 
attitude of superiority which the Russians had formerly 
assumed towards them*•*33
In the pay of the Japanese— who were not at all de­
sirous of having the Siberian situation clear up, unless it
31Ibld.
^^Graves, 0£. cit.. p. 91.
33"The Situation In the Far East," Foreign Affairs. I
(June 15, 1925), 23.
was to their advantage--Semenov conducted independent opera­
tions in the Par East, as often against the Omsk Government 
as against the Bolsheviks* "The Red Terror in Russia was met 
by a White Terror of equal brutality in Siberia," Stewart 
points out, saying that the "deeds of the two White chief­
tains, Atamans Semyonov and Kalmykof, would have done credit 
to Genghis Khan*"-^ Semenov was by far the more powerful of 
the two, and was able to increase the strength of his army 
from a handful of the worst dregs of humanity, until at one 
time he commanded more than sixty-thousand men* While out­
wardly declaring that they were on the side of the Czecho­
slovaks, Semenov and his Cossacks did everything possible to 
cause friction within the Legions, and occasionally the 
Czechoslovaks had to fight them as well as the Bolsheviks to 
continue their normal duties of guarding sections of the 
railway *35
In Western Siberia where he had his seat of govern­
ment at Omsk, Kolchak surrounded himself with a staff, most 
of whom were of the "worst class of ruthless, corrupt and 
self-centered ex-Czarists coming from both soldiers and 
bureaucrats," Dupuy states*^ "* *.His actions and those of
^Stewart, ojd. cit * * p* 125*
35saerlein, op* cit.* pp* 177-78; Graves, op. cit* * 
pp* 30^-5 *
3^Dupuy, o&* cit*, p* 207*
his staff alienated the Czechs•...The Kolchak government in 
addition alienated the entire Siberian people." 37 Kolchak 
perhaps believed that with the help of the Allies he could 
hold off the Bolsheviks in the Trans-Baikal region, "But 
the Czechs were demoralized, anxious to get home, and com­
pletely disillusioned about the character of the Admiral's 
9Cause'* "38
Despite this many problems associated with American 
participation in Siberia, the intervention received "consi­
derable public support in the United States,"^9 and during 
the summer the newspapers carried many stories of the pro­
gress of the Czechoslovak Legion's across Siberia* The 
Legions "became a symbol of both the romantic and the heroic* 
In fact for most Americans the -Czechoslovaks as a people ex­
isted only through the army in Siberia* Kerner points
out that "Many Americans could not pronounce their name nor
it!visualize a location for them, yet the popular press
37Ibld.
3®Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs. A His- 
tory of Relations Between the Soviet Union and the Rest of 
the World, 1917-1929 (Princetom Princeton University Press,
1951)> p7 212*
39<phomas A* Bailey, America Paces Russia, Russian-Am- 
erican Relations from Earl.y~l£imes to Our Day (Ithaca* New 
Yorks Cornell University Press, 1950)s P*
^Robert Joseph Kerner (ed*), Czechoslovakia 1 Twenty
Years of Independence (Berkeley and Los Angeles s University
of California Press, 19^0), p* 80*
^Ibld.
called for added support for the Legions, as advocated in 
this article, typical of the times:
The first thing that must be done is to reach the 
Czechoslovak forces which have been so ably fighting 
the Teutonic-Bolshevik regime for the past several 
months*..Here is a strong force with which we can co­
operate, so that to reach it must be our first step*^2
Despite the fact that he had been sent to Siberia "to 
help the Czecho-Slovaks" and "steady efforts at self-govern­
ment or self-defense in which the Russians may be willing to 
accept assistance," General Graves had very little opportun­
ity to achieve either goal, bound as he was by the Aide Mem- 
oire. and thoroughly disgruntled with the activities of all 
the forces at work in Siberia* Bailey has expressed the 
reaction of the various factions to this apparent disassoc- 
iation of the Americans from the problem at hand, as follows:
The Reds were angry because we were indirectly help­
ing their enemies; the Whites were bitter because we did 
not help enough; the Allies were displeased because we 
had such limited objectives; and the Japanese were sus­
picious because we so obviously were trying to hamper 
their ambitions. Actually by opposing Japanese designs 
we were promoting the territorial integrity of Russia* 3
Following the signing of the Versailles Treaty in June, 1919,
the intervent ion seemed to make little sense to the American
military forces and to the American public at large.^ How-
• B* Gardiner, "Our Military Problem in Russia," 
The World1s Work, XXXVI (October, 1918), 603*
^Bailey, op. clt*, p. 2^5 •
^Pauline Tompkins, American-Russian Relations in. the 
Far East (New York: The Macmillan Company, 19^9), p. 137*
ever, political and diplomatic reasons kept American troops 
there until an, official American note was sent to the Japan­
ese Government on January 9, 1920, giving the United States1 
decision to evacuate Siberia.^5 After months of almost 
ceaseless bickering with the Kolchak Government and the 
Allies, the last American contingent pulled away from the 
docks of Vladivostok on April 1, 1920 whiie a Japanese 
band, played the popular tune, "Hard ^imes come Again Mo 
M o r e M e a n w h i l e ,  the Czechoslovaks, also caught in the 
middle of the power squeeze, had concluded the Treaty of
Kujtun, |"~February 7, 1920~| with the Soviets, under which the
liftLegions were to be permitted free passage from Siberia.
On the day the Treaty was signed, Admiral Kolchak, the 
"Supreme Ruler", was tried by a Revolutionary Tribunal and 
shot The abortive Omsk Government, not able to face up
to the demands of the times, was ended. Nearly all of the 
Czechoslovaks were repatriated between April and November, 
1920, mainly in Japanese ships, many of which they chartered
^Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States. 1920 (Washingtons Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1 9 3 6 5 , II, pp. 2 0 6-7 .
^Graves, 0£. clt.■. p. 326.
^?Roy Watson Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern 
Policy. 1913-1921. (New Xorks Bookman Associates, 1947), 
p. 2 4 7 .
Vondracek, oj>. cit.. p. 136*
1^6
and paid for themselves, and in others which were chartered 
through the American Red Cross. ”One of the last transports 
was carried to Europe on board the first Czechoslovak ship 
Legie. bought by the Legionaries* Bank in Vladivostok.’'5°
No body of troops in the Russian Civil War had shown 
such resolution and unity as the legionnaires. A hun­
ger for independence which had been frustrated since 
the battle of Biia Hora in 1620 buoyed them up many 
times when events threatened to drown them in the morass 
of politics and blood-shed* The knowledge that they 
were creating a sentiment which would determine the atti­
tude of powerful nations toward their new state laid 
upon them a sense of responsibility unshared by many 
thousands in other armies.51
With the sailing of the Americans, many of the Czecho­
slovaks, and the other Allied forces, the field was left to 
Japan. As early as March 31, the Japanese Government, dis­
claiming any ambitions in Russia, noted that it was unable 
to withdraw its forces, stating that?
As soon as the political conditions in the territor­
ies adjacent to our country settle down, as soon as the 
menace to Manchuria and Chosen has been removed, the 
safety of the lives and property of communications guar­
anteed , we hereby reaffirm our pledge that the Empire 
will evacuate Siberia, provided the Czecho-Slovaks have 
been completely withdrawn.52
As noted above, the last of the Legions sailed from 
Vladivostok in November, 1920, yet Japanese expansionists, 
following their desire to increase their industrial and ter-
5°Baerlein, pp. cit., pp. 275-79* 
51stewart, op. cit., pp. 12^-25•
52£or. Bels. . of TJ. S.,, 1920. Ill, p. 505,
ritorial empire, continued the intervention until October 
1922, when their withdrawal was arranged as part of the 
agreements stemming from the Washington Conferenee.53
53curry, pp. .cit., p. 2^7.
CHAPTER VIII
FREEDOM AT LAST: A NEW NATION IS CREATED
As the Czechoslovak Legions gained world-wide acclaim 
for their successful exploits in Russia and Siberia, the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated rapidly, reeling under 
the military blows of the advancing Entente forces, and 
feeling more and more the pressure put upon it by national­
istic elements at home. The Dual Monarchy, likewise, con­
tinued to fare badly on the diplomatic front and suffered a 
telling blow when the United States Government recognized 
the Czechoslovak Nation officially in early September, 1918. 
For the first time the term, 1 “actual Government1 was unre-
I
servedly applied to the National Council in a solemn com­
mitment by a state so important as America,” Bene¥ points 
out• The recognition accorded by the United States was 
of a unique character in the history of international rela­
tions, Fenwick reported in the American Political Science 
Review» later that year. His concise resume’ of the practi­
cal politics of recognition,of particular interest to stu-
^ r .  Eduard Benel, My War Memoirs. (Trans.), Paul 
Selver (Boston and New Yorks Hougbton-Mifflin Company, 1928), 
p. 4l7l.Cf., Thomas Capek, Jr., Origins of the Czechoslovak 
State (tTTew Yor£T] The Revell Press, 192^7, pp. 83-84; De«= 
partment of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations 
of the United States. 1918« Russia Washington? Government 
Printing Office, 1931)» T> pp. 824-25, (cited hereafter as 
For. Reis. of U. S., 1918» Russia).
dents of this period, follows, in part:
The traditional rule of international law has been 
that a new nation will be recognized by the existing 
members of the family of nations only when, after suc­
cessful revolution against the state of which it for­
merly was a part, it has given evidence of its ability 
to maintain itself. In most cases the new community is 
recognized as a de facto belligerent before its final 
recognition as a (2® jure state is accorded. In every 
instance the claimant for international recognition 
must have obtained possession of definite territory and 
must have organized a government capable of giving ex­
pression to the will of its people. But in the case of 
recognition of the Czechoslovak Nation, these conditions 
have not been fulfilled. In the first place, recogni­
tion has been accorded, not to a government established 
in the territory inhabited by the Czechoslovak people, 
but to aNational Council with headquarters in Washing- 
ton [jicu . Moreover, the new state can hardly be said 
to have at; present a de, facto existence. Its active 
supporters are to be found among the groups of Czecho­
slovaks in Siberia and in the states of the Entente 
Allies....The National Council is therefore, an absentee 
government in command of a number of distinct armies 
fighting against the nation of which their territory is 
still a de, facto part and to which their brethern in 
Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia are still rendering a for­
mal allegiance.2
The American recognition, thus, went further than 
that ; accorded by the other Allied Governments. And the Am­
erican people, "whose interest in the Siberian adventure had 
given the impetus to the adoption of this measure, approved 
it wholeheartedly," Mamatey states.3
^Charles G. Fenwick, "Notes on International Affairs," 
American Political Science Bevlew. XII (November, 1918), 
pp • 715 -l£>.
3victor S. Mamatey, The United States and East Cen­
tral Europe. 191^-19181 A Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and 
Propaganda (Princeton: P'rinceton University Press, 19 kb], 
p • 3 TO«
Believing that the end was near for the Dual Monarchy 
and fearing that a successful Austro-Hungarian peace offer 
might rob them of their hard-earned successes, the Czechoslo 
vak National Council in Paris, on October 14, announced the 
formation of the Czechoslovak Provisional Government, with 
Dr. Masaryk as President; Eduard Benes, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and Milan Stefanik, Minister of War The National 
Council based its action on the successive recognitions by 
the Governments of the United States, France and Italy, and 
on the statement made by Deputy FrantiHek Stanek in the 
Relchsrat on October 2, in which the National Council was 
given a mandate to speak for the Czechoslovak peoples at 
home, as well as on the Czech withdrawal from the Reichsrat 
on October 9*3 While Benes was announcing the formation of 
the Provisional Government, Dr. Masaryk was busy in Washing­
ton, drafting the Declaration of Czechoslovak Independence, 
with the assistance of a group of American friends.^ Copies
t
were sent to President Wilson, to the State Department and 
to Benes in Paris, where it was issued over the signatures
v ^For. Reis. of U. S., 1918. Sup. JE, I, p. 846; Cf.
Capek, op. cit., pp. 8^-85.
5Mamatey, pp. cit., pp* .330-31*
6Ibia., p. 332.
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of Masaryk, Benes and Stefanik on October 18*7
On the same day that the Declaration was released in 
Paris, President Wilson, addressing his reply to the Habs- 
burg politicians in Vienna, stated that since his Fourteen 
Points had been promulgated, the situation had changed, and 
that he no longer could answer for the Czechoslovak leaders, 
on matters pertaining to the Czechoslovak lands and peoples* 
This change in official position of the President of the 
United States was warmly welcomed by the emigre leaders and 
caused consternation in the Dual Empire* "Masaryk has put 
on record his admiration for the ’manly and honourable’ way 
in which Wilson revised his original views, especially with 
regard to Austria-Hungary...", Seton-Watson has written*® 
Masaryk also noted the effect of the President’s position on 
the leaders of the Dual Monarchy:
German and Austrian writers, military as well as poli­
tical, agree that President Wilson’s answer on October 18, 
to Austria’s offer of peace, sealed her fate and settled 
likewise the question of our freedom. Both personally 
and as the representative of the United States, Wilson 
had become a great moral and political figure in Europe.°
?Capek, op. cit. *■ pp. 91-951 For. Reis. of U. S.,
S u p . I, I, 847-¥8; Hon*Charles Pergler, "An Experiment in 
Progressive Government, the Czechoslovak Republic,," The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
LXXXIV (July, 1919), "58-33*
®R. W* Seton-Watson, Masaryk in England (New Yorks 
The Macmillan Company, 19^+3) * H 3 »  (Cited hereafter as
Masaryk in England)«
^Dr. Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a State. 
Memories B and Observations (New York: Frederick A. Stokes 
Company, 192?)* p. 293« Ccited hereafter as Masaryk, Making 
of a State)•
The carefully planned propaganda campaign, conducted 
by Masaryk and the National Council, received another "spec­
tacular" boost on October 26, when Professor Masaryk read 
the joint declaration of the "Mid-European Democratic Union" 
at Independence Hall in Philadelphia. The Union represented 
most of the oppressed peoples of Austria-Hungary, and while 
not In agreement on all matters of policy, their united 
stand at this time produced very favorable public response. 
Masaryk read the declaration, "while the Bell of Independ­
ence was rung in accordance with historical precedent* The 
proceedings were thoroughly ®American®," Masaryk later wrote, 
"but they were sincerely meant and were s u c c e s s f u l . T h a t  
the proceedings were thoroughly "American", is borne out by 
this account published in a popular periodical of the days
Following the signing, Professor Masaryk read the 
declaration to thousands of persons gathered in Inde­
pendence Square* As he finished, a second Liberty Bell, 
cast in the model of the first and paid for by children 
of the oppressed nationalities in this country, rang 
out its twentieth century defiance to the autocracy of 
Austria-Hungary
O k ’ this same day, a number of delegates, representing the 
Czech National Committee at Prague, gathered in Geneva to 
meet with Benes and Stephen Osusky, representing the Czecho­
slovak Provisional Government at Paris, recognized by the
IQlbid.* p. 255*
H " T h e  New Declaration of Independence Under the Old 
Liberty Cupola," The Survey * XLI, No. k (November 2, 1918),
115.
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Allies. Among those making the trip to Switzerland were 
Dr. Kramar, Vaclav Klofac, Frantisek £>tanek and others, mem­
bers of the "Mafffla" and similar resistance groups, who had 
served as connecting links between the people within the Em­
pire and the Czechoslovak National Council abroad. There 
was full agreement between the two groups, and while the his­
toric meeting was in progress, a bloodless revolution took 
place in Prague, with the remaining members of the National 
Committee, there, proclaiming the deposition of Emperor 
Charles as King of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia, 
and the establishment of a free and United Republic of 
Czechoslovakia.^ The revolutionaries at home, led by Alois
V, / v  y  V / /
Has in, Antonin Svehla, Frantisek Soukup and Mgr. Strlbrny, 
took over the government in Prague, and "itianoeuvered the 
Austrian military authorities into a capitulation on Octo­
ber 30th...
The Slovakian leaders added their contribution to the 
Czechoslovak cause late in the war and on October 30, at 
Turciansky Sv. Martin, agreed to form part of the new state. 
The proclamation issued at that time severed all connections
12H. W. V. Temperley, (ed.), A History of the Peace 
Conference of Paris (Londons Henry Frowde, Hodder & Stough­
ton, 1920-192^5, IV, pp. II2-II3;; Felix John Vondracek, The 
Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia. 1918-1935« (New Yorks Co— - 
Oumbaa University Press, 1937)? PP* 15-16.
^Elizabeth Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans, A Study 
of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and 
Moravia (NewYorks Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 80.
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with the Hungarian Grown and firmly allied the Slovaks with 
their Czech and Moravian brothers. It read in parts
The delegates of all the Slovak political parties, 
assembled on October 30, 1918, at Turciansky Sv. Martin, 
and organized into a Slovak National Council as members 
of the great Czechoslovak nation, affirm the right of 
self“determination, a right admitted by the entire world. 
The National Council declares that it alone is authori­
zed to speak and act in the name of the Czechoslovak 
nation living within the limits of Hungary®
« o o » • « • o . « o « a . o * o e  a o » o o . « o o «  • * * • • » * o « • » • . « a . * * * * . . . . . .
In view of this principle, we approve the new legal in­
ternational situation formulated October 18th by Presi­
dent Wilson and recognized October 2?th by the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary.^
On October 31> the National Committee at Prague and 
the Provisional Government at Paris merged into a single 
active organization and issued the Declaration of Geneva.
Dr. Kramer headed the signers of the Declaration which 
stated t
.o.we approve entirely the policy and all the military 
and diplomatic action of the Czechoslovak National 
Council, transformed into the Provisional Government 
of the Czechoslovak Countries, now sitting in Paris, 
as well as all the engagements undertaken by it, in 
the name of our nation, toward the Allied and Associa­
ted States.1*
The Armistice, ending hostilities of the Great War, 
was signed on November 11, and of the new States, Czechoslo­
vakia alone participated In the negotiations leading up to 
this long-awaited event* Bene¥ states that the selection of 
the Czechoslovak State to this signal honor was founded rfon
•^({apek, op. cit. ® pp. 99-101. Complete text. 
^ I b i d ., pp. 102-4.
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the basis of our juridical recognition and the treaties with 
the Allies which were signed before the collapse of the Em­
pire." ^  Also, on November II, Emperor Charles announced his 
withdrawal from "every participation in the administration 
of the State,h17 ending the rule of the House of Habsburg, 
which had been a power in Europe for more than six hundred 
years.
Following the dissolution of the Empire, Hungarian 
politicians made a last unsuccessful attempt to salvage the 
remains of the Magyar Kingdom, declaring themselves no 
longer connected with the once-proud Dual Empire. Allied 
opinion, however, did not approve when?
The Magyar Government, headed by Count Karolyi, 
made a vain and very belated plea that the geographi­
cal frontiers of Hungary should be preserved, that the 
Magyars were ready to grant the complete autonomy to 
Serbs, Slovaks and Rumanians comprised in those 
boundaries
Ten days after the Empire was dissolved, a military conven­
tion was signed between the victorious A m e s  and Hungary 
alone. This purely military document spelled out the lines
l6Benes, pp. pit., p. 463.
mes Brown Scott (ed»), Official Statements of 
War Alms and Peace Proposals. December 1916 to November 1918 
(Washington? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1921), p. 4?2.
R. Savic, "A Danubian Confederation of the 
Future,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, LXXXIV TTuly, 1919), 74-75.
behind which the Magyars were to retire until more permanent 
frontiers could be determined* "Hungary had indeed become 
an independent state, but she had collapsed completely be­
fore her conquerors and had to accept any terms which they 
imposed*"*^ 9 The Magyars were destined to lose their Slovak­
ian holdings, along with the great influence they once pos­
sessed in Central Europe*
Within three days of the Armistice the Czechoslovak
Revolutionary National Assembly met in Prague, in accordance
with the Geneva Agreement, and elected Masaryk President of
/ vCzechoslovakia by acclamation* Dr* Karel Kramar headed the 
first cabinet as Premier; Dr* Eduard Bene^ was named For­
eign Minister, and Dr* Alois Ha^in was chosen as Minister 
of Finance
One of the new President’s first official acts, re­
corded in the following statement, shows his concern with 
keeping the Czechoslovak troops, who had done so much toward 
achieving independence for the new state, informed concern­
ing the political situation;
As soon as the Republic had been proclaimed at Prague 
and I had been elected President on November 14, I sent 
an Army Order to our troops in France, Italy, Russia and 
Serbia, Informing them of the establishment of our State 
and defining the task of the army* It announced that
^Harold Temperley, "How the Hungarian Frontiers Were 
Drawn," Foreign Affairs„ VI (April, 1928), 433*
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the Legions in Prance and Italy would shortly return 
home, and commanded those In Russia and Siberia to 
stand by the Allies.21
The first small contingents of the Legions from France 
and Italy, as a matter of fact, arrived In Czechoslovakia on 
November 14 ,^  and were accorded a tumultuous welcome; but 
it was to be almost two years longer before the last of the 
members of the war-weary Legions from Siberia were to ar­
rive in Prague, Gratz, Pilsen and elsewhere in Czechoslo­
vakia to take their places in the new State and help build 
the nation for which they had struggled so long.
^Masaryk of a State« pp. 3H-12. 
op. cit.. p. 16.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
Although the Habsburg Empire exhibited signs of both 
Internal weakness and loss of stature on the international 
scene, it enjoyed the status of a major Power in the Euro­
pean family of nations prior to the outbreak of the World 
War. In the fateful year of 1914, with Franz: Joseph enter­
ing the sixty-sixth year of his unprecedented reign over 
Austria, and his forty-seventh year as King of Hungary, 
about 50,000,000 persons, owed him their allegiance and 
made up the melange that was Austria-Hungary. Internal 
pressures were beginning to give grave concern to the bu­
reaucrats charged with the responsibility for affairs of 
state, and pressures were growing all along the outer per­
imeters of the Empire as Slav and Italian elements sought 
to win greater independence for their kinsmen living with­
in the borders of the Dual Monarchy, if not to effect a new 
political tie with them. Yet, few foresaw any marked change 
in Habsburg affairs in the immediate future. A State that 
had endured for more than six hundred years as a European 
Power would, It was confidently believed by most people, 
survive the minor problems of the new Twentieth Century.
Franz Joseph, old-fashioned and anxious to maintain 
Habsburg family power, tended to resist change and supported 
those moves of his officials which were designed to preserve
the status quo and continue German-Magyar supremacy through­
out the land. The Habsburgs had always maintained their 
position through adept use of the tactics of balance and 
maneuver, and the statesmen were only using old methods 
when they pitted one element against another, internal or 
external, in their attempt to assure the continued supre­
macy of the two favored races that controlled the Habsburg 
lands *
In the twilight of his reign, the aged Emperor grew 
increasingly determined in his policy of opposing the Slavs 
who made up the major portion of the population of his 
domains. These subject races, showing growing signs of 
nationalism everywhere, groaned under the autocratic rule 
he and his ministers imposed, but were unable to gain any­
thing but insignifleant concessions from the Ballplatz. 
Irredentism flared in many areas of the Dual Monarchy, but 
repression, tempered by slight concessions and the constant 
shifting of Imperial favor from one race to another, ap­
peared to block major uprisings.
One person, in a position of potential great power, 
did recognize the Slav problem and sought for a solution to 
it. This was Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir-apparent, 
who was assassinated at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. It has 
been reported that he 1 inclined to the Idea of remodelling 
the Dual Monarchy into a number of national states, linked
•1
together by a strong Central Parliament.'* This tendency 
toward Federalism, in which the Slav peoples of the Dual 
Monarchy would achieve the status of the Germans and Magyars 
earned him no support from those holders of vested interests 
and ran directly counter to the objectives of those Slav 
and Italian elements who wanted independence from the Habs- 
burgs. Franz Ferdinand8s death ended serious efforts to 
obtain a solution to the Slav problem within the boundaries 
of the Empire, and by a strange ironyy gave the Habsburg 
Monarchy its last chance to act as a Great Power. As 
A# J. P. Taylor has written;
The murder jolted the dynasty into actions even 
Francis Joseph favored war, though he despaired of the 
outcome and, for that matter, was relieved that the 
death of Francis Ferdinand had vindicated the principles 
of dynastic purity which had been Infringed by Francis 
Ferdinand’s marriage*2
With the elimination of their one supporter at Court, 
and the wrath of the Germans and Magyars turned against the 
Serbs, the Austrian Slavs were faced with a war they did 
not wish to support, as well as with the continuation of a 
system of government which offered them nothing but second- 
class status in public and private affairs. The declara­
tion of war determined many of their leaders to seek the
•*"R. W. Seton-Watson, Saralevo (London; Constable and 
Company, Limited, 1925)* pp. 83-84.
^A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy. 1809-1918 
(Londons Hamish Hamilton, 1948), p. 231«
complete liberation of their peoples from Habsburg misrule. 
The movement which resulted in the formation of the Czecho­
slovak Republic was one of several nationalistic aspira­
tions which arose from the conflict.
Under the capable and dedicated leadership of Mas-
v V /
aryk, Benes and Stefanik, laboring outside the area of the 
Monarchy, and Kramer, &tanek, Ra^in and others who remained 
within Austria-Hungarian territory during the war, the 
Czechoslovak cause was the most ably directed national 
movement of all those that developed against the Habsburgs. 
•Endowed with a foresight apparently not given to the leaders 
of the other nationalistic movements, Masaryk and the Czech©** 
Slovaks turned to the Western European nations and, later 
to the United States, for help in recognition of their 
national Independence. The Czechoslovak National Council 
established branches in all the Allied and Associated coun­
tries, providing a focus for the campaign of education, 
diplomacy and active participation of Czechoslovak forces 
on the side of the Allies, which Czechoslovak leaders 
deemed necessary for a successful bid for independence*
It is possible that the establishment of a Czecho­
slovak State could have been achieved without the services 
of a substantial armed force, but it Is doubtful. The 
Czechoslovak Legions, fighting in France, Italy, Russia and 
Siberia, gave Masaryk and the National Council a propaganda 
tool with which to direct the attention of the world t© &
hitherto virtually unknown nation,, held deep within the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire and sundered by the component parts 
of that coalition. The exploits of the Legionaries in the 
Great War far outweighed their actual numbers. In a 
struggle which saw some ten million soldiers of all com­
batant nations killed, the members of the Legions numbered 
only approximately two hundred thousand devoted soldiers# 
Yet, so imbued were they with nationalistic fervor, Czecho­
slovakian ambitions could hardly have been better served# 
Their achievements helped in the raising of funds for the 
necessary education and propaganda campaigns devised by 
their political leaders, they won fame by their valiant 
struggles against vastly superior numbers in Russia and 
Siberia, and most important of all, they created a sympa­
thetic public opinion which could not have been attained in 
any other way# It was upon these achievements that their 
political leaders based the Czechoslovak program calling for 
national recognition on the part of the powerful Allied Gov­
ernment s .
Funds from the West, fighting forces in the East, 
undaunted opposition to the Monarchy by the people at home, 
and shrewd diplomatic maneuvering throughout the world, all 
these factors combined to create a sovereign Czechoslovakia 
after three centuries of Habsburg domination# The Czechoslo* 
vak Legions, with their ancient heritage undergirding their 
will for independence, greatly strengthened the political
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position of the National Council. They, alone, could have 
played this Important role in Czechoslovak history.
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